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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
The last two decades have experienced an increasing awareness about global 
warming, its causes, and potential effects on the ecosystem, in general, and on 
humankind, in particular. Global warming is nowadays recognized as one of the most 
impressive global negative externalities and market failures generated by the current 
economic system (Stern et al. 2006). In an attempt to safeguard against the risk of 
massive damage caused by a change in climate, the international, European and 
national institutions have committed to clear environmental goals aimed at stabilizing 
the global temperature at a non-dangerous level. In 2005, with the entry into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol, the ratifying Parties have committed to reduce by 2012 their 
emissions to 5.2% below the level of 1990.  After having ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 
the European Commission (hereinafter EC) published the 2007 communication 
"Limiting Global Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The Way Ahead for 2020 and 
Beyond" in which it expressed its firm intention to enforce emissions reduction 
climate policies even beyond the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. At the end of 2008, the 
European Climate Package, which imposes a unilateral 20% emissions cut below the 
1990 emissions level to be met by 2020, was finally approved.1  
Such emission reduction targets are ambitious and costly as they require substantial 
investments to move to a low-carbon economy. In the light of the trade-off  between 
environmental protection and economic growth, mitigating climate change without 
preventing the economy from growing has become one of the most important issues 
on the global and European political agenda. Clear, credible and efficient economic 
instruments have to be designed in order to induce a reduction of greenhouse gas 
(hereinafter GHG) emissions and to achieve the emissions reduction targets in a cost-
effective way. According to the Law & Economics literature, a cap and trade 
system—where a limited number of freely tradable polluting property rights is 
generated and assigned to economic agents—gives optimal incentives to induce 
efficient emissions reduction (e.g. Coase 1960, Dales 1968). Indeed, according to the 
Coase theorem, as long as transaction costs tend toward zero, free bargaining ensures 
that tradable permits are allocated to those who value them most, while emissions are 
reduced where marginal abatement costs are lowest. As a consequence, in the long 
                                                 
1 In September 2009, at the time of writing this thesis, the world most influential economies are 
negotiating on a post-Kyoto cooperative international treaty aimed at imposing new emissions 
reduction targets at a global level 
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run polluters’ marginal abatement costs (MAC) are going to be equalized and the final 
permits’ price will equal the lowest MAC.   
In Europe, the political will to move toward a low-carbon economy has favored the 
institution of a Cap and Trade System—the European Emissions Trading Scheme-
(ETS)—aimed at facilitating the achievement of the Kyoto target in a cost effective 
way by promoting emissions reduction on behalf of the biggest European polluters in 
the energy and industrial sectors. The scheme for GHG emission allowances trading 
within the Community has been established by the Directive 2003/87 proposed by the 
European Commission and approved by all EU Member States (hereinafter MS) and 
by the European Parliament. Successively to the new more ambitious European 
emissions reduction target (-20% by 2020) which was set by the 2008 EU Climate 
Package, a new Directive 2009/29 has been designed which amends the first ETS 
Directive 2003/87, and will reform the ETS institutional framework and extend the 
ETS to a Post-Kyoto trading period (2013-2020).  
According to the European ETS Directive, the ETS was expected to promote 
emissions reduction in an efficient and cost-effective way (art.1), by reducing the 
GHG emissions where the marginal abatement costs are lowest. In fact, the European 
Commission estimated that “the scheme should allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto 
target at a cost of between € 2.9 and € 3.7 billion annually. This is less than 0.1% of 
the EU's GDP. Without the scheme, compliance costs could reach up to € 6.8 billion a 
year”(EC 2004: 6). In spite of these declarations, the partial results achieved during 
the first ETS trading period seem to suggest that the ETS is far from being an 
effective and market oriented mechanism.  
Therefore, this thesis intends to assess the effectiveness of the ETS in promoting a 
cost-effective emissions abatement to facilitate the achievement of the European 
emissions reduction targets. The main questions we want to answer with this thesis 
are “is the ETS a cost-effective mechanism to reduce emissions in order to comply 
with the EU Kyoto target?” and “in the case that  inefficiencies are identified, can the 
ETS performance be improved by correcting the relevant legislation?” 
So far, we have clarified the general questions we want to answer through this 
research. The next section will  present the structure of this research, the topics to be 
discussed and the  methodology which has been adopted to analyze the ETS and 
assess its effectiveness. 
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Section 3 will describe the scope and boundaries of this research, contextualizing the 
European climate policy within the more extended scientific, political, economic and 
legal debate concerning climate change and the international efforts—the Kyoto 
Protocol, in particular— aimed at inducing global and collective action to reduce the 
world greenhouse emissions to a safe level. Section 4 describes the synopsis of this 
thesis.  
 
2.  Methodology and Content of the Research  
After having clarified the main purpose of this thesis, this section describes the general 
methodology adopted to assess the effectiveness of the ETS. Following the Law & 
Economics approach, the effectiveness of the ETS will be assessed through an 
economic analysis of its legal framework and institutional design. First, a positive 
analysis is conducted to assess whether the ETS has been affected by some 
inefficiencies or fallacies. Then, when some inefficiencies are identified, it becomes 
necessary to investigate to what extent they can be considered a consequence of the 
underlying European institutional design and legal framework. Afterwards, in the case 
the ETS institutional design has been found ineffective or distortive, we will proceed 
to assess whether and how the ETS inefficiencies can be reduced by improving the 
European legislation. This second part constitutes the core of the normative analysis of 
the thesis. 
The positive-normative approach of this thesis will be applied at two parallel levels. 
First, a macro-level analysis of the ETS will be developed, focusing on the ETS cap 
level. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the stringency of the ETS cap. In fact, 
the level of the ETS cap determines the amount of emissions the ETS sectors have to 
reduce and how the emissions reduction burden deriving from the Kyoto Protocol is 
going to be divided among ETS and non-ETS sectors. Therefore, assessing the 
stringency of the ETS cap and determining whether the emissions reduction burden 
deriving from the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has been divided between ETS 
and non-ETS sectors in a cost-effective way will help us to understand if and how 
much MS rely on this economic flexible mechanism to comply with the Kyoto target. 
Second, a micro-analysis of the ETS will focus on the allocation rule adopted to 
assign the initial number of allowances among the ETS sectors. The choice between 
grandfathering and auctioning impacts the ETS sectors’ costs as well as  
competitiveness on the secondary markets, and these allocation rules will be 
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compared according to both an efficiency and an equity approach. The main purpose 
of this analysis is to assess whether grandfathering can be considered – in theory and 
in practice – an efficient and fair allocation rule. This will be done by clarifying the 
conditions under which this allocation rule is consistent with the polluter-pays 
principle. 
This research will be developed following a chronological order to better specify the 
evolution of the European legislation regulating the ETS and its consequential impact 
on the tradable permits market. First, the stringency of the ETS cap and the ETS 
allocation rule, as they have been designed by the first ETS Directive 2003/87, will be 
analyzed in order to assess whether the ETS performance and the emergence of some 
market inefficiencies during the first trading period 2005-2007 can be considered a 
consequence of the ETS regulation. Afterwards, some normative considerations 
aimed at modifying the ETS cap stringency or the adopted allocation rule will be 
advanced in order to reduce and correct the ETS inefficiencies by improving the 
European legislation. In the light of these normative conclusions, the content of the 
new ETS Directive 2009/29 will be finally discussed to assess whether, and to what 
extent, the way the ETS has been reformed actuality improve its effectiveness during 
the third ETS trading period 2013-2020.  
After having specified the general structure and methodology of the research, the next 
section will describe the scope and boundaries of the thesis. 
 
3.  Context, Scope and Boundaries of the Research 
This section intends to specify the scope and boundaries of this research, which  was 
developed through the 1st of September 2009.2 As previously mentioned, this thesis 
focuses on the EU ETS and on the European legislation which has established it.  
The main attempt of this research is to assess the effectiveness of the cap and trade 
scheme launched in Europe to promote the abatement of emissions with the purpose of  
complying with the Kyoto emissions reduction target. The decision to focus only on 
the European ETS economic instrument implies that this thesis does not intend to 
bring any new insight to the debate about climate change, its potential evolution and 
effects—that would be mainly a scientific task. The aim of this research is neither to 
                                                 
2 Therefore, any legal, political or economic event which has taken place after this deadline – such as 
the post-Kyoto negotiation to be held in Copenhagen in December 2009 - could not be taken properly 
into account in this thesis 
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establish if the Kyoto target is efficient nor whether it can ensure an optimal 
environmental protection. For, this would be a purely economic task requiring the 
estimation and balancing of economic costs and benefits linked with climate change 
and its mitigation. The thesis will not question the efficiency of the Kyoto target itself 
and its allocation among the EU MS. That is, analyzing the Kyoto Protocol and the 
benefits and costs related to this international treaty goes beyond the scope of this 
research. In fact, it is important to stress from the very beginning that I consider the 
Kyoto emissions reduction target as a given, and by questioning the effectiveness of 
the EU ETS to reach a political target, I make no attempt to infer any conclusion 
concerning the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol in general.  
Rather, under a Law and Economics perspective, the main purpose of this research is 
to analyse if and to what extent the legal and economic instruments defined to reach 
the Kyoto target (which is taken as a given and is not questioned) can be considered 
effective. In the case that inefficiencies are identified, this research will develop some 
normative considerations aimed at correcting and improving them. Indeed, this thesis 
has been developed on the preposition that an economic instrument, such as the 
emissions cap and trade scheme, can be more or less effective in reaching a goal even 
if the goal has not been properly chosen.   
Despite the fact that we have limited the project to the consideration of the ETS and 
the European legislation, it is important to mention that both the European climate 
policy and the ETS have been developed within a more general scientific, economic 
and political context and debate about the following:  
1. the scientific analysis of the causes of global warming, its evolution and 
potential consequences,  
2. the economic analysis of the costs and benefits of climate change and its 
mitigation,  
3. the political process aimed at mitigating climate change by promoting 
cooperation at an international level and by inducing an effective reduction of 
GHG emissions at a local level. 
 
As previously mentioned, these scientific, economic and political topics will not be 
deeply analyzed, questioned and discussed. Nevertheless, it is important to be aware 
that the ETS and the European climate policy have been developed within this general 
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framework, which will be shortly reviewed in the initial introductory chapters of this 
thesis. 
 
4. Synopsis of the Research 
After this first introductory chapter, chapter 2 contextualizes the European ETS 
economic mechanism within the broader scientific and economic debate about both 
climate change and its mitigation costs and policies. We initially clarify what is meant 
by the term “global warming”, its causes and its main anthropogenic sources, as well 
as the possible natural consequences linked to different climate scenarios. Next, this 
chapter focuses both on the economics of climate change and on the economic debate 
concerning the costs and benefits of global warming as opposed to the costs and 
benefits of its mitigation. Then we shortly review the different economic models 
adopted to assess the optimal level of emissions reduction, highlighting the different 
assumptions, methodologies and contrasting results without pretending to assess 
which are the most reliable. Afterwards, we introduce the economic concept of 
negative externality and briefly summarize the problems that have to be addressed 
when dealing with the provision of global public goods. Finally, the chapter  
describes the political and juridical pathway that has brought about the entry into 
force of the Kyoto Protocol, the first international treaty aimed at stabilizing the 
emissions of GHG at a safety level; it will do so by focusing on the Protocol’s 
content, namely the emissions reduction targets and the flexible mechanisms 
established to reach them. Moreover, given that the Kyoto Protocol de facto does not 
impose any emissions reduction commitment on the US and on the developing 
countries (Carraro et al. 2009), introducing the Kyoto Protocol is crucial to underline 
from the very beginning the unilateral nature of the European climate policy, which is 
aimed at achieving a stringent emissions reduction target in an asymmetric geo-
political scenario.  
Chapter 3 presents a taxonomy of the legal rules and economic instruments which 
can potentially address the problem of environmental externality, and in particular the 
problem of climate change. Under a Law & Economics perspective, it is possible to 
separate legal and economic instruments that intervene ex-post—such as the liability 
regime—from other regulatory instruments that intervene ex-ante. Moreover the 
different legal instruments can be classified according to their degree of flexibility: 
ranging from the more interventionist and direct Command and Control type of 
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regulation to the market-oriented economic instruments, such as pollution taxes and 
the cap and trade system.      
Focusing on the mechanism of Cap and Trade as implemented by the European 
legislation in the form of the Emissions Trading Scheme, this research is not aimed at 
developing an exhaustive comparative analysis of the different competing legal 
solutions. Nevertheless, this chapter intends to review the properties and the related 
advantages and disadvantages of the most important legal and economic instruments 
adopted so far in the field of environmental law. It will do so in order to explain why, 
among them, the cap and trade system has been chosen first in the Kyoto Protocol and 
then within the European legislation as the principle legal and economic instrument to 
address the problem of climate change. The emergence of the cap and trade scheme is 
also explained from the perspective of political economics which takes into 
consideration how the private interests of the regulated parties tend to influence the 
type of adopted regulation.   
Chapter 4 focuses on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in the European 
legislation and in particular on the Directive 87/2003/EC which establishes the 
Emissions Trading Scheme. This chapter intends both to introduce the economic and 
legal background of the ETS and to describe the functioning and the most important  
features of the ETS that will constitute the core of this thesis. Starting with a brief 
reminder of the importance of the previous experience of the American SO2 emissions 
trading program, this chapter describes both the origin of the EU ETS within the legal 
framework of the Kyoto Protocol and the role it covers within the European climate 
policy. The legal nature of the allowances within the field of property law is also 
briefly discussed. 
The ETS is contextualized in a temporal and spatial framework. The length of the 
ETS regulation and its subdivision into different trading periods is specified together 
with its scope: the amount of emissions and number of emissions sources that fall 
within the ETS. This specification is important to underline that the ETS regulates 
only a subset of the GHGs and emissions sources covered by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Moreover, this chapter describes the responsibilities that the MS have in  
implementing the ETS at a national level. The functioning of the National Allocation 
Plans is explained in order to highlight how many responsibilities have been 
decentralized and delegated at a national level according to the principle of 
subsidiarity.  
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Finally, this chapter intends to illustrate how the ETS can impact the secondary 
market—in this case the electricity generation market— by inducing a reduction of 
emissions through a switch to less carbon-intensive fuels. As such, the indicator of 
CO2 theoretical coal-to-gas switch price is also introduced.  
Chapter 5, which along with chapter 6 and 7 constitutes the core of this thesis, 
develops an analysis of the ETS at a macro-level, focusing on the level of the ETS 
cap.3 The purpose of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of the ETS in 
promoting emissions reduction required to comply with the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment. In particular, this chapter analyses the extent to which MS are 
effectively relying on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments. In order to 
do so, it determines whether the emissions reduction burden deriving from the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has been divided between ETS and non-ETS sectors 
in a cost-effective way. Therefore, this chapter focuses mainly on the ETS cap and on 
its stringency, where the ETS cap indicates the proportion of emissions that the ETS 
sectors are legally required to abate and, consequently, the amount of emissions the 
non-trading sectors have to reduce to comply with Kyoto commitments.  
A theoretical benchmark is determined to assess the ETS cap stringency and to 
evaluate if emissions permits have been over-allocated during the first and second 
ETS trading periods. 
Over-allocation is defined here as occurring when the ETS cap exceeds a theoretical 
ETS cap that would impose an emissions reduction burden on the ETS sectors 
proportional to the share of European emissions they produce. The analysis clarifies 
how the emissions reduction effort has been divided between ETS and non-ETS 
sectors, highlighting to what extent MS effectively rely on the ETS to comply with 
their Kyoto commitment. Finally, the inefficiencies concerning permits over-
allocation are analysed, namely cross-subsidization from non-ETS to ETS sectors, 
national subsidy to the ETS sectors, lack of harmonization within the ETS and 
consequential distortion of competition in the secondary markets. 
After having discussed the ETS effectiveness by assessing the ETS cap stringency at a 
macro-level, chapter 6 focuses on the allocation rule adopted during the first and the 
second ETS trading periods, which is  grandfathering: the initial allocation of 
                                                 
3 Part of this chapter has been published as a research article in the international review Climate Policy. 
For major details see: S. Clò (2009), “An analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Effectiveness”, 
Climate Policy, 9, 227–241 
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allowances free of charge proportionally to historical emissions. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to assess whether grandfathering can be considered – in theory and in 
practice – an efficient and fair allocation rule. This will be done by clarifying the 
conditions under which this allocation rule is consistent with the polluter-pays 
principle. The basic question is the following: do polluters pay under grandfathering – 
or not?4  
Taking into account the complexities inherent in the interpretation of principles, the 
chapter presents the polluter-pays principle as it distinguishes between an efficiency 
and an equity interpretation. In light of these different interpretations, this chapter 
develops a comparative analysis between grandfathering and auctioning in order to 
assess to what extent the different allocation criteria can be considered efficient and 
fair. Finally, this chapter analyses whether the theoretical findings concerning the 
efficiency and fairness of grandfathering are still valid within the ETS. By 
highlighting the inefficiencies that have emerged at the time of applying this 
allocation rule in the ETS, the chapter concludes by determining some conditions that 
have to be satisfied in order to ensure the consistency of grandfathering with the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter- pays principle. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the reform of the ETS. In light of the new ETS Directive 
2009/29/EC, which has amended the first ETS Directive, this chapter is aimed at 
assessing if and how the ETS functioning will be effectively improved during its third 
post-Kyoto trading period (2013-2020). 
The chapter focuses on the major provisions of the new ETS Directive and on the 
variables previously analysed in chapters 5 and 6, namely the ETS cap setting 
procedure and the allocation rule.  After recalling the inefficiencies that emerged in 
the past trading periods, this chapter analyses how these variables have been reformed 
in order to assess if and to what extent the new ETS Directive will improve the ETS 
functioning by increasing its effectiveness, avoiding undesirable distributive effects 
and granting higher harmonization within the market aimed at minimizing distortion 
of competition.  
The chapter focuses on the phenomenon of Carbon Leakage that could emerge by 
strengthening the ETS cap and by passing from grandfathering to auctioning. The 
                                                 
4 Part of this chapter has been originally published as a research article written jointly with Edwin 
Woerdman and Alessandra Arcuri in the Review of Law and Economics. For major details see: E. 
Woerdman, A. Arcuri and S. Clò (2008), “Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays Principle:  Do 
Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?”,  Review of Law and Economics, 4(2) 
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methodology to assess the ETS sectors’ exposure to Carbon Leakage is described  and 
the results of the EC quantitative assessment are presented and discussed. Particular 
attention is devoted to the discussion of both the criteria and the level of data 
aggregation adopted to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage in order to determine if and 
when the defined procedures can be considered as having a solid economic 
background and when they can be regarded as mainly political or extra-economic.  
Finally chapter 8 summarizes the main conclusions that have been reached as a result 
of this research. 
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Chapter 2. Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol: an Overview 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to facilitate cost-effective compliance with the European emissions reduction 
target established in the Kyoto Protocol, a system of tradable emissions allowances 
has been established in Europe. This thesis intends to assess the effectiveness of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme in facilitating the European compliance with its emissions 
reduction target, which is taken as a given. This means that we do not intend to draw 
any conclusions about the efficiency of the emissions reduction targets established in 
the Kyoto Protocol, nor about the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol itself. We do not 
exclude the possibility that an effective instrument can be established to comply with 
an inefficient target. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, it can be useful to contextualize the 
European ETS economic mechanism within the broader scientific, economic and 
political debate about both climate change and the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, in order to 
discuss the ETS, it is first necessary to introduce the flexible mechanisms established 
by the Kyoto Protocol to facilitate the achievement of the national emissions 
reduction targets. Moreover, given that the Kyoto Protocol de facto does not impose 
any emissions reduction commitment on the US and on developing countries (Carraro 
et al. 2009), it is crucial to underline from the very beginning the unilateral nature of 
the European climate policy, which is aimed at achieving a stringent emissions 
reduction target in an asymmetric geo-political scenario. In fact, this thesis does not 
pretend to explain why the European Union has committed to such an ambitious and 
asymmetric target; nor does it intend to assess the efficiency of the European 
emissions reduction target itself. Nevertheless, as chapter 7 on Carbon Leakage will 
discuss, the effectiveness of the ETS itself risks being jeopardized by the unilateral 
and asymmetric nature of the European climate policy. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we clarify what is meant by the term 
“global warming” (section 2), what are its causes and its main anthropogenic sources 
(section 3) and the possible natural consequences linked to different climate scenarios 
(section 4). After addressing these issues, this chapter focuses both on the economics 
of climate change and on the economic debate concerning the costs and benefits of 
global warming as opposed to the costs and benefits of its mitigation. Different 
economic models to assess the optimal level of emissions reduction and to determine 
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more appropriate mitigation policies have been proposed. Section 5 briefly reviews 
this literature, highlighting the different assumptions, methodologies and contrasting 
results without pretending to assess which are the most reliable. 
Afterwards, section 6 introduces the economic concept of negative externality and 
briefly summarizes the problems that have to be addressed when dealing with the 
provision of global public goods. Section 7 recalls the political and juridical pathway 
that has led to the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the first international treaty 
aimed at stabilizing the emissions of GHG at a non-dangerous level. The most 
important environmental principles that during the last decades have been recognized 
within the international environmental legislation are briefly described and both the 
content and the major innovations of the United Nation Framework Convention on 
Climate Change are reviewed. Section 8 introduces the content of the Kyoto Protocol 
(the emissions reduction targets and the flexible mechanisms established to reach 
them). Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. What is Global Warming? 
Solar radiations constitute the principal source of temperature on Earth. Of course, 
solar radiations reach different planets and satellites within the solar system; however, 
the Earth is the only planet warmed by the sun where life has flourished. What makes 
the difference is the atmosphere, which is composed of a mix of different gases: 
78.08% nitrogen, 20.95% oxygen, and a lower amount of the so-called “trace-gases” 
such as water vapour, methane, and carbon dioxide (CO2) which are extremely 
important. In fact, like glass in a greenhouse, thanks to these “trace-gases”, the 
atmosphere is able to be penetrated by the radiations in the visible part of the 
spectrum, and at the same time it can absorb and retain low frequency radiations, such 
as infra-red. This means that solar rays can first pass the atmosphere and reach the 
Earth; secondly, the rebounded rays are partly captured by the atmosphere, which 
“captures” them as it allows a rise in the Earth’s temperature. 
The presence of GHGs is therefore crucial for life to take place on Earth: without 
GHGs the Earth’s temperature would be around zero and life would not be possible. 
However, as the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere increases, the amount of 
solar rays captured by the atmosphere increases and the global temperature increases 
as well, thereby incurring the risk of compromising the equilibrium of the ecosystem. 
13 
 
This is what we generally mean by the term “global warming” which refers to the 
phenomenon resulting from the rise in the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere. 
Based on the analysis of historical data, scientific research nowadays has reached two 
important conclusions. First, it has been established that the concentration of GHGs in 
the atmosphere is increasing, causing an indirect increase in the Earth’s average 
temperature— a phenomenon that is known as the so-called global warming effect. 
Second, the increased concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere has been caused by 
human economic activity and by the combustion of fossil fuels. 
At the time this thesis was developed, the last published report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC fourth assessment report 2007)—
the leading scientific body for the assessment of climate change, established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) and composed by thousands of scientists— asserted that: 
 
The global atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has 
increased from a pre-industrial value of about 280 parts per 
million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005. The atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide in 2005 exceeds by far the 
natural range over the last 650,000 years (180 to 300 ppm) as 
determined from ice cores. The annual carbon dioxide 
concentration growth rate was larger during the last 10 years 
(1995–2005 average: 1.9 ppm per year), than it has been since 
the beginning of continuous direct atmospheric measurements 
(1960–2005 average: 1.4ppm per year) (p.2) 
 
3. The Sources of Emissions 
Nowadays, it has been widely accepted that the increase in the concentration of GHGs 
in the atmosphere has been principally caused by anthropogenic economic activities, 
including industrial production, energy generation, transportation and the change of 
land use, such as deforestation. In fact, most of these activities require the combustion 
of fossil fuels, which causes the emission of greenhouse gases. It is possible to 
determine a direct correlation between economic growth and the increase in GHGs. 
According to Kaya (1990), the amount of carbon dioxide emissions released into the 
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atmosphere depends directly on the GDP, which can be further decomposed into 
different variables:  
1. the rate of population growth,  
2. the GDP per capita,  
3. the energy intensity of the technologies adopted to produce (amount of energy 
required to produce one unit of output), which depends on the efficiency and 
performance of the technological processes, and  
4. the carbon intensity of the energy use, which mainly depends on the fuels that 
are burned.  
 
CO2 emissions = Population x (GDP percapita) x (energy use/GDP) x (CO2
emissions/energy use) 
 
The World Resource Institute (WRI) has classified the most important world 
economies according to these variables.  
 
  Table 1 – Key Variables reflecting Energy related Co2 emissions 
 Cumulative 
CO2
emissions5
(MtCe) 
Yearly 
CO2
emissions 
(MtCe) 
CO2 per 
capita 
(MtCe) 
Income per 
capita 
$Intl 2005 
Per Person 
Carbon 
Intensity of 
Energy Use 
(TCe/TOilEq.) 
GHG 
Intensity of 
the Economy 
 (tCe/Mill. 
Intl $) 
USA 91,088.4 1,575 5.3 42.672 0.68 123.7 
Japan 12,154.8 340.5 2.7 31.041 0.65 85.9 
EU 
27 
83,447.1 1.124.2 2.3 27.642 0.62 83.6 
China 27,075.4 1.693.9 1.3 4.521 0.90 285.6 
India 7,487.3 363.3 0.3 2.416 0.64 135.5 
Source: WRI 2009 
From the data reported in the table above, it is possible to observe a direct correlation 
between income and emissions per-capita: countries with a higher level of income 
per-capita tend to experience a higher level of emissions per-capita. Moreover, it is 
possible to observe that, on average, the more a country is industrialized, the higher 
the amount of cumulative and per-capita emissions is. Thus, emissions are mainly 
driven by economic growth, which is associated with an increase in energy 
consumption. This correlation has been strongly supported by previous economic 
                                                 
5 Cumulative emissions have been calculated from 1850 to 2006 
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research. Using a panel data composed of 163 countries, Neumayer (2004) shows that 
the correlation between per-capita CO2 emissions and per-capita GDP is nearly 0.9. 
Similarly, Huntington (2005) shows that in the United States a 1% increase in the 
GDP per capita has led to a 0.9% increase in emissions per capita, ceteris paribus. 
However, the marginal variation of emissions per unit of production tends to decrease 
for decreasing levels of carbon and energy intensities. In other words, the more a 
technology is efficient (low energy intensity) the lower the level of emissions released 
for any unit of production tends to be. This relation demonstrates that while 
industrialized countries emit more than developing countries because they experience 
higher production and GDP rates, they nevertheless tend to experience lower levels of 
emissions per unit of production than developing countries because they use more 
efficient and less polluting technologies, and on average they produce at a lower 
energy intensity rate than developing countries.  
The Kaya equation and the data reported in the previous table can be useful for two 
reasons. First, they give some basic indications regarding which variables have to be 
taken into account when modelling future emissions scenarios. Second, they offer 
some indication as to where and how emissions can be reduced. In fact, knowing the 
sources of emissions, the variables which influence emissions and where CO2 
emissions are produced is a pre-requisite to understanding where and how such 
emissions can be abated.  
We can assert that population growth is likely to provoke an increase in GHG 
emissions, as well as an increase in the GDP, unless it results in the introduction of 
more efficient and less energy intensive technologies that can work with less carbon 
intensive fuels.  
The Kaya equation suggests different strategies to reduce CO2 emissions: one might 
either diminish the overall level of population and GDP growth—an option that is 
neither politically nor economically acceptable—or, alternatively, one might improve 
the energy efficiency of the technologies and reduce the carbonic intensity rate of the 
economy. It is important to observe that in the past decades, despite the fact that the 
industrialized countries have experienced an improvement in energy efficiency and a 
reduction of carbon intensity, emissions have continued to rise since the GDP and 
population have increased at a faster rate. We can conclude that the real challenge 
facing market based instruments such as the ETS is to create the right incentives to 
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innovate and adopt more efficient and less carbon intensive technologies, without 
compromising economic growth.  
   
4. Emissions Projections and Climate Scenarios  
During the past decades the anthropogenic economic activity has caused a higher 
concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere and, consequently, a rise in the global 
temperature. Such a causal relation has been supported by the analysis of historical 
data. Conversely, many uncertainties affect the ability to build future climate 
scenarios that are widely accepted in the scientific community. Many scientific and 
economic uncertainties limit the ability to assess the future trend of emissions, 
preventing us from predicting both how the variation of the concentration of the 
GHGs in the atmosphere will impact the global temperature exactly and how the 
change in climate will affect the ecosystem. 
Such a complexity is mainly caused by the so-called natural feedback loops: natural 
phenomena that are interdependent with climate change because they are influenced 
by the variation of global temperature, and  that at the same time influence the climate 
conditions. Feedback loops may be positive, thus having an exponential reinforcing 
effect on warming, or they may be negative, in which case they have a countering and 
balancing effect on the change in climate conditions. An example of negative 
feedback is the “iris effect”: just as the iris of our eyes closes up when the light 
increases, an increase in temperature may produce more water vapour resulting in a 
higher number of clouds that limit the sun rays (e.g. Lindzen et al. 2001). In this case 
the ecosystem, like Adam Smith’s invisible hand, would be sufficient to bring the 
global temperature to a sustainable equilibrium. A case of positive feedback is the 
Albedo Effect (Palle et al. 2004): white areas tend to reflect sunlight while black areas 
tend to absorb it. So, as the ice increasingly melts, the Earth’s tendency to reflect the 
sun rays decreases and the world ends up absorbing more light and consequently 
warming up even more. 
Although scientific and economic uncertainties impede us from reaching widely 
accepted conclusions about the future trend of climate and its impact on the 
ecosystem, many climate scenarios have been developed and their conclusions look 
quite straightforward. The IPCC has extrapolated some Business as Usual (BaU) 
emissions scenarios by projecting the past economic and emissions trends into the 
future under the assumption that no policy will be developed to mitigate climate 
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change. These scenarios describe some possible environmental and economic impacts 
that, in spite of not being certain, represent a risk that governments have to take 
properly into account. 
The IPCC’s first report (2000) concluded that, unless the world economy was de-
carbonized, by the end of the century the concentration of GHGs would reach 800 
ppm, thereby causing an average increase in the world temperature between 1.4°C 
and 5.8°C (the range of different possible temperatures is due to the uncertainty of the 
world feedback). In 2007, a new IPCC report concludes that, at the current rate of 
growth, the global temperature will probably rise between 1.1°C and 6.4° C by the 
end of the century. In spite of the scientific uncertainty, the effects on the temperature 
increase the risk of triggering natural catastrophes: a rise in the sea level, a decrease in 
agricultural production, increases in extreme weather events such as hurricanes, and 
so forth. Also the World Energy Outlook (WEO), elaborated by the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) in 2008, reaches some worrying conclusions. The IEA future 
BaU emissions scenarios are simply not sustainable from both an environmental and a 
socio-economical perspective. On top of climate change, the lack of energy-security 
supply constitutes another problem underlined by the IEA. 
  
Figure 1 -  World Oil Production by OPEC/non-OPEC in the Reference Scenario 
 
Source: IEA 2008 
  
The figure above shows that in the WEO reference scenario oil remains the most 
important energy source experiencing an increase in daily production (104 million 
barrels in 2030) which comes mainly from the OPEC countries. These figures imply 
that a capacity of 64 million barrels should be installed in order to satisfy the increase 
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of the world demand, an amount which is six times higher that the actual oil capacity 
in South Arabia. In this scenario, also the CO2 eq. emissions from energy sources 
would increase exponentially from the actual 27 billion tonnes to 40 billion tonnes in 
2030. Such an increase of emissions is expected to come from non-OECD countries, 
mainly China, India and the Middle-East, because of the more rapid population and 
GDP growth there than in  developed countries (see figure 2 below). 
  
Figure 2 - Energy-related CO2 Emissions in the Reference Scenario 
 
 Source: IEA 2008 
 
Although these scenarios remain uncertain, the risks they may involve are sufficiently 
high to call for intervention aimed at stabilizing emissions at a safe level. The obvious 
conclusion is that this BaU emissions scenario can be mitigated only through 
collective and global action against climate change which involves both developed 
and developing countries. First a problem of evaluation has to be solved: using a cost-
benefit analysis economists have to determine what the optimal amount of money to 
spend is in order to reduce emissions to a non-dangerous level. Secondly, a problem 
regarding incentives needs to be addressed: how to promote collective action against 
climate change. The following paragraph shortly discusses both these evaluation and 
incentive problems. 
 
5. The Economics of Climate Change 
While scientific research on global warming has increasingly focused on the causes of 
climate change—on its possible future trend and on its consequences for the 
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ecosystem—economic analysis has been increasingly applied to climate change in 
order to quantify in monetary terms the costs and benefits linked to climate change 
and its mitigation. This economic analysis attempts to assess the size of the climate 
externality and the optimal level of emissions that should be reached—a level where 
the social marginal costs of climate change equal the related social marginal benefits. 
The existing literature has developed different methodologies to assess the costs of 
climate change in the case of non-intervention and the costs and benefits (or costs 
avoided) related to climate change mitigation policies. Depending on how the costs 
and benefits of climate change are quantified, the optimal equilibrium could change, 
calling for one particular climate policy instead of another.   
Bringing new insights to the economic debate concerning the assessment of the 
marginal costs and benefits of emissions and the optimal social level of CO2 emissions 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for the purpose of this research, it can 
be useful to review the relevant contributions in this field, highlighting the main 
findings and controversies.  
The results of different economic models are not uniform and usually differ depending 
on many underlying assumptions, factors and variables that have been taken into 
account. Among them, we can mention the following: (a) how marginal abatement 
costs are estimated, (b) which emissions scenarios are taken into account, (c) or the 
rate at which environmental friendly and efficient technologies are developed and 
introduced within the economy. Other important factors influencing the assessment of 
the costs of climate change mitigation include the time of intervention and the social 
rate at which future costs and benefits are discounted. Economists heatedly debate 
whether it is more efficient to call for fast intervention to safeguard against climate 
change or to call for a gradual reduction of emissions. Some economists argue that, as 
emissions stay for a long time in the atmosphere, it is irrelevant to reduce emissions 
today, or even in twenty years. Instead, these economists call for a gradual reduction 
of emissions, which should take place only after more environmental friendly and 
efficient technologies have been developed in order to reduce the marginal cost of 
abatement. According to this analysis, the faster emissions are reduced, the costlier 
abatement is. Among others, Nordhaus (2006) argues that “the efficient or ‘optimal’ 
economic policies to slow climate change involve modest rates of emissions 
reductions in the near term, followed by sharp reductions in the medium and long 
term” (p.6). 
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Other economists argue that the more we wait to reduce emissions, the higher the costs 
of intervention will be. According to the Stern Review:  
 
“Stabilising at or below 550 ppm CO2e (around 440 - 500 ppm 
CO2 only) would require global emissions to peak in the next 10 - 
20 years, and then fall at a rate of at least 1 - 3% per year (…) 
Delaying the peak in global emissions from 2020 to 2030 would 
almost double the rate of reduction needed to stabilise at 550 ppm 
CO2e. A further ten-year delay could make stabilisation at 550 
ppm CO2e impractical, unless early actions were taken to 
dramatically slow the growth in emissions prior to the peak” (p. 
218).
This conclusion is driven by the consideration that the more we wait to reduce 
emissions, the faster we will have to intervene to bring the increasing level of 
emissions to a safe level, as shown by the figure below. 
Figure 3 – Pathways to Bring Emissions to a Safe Level 
 
 Source: Meinshausen et al. 2006 
Starting from the findings of the IPCC model, the Stern Review argues that if the 
concentration of emissions were to exceed 550 ppm (parts per million), the global 
temperature would rise more than 2°C, causing catastrophic and damaging effects. 
Instead, 450 ppm is considered a safe level of emissions concentration. While the 450 
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ppm goal is very ambitious, as it requires fast and costly intervention to reduce 
emissions by 7%, the 550 ppm target would involve substantial climate risk. 
Notwithstanding, it would be easily achievable with the existing technologies by 
investing 1% of the global GDP. In June 2008, Stern corrected his analysis asserting 
that “to get below 500ppm would cost around 2% of the GDP” because of a faster 
than expected climate change (Jowit and Wintour 2008). 
The WEO 2008 has also described two alternative emissions reduction scenarios. 
According to the IEA, the first 550 ppm policy scenario could be achieved by 
investing 0.25% of the World GDP and by establishing a CO2 price of 90$. Under 
this scenario the global temperature would increase by 3°C. The second 450 ppm 
policy scenario would require more substantial investments equal to 0.6% of the 
global GDP and a CO2 price of 180$. Under this scenario the global temperature 
would increase by 2°C, stabilizing at a safe level. 
  
Figure 4 - Reductions in energy-related CO2 emissions in the climate scenarios 
 
Source: IEA 2008 
  
The Stern Review and the WEO 2008 argue that the stabilization of emissions gases 
in a range between 450 and 550 ppm would imply a 2- 3°C  increase in the global 
temperature: a target that could be reached by investing between 0.4 and 2% of the 
global GDP. These costs would increase if the climate policies were postponed in 
time, since a faster emissions reduction would then be required. On the contrary, 
according to the BaU emissions scenario, where no measures undertaken to abate 
emissions, the global temperature would increase by 5-6°C by the end of this century, 
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causing an economic loss that the Stern Review estimates between 5 and 20% of the 
global GDP.    
According to the Stern Review, fast intervention to mitigate climate change is not 
only environmentally friendly but also economically sound. 
Many economists have supported this view. “The world would be foolish to neglect 
this strong but strictly time-bound message” commented A. Sen, while R. Solow has 
argued that “[s]ooner is much better”. J. Stiglitz – another Nobel Prize in Economics – 
commented in this way: “it makes it clear that the question is not whether we can 
afford to act, but whether we can afford not to act”.
Other economists have criticized the assumptions adopted in the Stern Review which 
have led to these conclusions. According to Nordhaus (2006), “The Review’s 
unambiguous conclusions about the need for extreme immediate action will not 
survive the substitution of assumptions that are consistent with today’s marketplace 
real interest rates and savings rates.” Similarly, Dasgupta (2006) has argued that “the 
strong, immediate action on climate change advocated by the authors is an implication 
of their views on intergenerational equity; it isn’t driven so much by the new climatic 
facts the authors have stressed”.
The emergence of this economic dispute is related to the fact that climate change has 
different effects in the time-spatial framework creating the difficulty of doing cost-
benefit analysis across borders and generations. First, the increase of the temperature 
would have different effects in different parts of the world: while countries close to the 
Equator risk facing massive damage, northern countries, such as Russia or Greenland, 
would benefit from an extra couple of degrees, since many uninhabitable areas would 
become more comfortable, and many natural resources—such as oil reserves—would 
become more easily accessible. According to Mendelsohn et al. (2006), the GDP in the 
former Soviet Union countries would increase by almost 11% after a global 
temperature increase of 2.5%. The non-homogeneous effects of global warming 
around the world make global cooperation aimed at mitigating climate change more 
difficult.  
Another related problem regards the different statistical value of life across countries. 
Rich countries are willing to invest more money in health protection and safety than 
developing countries, leading some economists to conclude that life in developed 
countries is valued more than life in developing countries. Moreover, the classic 
economic assumption of diminishing marginal utility implies that the same monetary 
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damage has a higher impact on poorer than richer people. Of course, both the social 
optimum and the welfare assessment of the market equilibrium differ depending on the 
value that is attached to life and the environment. According to many economists, 
equity weighting of costs and benefits is required to reflect the law of diminishing 
marginal utility and to measure the social cost of carbon (Pearce, Cline et al. 1996). As 
it will be explained in the following sections, the social cost of carbon corresponds to 
the environmental damage caused by the emission of greenhouse gases; this damage is 
likely to be borne by a third party – namely, society as a whole –and without any right 
to compensation. According to Anthoff et al. (2009) the higher the equity weighting, 
the higher the social cost of carbon. In fact, “[e]quity-weighted estimates of the 
marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions are substantially higher than 
estimates without equity-weights; equity-weights may also change the sign of the 
social cost estimates” (Anthoff et al. 2009, p.1). 
Another heavily debated issue is the choice of the social discount rate which has to be 
applied in order to assess the net present value of the costs and benefits. These costs 
and benefits—in the alternative cases of intervention and non-intervention against 
global warming—will have to be borne by future generations because of climate 
change. Discounting is a measure of time preferences, and the choice of the discount 
rate reflects the value that today is attached to the future. People attaching higher value 
to present than to future consumption are represented by a high discount rate, which in 
turn reflects a high degree of impatience. Since climate change has long term effects, 
the adoption of normal discount rates (between 3% and 6%) would lower the net 
present value of high and costly damage caused by global warming in the long run. 
Therefore, some economists have used a lower discount rate in order to equally 
evaluate future and present events. In fact, as the discount rate decreases, the social 
cost of future damage and the social cost of carbon emissions increase as well as, thus 
calling for stronger and faster climate mitigation policies. For instance, the Stern 
Review adopts a 0.01% discount rate, concluding that the CO2 social cost is 310 $/ton. 
On the contrary, by using a 3% discount rate in the “Dynamic Integrated Model of 
Climate and the Economy” (DICE), Nordhaus estimates a CO2 social cost equal to 
13$/ton. This is not to say that one discount rate is better or more correct than the 
other; simply put, different discount rates reflect different political preferences and 
result in a different estimation of the environmental costs of carbon emissions.  
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This thesis does not intend to bring new insight to the debate regarding the economics 
of climate change and the assessment of the optimal social level of emissions. In fact, 
this thesis intends to address the “incentive problem” while not questioning the 
evaluation problem; that is, the emissions reduction target is taken as a given, and its 
efficiency is not questioned. For the purpose of this research, it is sufficient to stress 
that almost all scientists recognize that global warming is taking place because of 
human activity and almost all economists nowadays advocate for intervention as a 
means of mitigating climate change (for example, commenting on the Stern Review, 
even Nordhaus, who has questioned many assumptions adopted by Stern, has 
recognized that “the results are correct in sign if not in size”, while they mainly 
disagree on the time and on the size of intervention). 
The belief that technologies are sufficiently developed to move to a low-carbon 
economy without compromising economic growth is also widespread. However, as the 
following sections about public goods and the Kyoto Protocol will clarify, the main 
difficulty of reducing emissions is not technological or scientific, but rather economic 
and political.  
 
6. How to Deal with Global Public Goods? 
In economics, the emission of greenhouse gases is defined as a negative externality: a 
cost that is not reflected in the market price system and that the emitter does not have 
to pay. In default of any legal obligation, the damage caused by the emission of 
greenhouse gases is likely to be borne by a third party—the society as a whole— 
without any right to compensation. Symmetrically, the preservation of the Earth’s 
atmosphere can be defined as a public good. Economic literature classifies as “public” 
those goods that are both non rival and non-excludible: use by one agent does not 
diminish the availability of that good to others, who cannot be excluded from using 
the same good simultaneously.  
When market mechanisms fail to induce spontaneously any internalization of the 
environmental negative externality, the amount of emissions released into the 
atmosphere exceeds the optimal social  level, at which the marginal costs of pollution 
equal the marginal benefits. This in turn calls for public intervention aimed at 
correcting such a market failure and  preserving the public good from an excessive 
private exploitation and depletion (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968; Russett and Sullivan 
1971). 
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First, the optimal social equilibrium has to be assessed by balancing the marginal 
costs and benefits of pollution. This is a problem of evaluation. Then, the problem of 
incentives has to be addressed: an effective legal instrument needs to be designed in 
order to induce an internalization of the environmental externality up to its optimal 
level at the minimal social cost (Barrett 2002).  
Designing an effective legal and economic instrument becomes more problematic 
when the public good to be preserved and the externality to be internalized are 
transnational or global in nature.  Global warming and climate change have been 
widely identified as a case of transnational negative externality “for which allocative 
decisions in one country have consequences in another that is not party to the 
decisions, and no market exists to compensate for the associated costs or benefits” 
(Arce and Sandler 2001, p. 1).6 Given the global dimension of climate change, it is 
unlikely that an independent and unilateral intervention aimed at reducing emissions 
internally on behalf of one single country can optimally preserve that public good. 
The preservation of transnational public goods calls for international arrangements 
and cooperation among states. Therefore, during the past decades, legal and economic 
scholars have increasingly analysed how to promote international cooperation in order 
to ensure an optimal reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (Barrett 1990; Martin 
1999).  
Starting from the basic assumption that states act as rational agents with stable 
preferences in order to maximize their own welfare or interests (e.g. Goldsmith and 
Posner 1998, 1999 and 2004; Guzman 2002; Sykes 2004), economic theory tends to 
foresee insufficient international cooperation, causing a sub-optimal level of 
environmental protection. That is, despite the fact that reciprocal cooperation would 
ensure a Pareto-superior outcome where social welfare would be maximized, self-
interest states are tempted to defect on cooperation by saving abatement costs while 
free-riding on other countries’ efforts to reduce emissions. This would in turn result in 
a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium where global public goods would be under-supplied. 
As argued by Bohringer, “individual rational countries only pursue their own interests 
and neglect the positive externalities of their reduction measures for other countries. 
Thus, the level of GHG emission reductions will be too low” (Bohringer 2002, p. 
452).  
                                                 
6 On global and transnational public goods, see Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern (1999) and Sandler (1997, 
1998); 
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We shortly review which factors hinder the capacity to promote effective cooperation 
at an international level. first, given the global nature of climate change, effective 
international cooperation requires (a) the participation of a high number of 
asymmetric countries which (b) are called to bear certain costs (c) despite the 
uncertainty of future benefits. Many economic models of industrial organization have 
shown that the probability of a collusive cartel being successful decreases as both the 
number of participants and their degree of cost asymmetry increase (Kuhn and Motta 
1999; Compte et al. 2002; Motta 2004). Similarly, it has been shown that the 
incentive to defect on international cooperation and to free ride on other countries’ 
efforts to reduce emissions increases as the number of participating countries 
increases (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994) and as the degree of costs 
asymmetries deriving from international cooperation increases among cooperating 
parties (Botteon and Carraro, 1993). In addition to these shortcomings, other peculiar 
features making a climate change agreement more complicated than other multilateral 
environment agreements have been identified. Among them, the high degree of 
uncertainty characterizing the phenomenon of climate change tends to deter countries 
from adopting  stringent and costly international agreements aimed at reducing carbon 
emissions. In fact, as previously mentioned, there is disagreement on many features of 
climate change, such as the effects of climate change, the optimal level of emissions 
concentrations, the probability of risky events occurring. These and other 
uncertainties generate a trade-off between the costs, benefits and risk of delayed 
action, on the one hand, and the costs, benefits and risk of premature abatement 
action, on the other hand (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This trade-off  limits the 
incentive to enter in a long-term and costly agreement for emissions reduction.  
Another factor limiting international cooperation is the lack of efficient technological 
solutions: contrary to the case of the Montreal Protocol intended to phase out ozone-
depleting substances, efficient breakthrough technologies to mitigate climate change 
have not been identified yet. The impossibility of adopting efficient environmentally 
friendly technologies limits the incentive to commit to stringent emissions reduction 
targets (Carraro and Galeotti 2003). Last but not least, international cooperation is 
hindered by the “absence of a hierarchical command structure” (Barret 2003, p. 46). 
As pointed out by Carraro, Egenhofer and Fujiwara (2009) “there is no global 
institutional framework able to deal with the many complexities associated with 
climate change” (p.2); therefore, international cooperation aimed at reducing 
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emissions cannot be imposed and must be voluntary. Bohringer argues that “the lack 
of supranational authority that could coerce countries into the implementation of 
globally efficient climate policies [including] the imposition of fairness principles 
about how gains from cooperation should be shared” constitutes the main problem in 
achieving efficient response policies to climate change (Bohringer 2003, p. 454). The 
fact that states are called to cooperate in a legal setting where “no international 
legislature exists to pass the equivalent of domestic statutes, and no international court 
exists with the power to create a general international common law” (Sykes 2004, p. 
2) has been widely identified as one of the major constraints limiting the mechanisms 
favouring the supply of global public goods.   
Economic and legal scholars have been increasingly analysing how to design effective 
mechanisms to promote international cooperation aimed at supplying global public 
goods (Kaul et al. 1999; Barrett 2002) and how to induce parties to cooperate 
internationally in spite of “the absence of an effective global governance system” 
(Carraro et al. 2009, p.3). Different proposals have been advanced in order to create 
incentives for sovereign states to cooperate (Carraro and Siniscalco 1998; Finus 
2003), including how to “fairly” distribute the potential gains from cooperation across 
countries (Moulin 1990, 1991; Borhinger and Helm 2001). Among others, Stavins and 
Barrett (2002), Bodansky (2004) and Egenhofer at al. (2004) have reviewed the 
literature analysing how to increase participation and compliance in international 
climate change agreements. However, reviewing exhaustively this literature and its 
main findings goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to mention that, in spite of the legal and 
economic peculiarities which make an international agreement against climate change 
particularly thorny, during the past two decades important steps to foster international 
cooperation in the field of climate change have been made not only on a theoretical, 
but also on a practical level. Indeed, in spite of the absence of an exogenous enforcing 
authority, the existence of a variety of endogenously defined mechanisms and 
remedies within international law has fostered international cooperation at a higher 
level than as predicted by conventional economic theory.  
International Relations and International Law & Economics scholars have identified a 
plurality of mechanisms and remedies aimed at inducing international cooperation. 
Among them, we recall: 
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1. Reciprocity: this mechanism ensures that states taking part in an international 
agreement perform symmetrically by excluding the combination of 
asymmetric strategies from the game and by making only the symmetric 
payoffs available (Fon and Parisi 2003). Already in 1984, Sugden showed that 
reciprocity can be a powerful mechanism to supply public goods through 
voluntary contributions given that “individuals act according to some moral 
principle that requires them to take account of other people’s interests” 
(Sugden 1984, p. 773). 
2. Retaliation: this mechanism can be brought back to the Friedman’s “trigger 
strategy” where one player commits to cooperate as long as the other player 
cooperates but punishes the opponent in the case defection from cooperation is 
observed. In the specific case of “tit for tat strategy” (e.g. Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981) the punishment continues as long as the other player defects. 
The imposition of a punishment in case of defection gives the self-interested 
agent an incentive to adopt a cooperative strategy. An example is seen in the 
linkage treaties strategy where it is established that a country that does not 
comply with a particular treaty has precluded the possibility to participate and 
to enjoy the benefits deriving from other international agreements, such as 
trade treaties or Research and Development cooperation treaties.  
3. Reputation: in 1984 Keohane argued that “regimes rely not only on 
decentralized enforcement through retaliation but on government desires to 
maintain their reputations” (Keohane 1984, p. 108). The role of reputation has 
been identified in the literature of International Law & Economics as one of 
the relevant mechanisms favouring cooperation among states (see Guzman 
2002, 2008; for a more sceptical view of the role of reputation see Goldsmith 
and Posner 2005). Reputation constitutes an effective mechanism to induce 
cooperation in the case of repeated games, and it relies on the principle that 
agents prefer to enter in cooperative agreements with credible and reliable 
parties. In a context of asymmetric information where countries cannot 
distinguish and separate ex ante good types from bad types, complying with 
international agreement becomes a signalling strategy aimed at building a 
“good type reputation”. Therefore, breaching international agreements might 
be profitable in a one shot game but it imposes an opportunity cost (loss of 
reputation) that will make it more difficult to build new agreements in the long 
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term. Reputation is a mechanism that differently from reciprocity and 
retaliation does not require a high level of coordination; therefore, it tends to 
be efficient also in those situations with high coordination costs where 
retaliation and reciprocity strategies are likely to not be effective (Guzman 
2006). As argued by Downs and Jones “a major—if not the major—reason 
why states keep commitments, even those that produce a lower level of returns 
than expected, is because they fear that any evidence of unreliability will 
damage their current cooperative relationships and lead other states to reduce 
their willingness to enter into future agreements” (Downs and Jones 2002, p. 
91). 
 
We have shortly recalled why, despite the fact that self-interested states may have an 
incentive to free ride on other countries’ efforts to reduce emissions, we still observe a 
certain degree of international cooperation that is higher than what conventional 
economic theory has predicted. As argued by Keohane “[f]or reasons of reputation, as 
well as fear of retaliation and concerns about the effects of precedents, egoistic 
governments may follow the rules and principles of international regimes even when 
myopic self-interest counsels them not to’’ (Keohane 1984, p. 106). 
In order to foster transnational cooperation, specific institutions and agreements have 
evolved within the body of laws governing relations between states. International 
agreements among states have widely emerged both as customary international law, 
which is defined as a “general and consistent practice of states followed by them from 
a sense of legal obligation”,7 and in the form of treaties, which have been defined as 
“an agreement executed by duly authorized officials of signatory states, evincing an 
intention to make it a binding legal obligation” (Sykes 2004). Or alternatively as a 
“express promises that are almost always embodied in written form; they often have 
built-in dispute resolution mechanisms such as international arbitration; and they only 
bind signatories” (Goldsmith and Posner 1998, p.4).  
As argued by Arce and Sandler (2001), in the environmental field, international 
cooperation has mainly developed in the form of international alliances or treaties. 
The most important among them is the Kyoto Protocol. The following section shortly 
describes the political and legal pathway that has led to the entry into force of this 
                                                 
7 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102 (2) 
(1987)  
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international environmental treaty. Although this thesis does not intend to analyse the 
Kyoto Protocol exhaustively, describing its content, limits and opportunities can be 
useful to introduce the ETS: the flexible mechanism foreseen by the Kyoto Protocol 
itself and established in Europe to facilitate compliance with an emissions reduction 
target.   
 
7. The Pathway toward the Kyoto Protocol 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 
1972 is widely considered one of the first crucial turning points in the development of 
international environmental law and politics (Munari and Di Pepe 2006). The 
Conference agreed upon the first international declaration of 26 principles concerning 
the protection of the environment and the preservation of its resources.8 On that 
occasion, the problem of global warming was only mentioned; instead, the first 
significant step to curb climate change was made twenty years later during the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth 
Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. On that occasion, the 154 participating 
Parties agreed upon the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Among 
the 27 principles which form the Rio Declaration, it is important—for the purposes of 
this thesis— to recall principle 16, widely known as the polluter pays principle. 
According to this principle “[n]ational authorities should endeavor to promote the 
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking 
into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of 
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international 
trade and investment.”9  
During the Earth Summit, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) was opened for signature. This environmental treaty, which 
provides the foundation for international efforts to address the problem of global 
warming, came into force on 21 March 1994. As declared in art. 2 of the Convention, 
“the ultimate objective of this Convention […] is to achieve […] the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Despite the fact that 
                                                 
8 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 1972 
9 Chapter 6 will develop a comparative analysis of the two alternative allocation criteria within the ETS 
according to an efficiency and an equity interpretation of the Polluter-Pays Principle. 
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this level was not quantified, art. 2 of the Convention continues declaring that it 
“should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” Art. 3 specifies 
the principles that should guide the Parties to implement the provisions of the 
Convention. Among them, we mention the so-called “precautionary principle” 
according to which “the Parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, 
prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.” 
According to the precautionary principle, lack of scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason to postpone measures aimed at preventing  threats of irreversible 
damage. It has been argued that this principle is economically grounded (Bohringer 
2003). In fact, given the large scientific and economic uncertainties concerning 
climate change and the risk of extreme and irreversible costly events, risk-aversion 
favours the adoption of the precautionary principle. Gollier et al. (2000) determine 
which conditions of scientific uncertainty call for immediate measures. The 
Convention specifies also that the measures to deal with climate change according to 
the precautionary principle should be cost-effective so as to ensure the stabilization of 
greenhouse gases at the lowest possible cost. Accordingly, we will analyse to what 
extent the ETS—the economic and legal instrument implemented in Europe—can be 
considered a cost-effective measure to reach the European emissions reduction target 
at the lowest possible cost. 
It is important to mention also the “common but shared responsibilities” principle of 
the Convention according to which “the Parties should protect the climate system for 
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities.” According to this principle, while all the Parties who ratified, accepted 
or approved the treaty are subject to a set of commitments aimed at responding to 
climate change, such obligations are differentiated among developing and 
industrialized countries, the latter of which are called to take the lead in combating 
climate change. For this purpose, the UNFCCC has divided the Parties in two groups. 
The so-called Annex I Parties are those industrialized countries which have been 
accumulating GHGs in the past decades and those economies in transition which are 
members of the OECD. The emissions per-capita of Annex I Parties are higher than 
those of most developing countries; therefore, as stated in the UNFCCC rulebook “the 
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principles of equity and  ‘common but shared responsibilities’ […] require these 
Parties to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends in emissions” (UNFCCC 
2002). The second group, called non-Annex I, includes most developing countries that 
did not contribute to global warming. While non-Annex I Parties are not expected to 
take the same measures as Annex I countries to de-carbonize their economy, the 
Convention requires them to take steps to reduce emissions and to report in more 
general terms on their actions to address climate change. 
While “taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances,” 
Art. 4 of the Convention establishes the commitments that all the Annex I and non-
Annex I Parties have to perform. Among these commitments the Parties have to 
“develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the 
Parties […] national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases.”  
Art. 7 of the Convention establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP), the supreme 
body of the UNFCCC. The COP has the duty “to keep under regular review the 
implementation of the Convention […] and shall make, within its mandate, the 
decisions necessary to promote the decisions necessary to promote the effective 
implementation of the Convention.”  
Since the commitments established in the Convention were not sufficient to seriously 
tackle climate change (UNFCCC 2002), art. 17 of the Convention establishes that the 
COP can, at any session, adopt protocols to the Convention. Already in the first COP 
meeting, which took place in Berlin in 1995, the Parties started to negotiate to decide 
on more detailed emissions reduction commitments for industrialized countries. After 
more than two years of negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol was finally adopted during 
the COP3, held in Kyoto on 11 December 1997.  
 
8. The Content of the Kyoto Protocol  
The Emissions Trading Scheme constitutes an example of the flexible economic 
mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, while this thesis does not 
intend to analyse and discuss exhaustively the Kyoto Protocol, it can be useful to 
shortly describe its content and the role of the flexible mechanisms. While sharing the 
objectives, institutions and principles of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol commits 
Annex I Parties to individual and quantified to limit or reduce their emissions. As 
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established in the Convention, the specific emissions reduction targets apply only to 
the Parties of the Convention that have become also Parties to the Protocol. The 
Convention establishes also that the Parties to the Protocol shall be bound by the 
Protocol’s Commitments only after it entered into force. 
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005, more than seven years 
after its adoption. In fact, the Protocol’s entry into force provision established that the 
Protocol could enter into force only 90 days after at least 55 Parties of the UNFCCC, 
representing at least 55% of the total amount of GHG emissions produced in 1990 by 
the Annex I countries, deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession. This provision underlines the importance of involving those states 
responsible for global warming; in fact, without the Participation by Annex I 
countries in the Protocol, its environmental effectiveness would have been seriously 
compromised.  
While the Convention adopted in 1992 failed to set clear targets for the abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g. Bodansky 1993), the Parties adopting the Kyoto 
Protocol agreed on quantified emissions limitation and reduction obligations. In 
detail, the Protocol establishes the duty to reduce the emissions of six GHGs by at 
least 5.2% below the level of 1990 during the Kyoto 5-year commitment period 2008-
2012. The six GHGs listed in Annex A are: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro- fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The overall 5.2% emissions reduction target has been 
differentiated among the Parties according to their ability to reduce greenhouse gases 
and by considering the possible impact of such a reduction on their economies 
(Brown 2005). While Australia, Iceland and Norway have been permitted to raise 
their 1990 emissions levels (respectively 108%, 110% and 101%), other states were 
permitted to stabilize their emissions gases at the 1990 level (the Russian Federation, 
New Zealand, and Ukraine) and other countries had to limit their emissions below the 
1990 levels. For instance, the former 15 MS of the European Union committed to 
overall reduce their emissions 8% below 1990 emissions level by 2012.  
The Kyoto Protocol states that “Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments” and “Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would 
occur in the absence of the certified project activity.” However, the concepts of  
supplementarity and additionality of these mechanisms with respect to domestic 
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actions were not sufficiently specified in the Protocol and were subsequently clarified 
during the seventh COP held in Marrakesh in 2001 where the Parties agreed upon the 
so-called “Marrakesh Accords”,10 which establish the modalities, guidelines and rules 
for participation in transactions under the flexible mechanisms. 
One of the most important and innovative aspects of the Kyoto Protocol has been the 
introduction of flexible economic mechanisms that countries can adopt to comply 
with their emissions reduction commitments. The economic principle supporting these 
mechanisms is that emissions should be reduced where abatement can take place at 
the minimal marginal costs. In fact, as it is a global problem, climate change can be 
mitigated by reducing emissions, independently of where emissions abatement takes 
place. The main purpose of these mechanisms is to grant a certain degree of freedom 
and economic flexibility in deciding how to comply with their commitments; this is 
accomplished by recognizing that important efficiency gains can be earned by 
allowing to Annex I states the possibility to meet their obligations not just 
individually but jointly (Brown 2005).11 The Protocol facilitates the concept of the 
“stabilization of greenhouse gases at the lowest possible cost” by providing for four 
innovative flexible mechanisms: 
– Joint implementation (JI): the Kyoto Protocol gives Annex I Parties the 
possibility to receive emissions reduction credits (ERUs) in the case they 
finance trans-border emissions reduction investments in other Annex I 
countries. As stated in the art. 6 of the Protocol “any Party included in Annex 
I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction 
units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by 
sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHGs in any sector 
of the economy, provided that: […] [a]ny such project provides a reduction in 
emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is 
additional to any that would otherwise occur.” 
– Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM): Annex I countries can receive 
emissions reduction credits in the case that they finance emissions reduction 
projects in non-Annex I countries. The UNFCCC has the duty to certify that 
emissions reduction has taken place, giving a corresponding amount of credits 
                                                 
10 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October 
to 10 November 2001, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 ( vol II, January 21, 2002). 
11 The concept of joint implementation is included in the Framework Convention, arts. 3(3), 4(2)(a). 
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that can be used by the investing country to comply with its emissions 
reduction target. CDM are similar to JI, but they have to take place in 
developing countries (non-Annex I Parties) in order to promote voluntary 
cooperation in achieving emissions reductions and to spur sustainable 
development. As stated in art. 12 of the Protocol: “The purpose of the clean 
development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in 
achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate 
objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Art. 3”. 
– Emissions Trading: art. 17 allows the ratifying Parties to trade the rights to 
emit CO2. Keeping the overall emissions reduction target fixed, countries 
which have abated more than their target can sell their surplus of abated 
emissions to other countries, giving them the possibility to comply with their 
emissions reduction targets. 
– Bubbling: the Parties can renegotiate and distribute their emissions 
commitments, keeping the overall emissions reduction target (art.4). The EU 
applied this mechanism by sharing its target with the European MS. The 
notification of the European Burden Sharing Agreement ensures that the 
European Member States are legally bound to specific national emissions 
reduction targets agreed under the burden sharing instead of the official 
European target established in the Protocol (COM 1999: 230). Also the sub-
division of the EU common target among different countries has been done in 
line with the principle of “common but shared responsibilities” by taking into 
account both the emissions per-capita and the expected economic growth 
(emissions per GDP).  
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Table 2 - Kyoto targets and emissions per-capita and per GDP 
Countries Target 
Austria -13% 
Belgium -7.5% 
Denmark -21% 
Finland 0% 
France 0% 
Germany  -21% 
Greece  +25% 
Ireland +13% 
Italy -6.5% 
Luxembourg -28% 
Netherlands -6% 
Portugal +27% 
U.K. -12.5% 
Spain +15% 
Sweden +4% 
    Source: Burden Sharing Agreement 
 
Although the Protocol imposes these obligations and possibilities on states, these can 
be passed on to industry in domestic legislation, as in the case of the Emissions 
Trading Scheme, which will be carefully analysed and discussed in the following 
chapters.
The introduction of international economic mechanisms to promote emissions 
reduction has been welcomed as a  world-wide success. As reported by Carraro et al. 
(2009), “both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have established numerous areas 
where international consensus has emerged or at least appears to be achievable” (p.2). 
Among them, we recall:  
(1) differentiation; with this term the authors refer to the “principle of common 
but shared responsibilities,” which has become part of international 
environmental law since the UNFCC entered into force. 
(2) A comprehensive approach to all emission sources: the Kyoto Protocol has 
addressed the comprehensive approach to all emissions sources by including 
six greenhouse gases and the possibility to absorb them through “carbon 
sinks” (Carraro et al. 2009).  
(3) flexibility and flexible mechanisms; that is, the importance of carbon or 
emissions markets. 
On an economic front the most important success of the Kyoto consists in the 
introduction of flexible mechanisms that are likely to promote effective emissions 
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reductions minimizing the cost of compliance. Grubb (2000) identifies different 
dimensions of flexibility that characterize the Kyoto Protocol. Among them, we 
recall: 
 
How flexibility: the Kyoto Protocol has designed a number of flexible mechanisms 
that give ratifying Countries a high degree of freedom to choose the most effective 
way to comply with the target: either making internal abatements or buying rights to 
emit. Different economic models have shown that without the introduction of flexible 
mechanisms which allow other means of compliance than domestic abatement, the 
cost deriving from the Kyoto Protocol would sharply increase. 
 
Table 3 – Estimated costs of achieving the Kyoto target from various economic 
models 
Model Marginal cost of target  
achieved domestically $/ton 
% GDP loss 
with domestic 
implementation 
% GDP loss with full trading 
 US Europe Japan   
SGM 163   0.4% 0.25% 
MERGE 274   1% “Decline Significantly” 
G-Cubed 63 167 252 0.3 – 1.4%  
POLES 82 130-140 240 0.2 – 0.3% 0.3% 
GTEM 375 773 751 0.7 – 2%  
WorldScan 38 78 87 -  
Green 149 196 77 0.4 – 0.9% 0.1-0.5% 
AIM 166 214 253 <0.5%  
Source: Grubb 2000 
 
Despite the fact that estimates strongly diverge among different economic models, 
and in some cases the different assumptions and welfare measures make these results 
not directly comparable, all the models nevertheless agree in sign (if not in size) 
showing that the GDP loss deriving from the Kyoto emissions reduction target 
declines significantly when the possibility of trading is added on top of the option of 
domestic abatement. 
 
Where flexibility: dealing with a global problem, its resolution requires emissions to 
be abated no matter where abatement takes place, and the Kyoto Protocol identifies 
some flexible mechanisms that can promote emissions reduction in developing 
countries. Many economists and political scientists have stressed the importance and 
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the effectiveness of the gradual and dynamic institutional approach that characterizes 
the Protocol. The initial top-down imposition of an emissions reduction target to 
developing countries would not have favoured international cooperation, since 
developing countries could have counted on valid argumentations supporting their 
refusal to commit to stringent emissions reduction targets. In the light of these 
considerations, developing countries have been first actively involved in the 
negotiation in order to become familiar with the hot issue without any duty or 
obligation. In a second step, in spite of the lack of any mandatory abatement target, 
they have been involved in the emissions reduction process through the development 
of voluntary projects. Economic instruments such as CDM can contribute 
substantially to the target achievement by facilitating the negative externality’s 
internalization by promoting cost-effective emissions reduction projects in developing 
countries and by overcoming the political inertia in approaching environmental issue 
at a global level. The CDM has been generally considered a useful and effective 
international mechanism to induce the achievement of short term goals. 12 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in spite of these innovative flexible mechanisms 
which have been introduced by the Kyoto Protocol, a wide number of opponents have 
described the Kyoto Protocol as a “deeply flawed agreement that manages to be both 
economically inefficient and politically impractical” (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002, 
p. 107). The major criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol regard its failure to induce 
collective action against global warming: developing countries are not committed to 
any emissions reduction targets and the US did not ratify the Protocol. In fact, in 1997 
the US Senate approved unanimously the Byrd-Hagel resolution according to which 
the US would have ratified the Protocol only under the condition of a “meaningful” 
participation of developing countries. Considering that developing countries are likely 
to cover more than half of global emissions before 2020, their participation in a 
                                                 
12 Concerning the CDM Pizer commented that “there is an unusual alliance of support for project-based 
crediting in developing countries: Environmental advocates see this as maintaining environmental 
integrity, businesses see this as a cheaper alternative to domestic compliance, brokers and dealmakers 
see profit opportunities, developing countries see foreign aid, and industrialized country governments 
see opportunities to complement domestic mitigation. Given the inevitable need to channel mitigation 
resources from industrialized to developing countries, more thought should be given to how these 
mechanisms can be expanded and improved” (Pizer, 2005, pg.2).
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collective action against climate change has been considered essential to address the 
climate change problem effectively and efficiently (Olmstead and Stavins 2006).  
Although this thesis does not intend to assess the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
has been crucial to underline from the very beginning the unilateral nature of the 
European climate policy, which is aimed at achieving a stringent emissions reduction 
target in an asymmetric geo-political scenario. In fact, despite the fact that the 
European asymmetric emissions reduction target is taken as a given, as chapter 7 will 
discuss, the effectiveness of the ETS itself risks being jeopardized by the unilateral 
and asymmetric nature of the European climate policy. 
 
 9. Conclusions 
This chapter has shortly reviewed the scientific and economic debate on climate 
change, and it has described the political and legal process that has brought about the 
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and the adoption of its flexible mechanisms. 
First, the chapter has introduced the problem of climate change, by clarifying what is 
meant with the term “global warming” and by identifying its historical anthropogenic 
causes and its possible and uncertain natural consequences. Then, we have briefly 
reviewed different approaches that economists have adopted to assess the optimal 
level of emissions reduction by balancing the costs and benefits of global warming 
against the costs and benefits of its mitigation. Different results have been reached 
depending on how scientific uncertainties and economic costs are taken into account 
and discounted. We have highlighted the different assumptions, methodologies and 
contrasting results without pretending to assess which are the most reliable. 
Afterwards, the economic concepts of negative externality and public good have been 
introduced, and the problems that have to be faced when the public good to be 
preserved and the externality to be internalized are transnational or global in nature 
have been summarized.  Some of these problems are linked to the global and 
uncertain nature of climate change itself. In fact, effective international cooperation 
requires the participation of a high number of asymmetric countries which are called 
to bear certain costs against uncertain future benefits. We have shown that, in spite of 
these shortcomings, important steps have been taken at an international level to 
mitigate climate change. Section 7 has described the political and juridical pathway 
that has brought to the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the first international 
treaty aimed at stabilizing the emissions of GHG at a safety level. Finally, section 8 
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has introduced the content of the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions reduction targets and 
the flexible mechanisms established to reach them. This part did not intend to draw 
any conclusions about the efficiency of the emissions reduction targets established in 
the Kyoto Protocol, or about the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol itself; nevertheless, 
such issues were required to introduce the European ETS economic mechanism. 
Moreover, given that the Kyoto Protocol de facto does not impose any emissions 
reduction commitment on the US and on developing countries (Carraro et al. 2009), 
this chapter has underlined the unilateral nature of the European climate policy, which 
is aimed at achieving a stringent emissions reduction target in an asymmetric geo-
political scenario. In fact, the effectiveness of the ETS itself risks being jeopardized 
by the unilateral and asymmetric nature of the European climate policy. 
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Chapter 3. Toward a Cap and Trade Scheme Solution: Economic and Legal 
Instruments to Address the Problem of Externality 
1.  Introduction 
Until some decades ago the market institution and its competitive mechanisms have 
been considered one of the main causes of environmental pollution and degradation, 
rather than a potentially efficient solution to these problems. Economic growth brings 
about an increasing pollution of the environment and exploitation of exhaustible 
natural resources. In particular, the combustion of fossil fuels—mainly oil, gas and 
coal—is at the base of the economic activities of energy and industrial production, as 
well as transportation. These fuels end are the major cause of  the release of GHGs in 
the atmosphere. In the past decades, an increasing scientific consensus has emerged in 
recognizing the anthropogenic causes of the change in climate conditions. The so-
called global warming can be considered an external cost of the human activity of 
production (and consumption) which causes damage and economic losses to third 
parties spread in time and space who are not likely to be compensated by the 
polluters. Climate change and global warming have been indicated as the “greatest 
and widest-ranging market failure ever seen” (Stern et al. 2006). 
Unless legal systems introduce  specific rules aimed at ensuring an optimal 
internalization of the costs of pollution within the market, global warming will 
continue to be a neglected cost that producers and consumers are not required to take 
into account when performing their activities. As far as private polluters are not 
required to support the costs of emitting GHGs in the atmosphere, climate changing 
activities will continue until the private marginal benefits of production and pollution 
are positive, resulting in a socially inefficient outcome where the marginal private 
costs of production are not aligned with the marginal social costs and where part of 
the private costs have to be borne by the society as a whole. 
It was Garret Hardin’s seminal 1968 art. that argued that when a public resource is 
freely available to everybody, in the absence of any property rule, each individual will 
have an incentive to use the resource to maximize its private utility, resulting in a 
collective over-exploitation and destruction of the resource: 
 
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destruction toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interests in a society 
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that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom of the commons 
brings ruin to all. (Hardin 1968, p. 1244) 
  
Common goods are likely to experience an over-exploitation of the resource in the 
short run and an under-investment in its protection and development in the long run. 
The probability of this tragedy occurring increases as the number of agents who can 
freely access the resource increases as well because of higher coordination and 
transaction costs among the parties. The concept of externality and the main 
arguments that explain the tragedy of the Commons can be easily applied to the case 
of climate change: the atmosphere has been considered a common and inexhaustible 
public good whose consumption is neither rival nor excludable. However, the recent 
increasing relevance in public opinion and in the political debate on the problem of 
global warming and on the potential risks it might pose to human kind is deepening 
the awareness that the atmosphere is becoming a scarce good that has been 
overexploited by self-interested private economic activities, whose protection will be 
undersupplied by free and unregulated markets.     
In this sense, environmental protection can be thought of as a luxury good: in the last 
decades more developed countries have been experiencing an increasing social 
demand for environmental protection. However, there are not sufficient profit 
opportunities inducing private economic agents to provide voluntarily the social 
optimal level of environmental protection. Such an outcome can be considered a 
market failure: market forces do not spontaneously serve the perceived public interest. 
As a consequence, public authorities have to intervene with tailored legal instruments 
aimed at correcting this market failure and ensuring an optimal level of environmental 
protection. In fact, the Law & Economics approach has developed the principle 
according to which the law should pursue the public interest in an efficient way, 
minimizing the social costs of intervention. This increasing awareness has induced 
more and more States to develop and adopt environmental policies aimed at 
internalizing the costs of pollution which have differed across countries and years. 
Once an optimal goal has been assessed, it becomes necessary to identify the most 
efficient and cost-effective instrument to reach it at the minimal social costs. In fact, it 
is possible to think about a legal system as being composed of different branches of 
law or legal rules which potentially compete by offering different solutions to the 
problem of environmental externality.  
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During the last decades, the Law & Economics literature has developed a broad 
comparative analysis of these legal instruments. The general conclusion that can be 
reached is that none of these legal rules can be considered a priori a first-best 
solution. The more desirable form of governance which can ensure an optimal 
externality internalization at the lowest costs needs to be evaluated case by case 
according to variables that have to be taken into account. That is, depending on 
different factors that are illustrated in the next sections, one legal rule can be preferred 
to the other, and, in general, different rules can be either substitute or complementary 
solutions. 
Although this research focuses on the mechanism of Cap and Trade, as it has been 
implemented by the European legislation in the form of the Emissions Trading 
Scheme, and therefore is not aimed at bringing an exhaustive comparative analysis of 
the different competing legal solutions, this chapter intends to develop a taxonomic 
summary of legal rules and economic instruments that can potentially address the 
problem of environmental externalities, and in particular the problem of climate 
change. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the properties and the related 
advantages and disadvantages that characterize the most important legal rules that 
have been adopted so far in the field of environmental law. This will be done in order 
to explain why, among them, the cap and trade system has been chosen within the 
European legislation as the principal legal and economic instrument to induce a 
reduction of emissions in a cost-effective way. 
The second section presents a taxonomy of the legal and economic instruments aimed 
at internalizing the external costs of pollution. These competing legal instruments can 
be classified according to different criteria: the time they intervene, which can be 
before or after damage has occurred (section 2.1); the extent to which they are 
economically incentive driven, a variable which depends on both the degree of 
interventionism and on the degree of flexibility left to the polluter in deciding how to 
internalize the environmental externalities (section 2.2); and whether they intervene 
within the market and through the market (section 2.3). The following sections 
analyse in more detail the different instruments presented in the taxonomy by 
focusing on their advantages and weaknesses in order to evaluate if they can be 
tailored to address the problem of climate change. Section 3 introduces liability rules, 
explaining in which cases a strict liability regime should be preferred to a negligence 
rule, and vice-versa. According to these argumentations, the section concludes that an 
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ex-pot type of intervention through the legal instrument of liability is not suitable to 
mitigate the problem of climate change. After describing the features and 
shortcomings of an ex-post type of legal intervention through private law and liability 
rules in the field of climate change, the chapter proceeds to describe the different 
types of environmental public law based on a ex-ante intervention. Section 4 
introduces the Command and Control type of direct regulation, explaining the relative 
weaknesses and the conditions that need to be satisfied in order to be an efficient and 
cost-effective form of regulation. After explaining why Command and Control is not 
suitable to address the problem of climate change, section 5 moves on to describe the 
passage to softer types of direct regulation—the so-called marked-based instruments. 
In particular, it describes the case of Pigouvian tax, highlighting its properties and 
relative advantages compared to Command and Control. Section 6 analyses the  cap 
and trade solution, which according to the Coase theorem can induce an optimal 
internalization of the costs of pollution by assigning the rights to pollute and leaving 
the regulated agents free to bargain. 
Section 7 offers a comparative analysis of the two market-based instruments of taxes 
and cap and trade. This section is aimed at explaining why in many circumstances, 
and in particular in Europe, the instrument of tradable permits has been preferred to 
other forms of regulation, and to a tax system in particular. First, the economic 
literature has found that, under uncertainty, the shape of the marginal cost and benefit 
functions, jointly with the time horizon of the regulatory policy, are important 
variables to be considered in the comparative analysis of prices and quantities types of 
instruments. In addition and in the context of climate change, the desirability of one 
economic instrument over the other depends also on its capacity to promote 
international cooperation to fight global warming and to guarantee national 
sovereignty over politically strategic issues (section 7.1). Moreover, in spite of being 
equally efficient, a cap and trade scheme where allowances are initially assigned for 
free, entails different distributive effects than taxes, and thus, according to the 
political economy approach toward regulation, private parties tend to prefer cap and 
trade schemes over taxes and tend to lobby for this form of regulation (section 7.2).  
These considerations are not exhaustive, but they should be sufficient in explaining 
why a cap and trade system where allowances have been initially allocated for free on 
the basis of the historical emissions has been preferred to both the alternatives of a 
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carbon tax system and of a cap and trade system where allowances are auctioned. 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  A Taxonomy of Legal and Economic Instruments Aimed at Internalizing 
Externalities 
The following sections present a taxonomy of the legal instruments developed in the 
field of environmental law in order to achieve the target of optimal internalization of 
the pollution externality at the lowest cost. According to their relative advantages and 
disadvantages, it becomes important to analyse how much these competing legal 
options can be tailored to address the problem of climate change, where the emissions 
reduction target is taken as a given and its economic foundations are not questioned.  
 
2.1 Ex-Ante and Ex-Post Legal Instruments 
The first distinction that can be made among different legal and economic instruments 
is between rules belonging to the branches of private law and public law. Private law, 
in the form of liability rules, intervenes ex-post after damage has occurred. In this 
case, polluters are free to engage in their activity without any kind of ex-ante 
restriction. Yet in the case that the activity causes damage, then the courts force the 
polluter to pay compensation to the victim. In this case the ex-post  compensation 
gives the polluter a indirect deterrent incentive to improve the level of care in its 
productive activity. An alternative way of dealing with the problem of environmental 
externality is to intervene ex-ante through public law. The public law instruments can 
take different forms—from direct regulation to more market oriented instruments like 
taxes—and are aimed at influencing the behaviour of the polluter ex-ante according to 
a proper cost-benefit analysis. This cost-benefit analysis should be performed by the 
more informed party who can assess and balance costs and benefits at the lowest cost. 
It is therefore important to adopt the legal rule that allocates the duty of developing a 
cost-benefit analysis to the more informed party.  
 
2.2  Non-Economic and Economic Instruments  
Another distinction that can be made among the different legal rules aimed at 
internalizing the costs of pollution is between non-economic and economic 
instruments. The field of non-economic instruments includes the command and 
control type of regulation. In this case no direct economic incentive is provided to the 
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polluter to induce him or her to adopt the socially desired behaviour. The central role 
is given to the regulator who first has to collect the required information to assess a 
cost-benefit analysis of pollution reduction, and then has to set some standards 
accordingly, like technological or performance benchmarks, that specify ex-ante how 
the polluter has to behave. After “commanding” the regulated agents to behave in a 
certain way, the public authority has also the duty to monitor and ensure that the 
regulated agents’ economic activity is in compliance with the imposed rule or 
standard. In the case they do not comply, either an administrative or criminal sanction 
can be applied. In some sense, the enforcement of sanctions in the case of non-
compliance can be thought of as a form of ex-post economic incentive to comply with 
the regulation ex-ante by adopting the specified standard. However, they cannot be 
considered proper economic instruments, as they have been defined by the relevant 
literature. 
According to Oates (1990), while with a command and control type of regulation the 
authority specifies how the regulated agent should behave in order to reach the 
socially desired target, with the adoption of economic instruments the authority limits 
its role to the definition of some incentives aimed at reaching the desired target. This 
is done while at the same time leaving the regulated agents free to decide how to 
behave in reaction to these incentives. Economic instruments are mainly characterized 
by two aspects: first, they are more flexible than the standard command and control 
rules, and, second, they are designed to facilitate the indirect alignment of private and 
social goals through a system of incentives. While the environmental targets are 
defined ex-ante, these mechanisms mainly leave the regulated subjects free to 
evaluate which is the more convenient way to reach them. It is interesting to highlight 
that the free market mechanisms, that have been considered responsible for the 
environmental externality, nowadays have bee identified as the most efficient way to 
solve this problem. In fact, given that the collective and free use of the environment is 
increasingly creating a problem of scarcity, its protection can be achieved by 
attaching a price to its use. This price is aimed at rationing the exploitation of the 
environment. This kind of mechanism is perfectly tailored to comply with one of the 
most important environmental legal principles according to which the polluter should 
bear the cost of the pollution he or she generates. Indeed, market-based instruments 
attach—more or less directly—a price to the consumption of the environment that the 
regulated agents have to pay in order to pollute. These mechanisms have been 
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criticized for being neither educative nor morally correct (Frey 1997) since they give 
the polluter the legally recognized possibility to buy the right to pollute: as long as 
polluters pay for the pollution they generate, they are allowed to pollute and to behave 
in the way they find most convenient. Market-based instruments can be either price-
based (i.e., indicating the imposition of tax or subsidies) or quantity-based (i.e., the 
system of cap and trade). In the latter case, the price paid to pollute derives indirectly 
from the interaction of the demand supply functions in a trading scheme under the 
constraint of a quantity restriction (i.e., a cap to the emissions that can be produced). 
Since private agents usually are more informed about production and abatement costs 
and benefits than the regulator is, market-based instruments are designed in a way that 
induces the private agents to reveal their private information. In this sense, market-
based instruments “exploit the capability of markets to aggregate information” 
(Hepburn 2006, p. 228). 
All these economic and non-economic instruments can be ordered according to the 
degree of direct intervention (Ogus 1994)—from the less interventionist ones, for 
instance, rules which impose some disclosure of information, to the most 
interventionist ones like the ex-ante assignment of licenses. However, within this 
classification it is not always possible to draw a clear dividing line among instruments 
according to the taxonomy that has been presented, at least from an economic 
perspective.  
First, the market-based instruments imply a soft form of regulation characterized by 
an ex-ante collection of information on behalf of the regulator in order to design the 
legal instrument, as in the case of a direct command a control type of regulation. 
Moreover, once the market-based instruments have been established, their 
implementation entails a form of ex-post control and sanctioning enforcement 
mechanism in case of non-compliance on behalf of the regulated sectors. It can be 
argued that all the legal instruments entail a form of economic incentive with different 
degrees of flexibility that are left to the regulated agents. From this perspective, there 
is not necessarily an exclusive equivalence between the ex-ante form of intervention 
through public law and what is meant by the concept of economic instrument. On the 
one hand, it has been sustained that the more strengthening forms of command and 
control types of regulation are not economic at all since they do not leave any degree 
of flexibility to the regulated subjects. On the other hand, the liability rules, which 
intervene ex-post in the field of private law and which are not considered an economic 
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instrument by the traditional legal literature, could be considered to a certain extent 
economic instruments. This consideration is based upon the fact that they do not 
impose any strict requirement; quite the contrary, the imposition of ex-post damage 
compensation increases the cost of pollution, thus creating an economic incentive to 
reduce it, and at the same time it leaves the polluter a high degree freedom and 
flexibility in deciding how to behave (Faure 2008). 
 
2.3 Within the Market and through the Market Instruments  
It has been shown that the instruments aimed at protecting the environment can be 
distinguished depending on the time they are implemented. This distinction is made in 
order to induce the polluter to internalize the external costs of pollution: ex-ante 
public law regulation, which imposes a cost to the polluter before damage has 
occurred, or ex-post private law and liability rules, which forces the polluter to 
compensate the victim for the harm inflicted after the damage has occurred. 
Moreover, the different legal devices can be classified depending on how much they 
are economically incentive-driven, a variable which depends both on the degree of 
interventionism and the degree of flexibility left to the polluter in deciding how to 
internalize the environmental externalities. Finally, it is possible to make a distinction 
between environmental protection and the internalization of the costs of pollution 
within the market and through the market (Clarich 2007). 
In the first case, it is the market itself that spontaneously develops private instruments 
within the market aimed at satisfying the increasing demand for environmental 
protection or at anticipating  the development of any kind of environmental protection 
measure. It is in the case of self-regulation where the market agents decide to publicly 
certify the compliance with quality standards that are more stringent than those 
defined in the legal system. Alternatively, in other cases, private agents facing a 
higher risk of environmental damage liability may decide to insure themselves against 
such a risk. This private solution can provide an indirect form of environmental 
protection: the insurer, who has to bear the cost of the potential environmental 
damage, has an incentive to control the polluter and to verify whether he or she has 
adopted all the measures required to minimize the risk of a harmful environmental 
accident. On the other hand, it is in the private interest of the ensured parties to 
improve the environmental safety standard which can eventually lead to a reduction of 
the risk premium they have to pay. The second case, where the environment is 
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protected through the market, has already been introduced as it consists of the 
establishment of flexible economic mechanisms aimed at giving the polluters  market 
incentives to reduce their polluting activity. In this case, the strategy that maximizes 
the producer’s own profit is at the same time the action that ensures a reduction of the 
environmental damage. 
Another distinction can be made between the type of public regulations that 
intervenes on the side of the demand within the existing markets with the explicit 
purpose of correcting their partial failures and the other type of public intervention 
that is aimed at creating a new form of demand through the establishment of new and 
artificial markets. In the first category it is possible to mention the example of the 
public administrations, which—in addition to being direct regulators—are also 
important consumers who have the faculty of re-orienting the demand toward 
environmentally friendly services and goods by including specific environmental 
standards that have to be satisfied in order to win the public contracts. The Cap and 
Trade system and the Emissions Trading System, in particular, are examples of 
artificial markets, and they constitute the core of this research. This system will be 
analysed in detail in the next chapters. 
After presenting a taxonomy of the legal and economic instruments aimed at 
internalizing the cost of environmental externalities, the next sections analyse these 
instruments in greater detail highlighting the related advantages and disadvantages in 
order to understand under which circumstances they are suitable to be adopted to 
mitigate the change of climate conditions in a cost-effective way. 
 
3. Liability Rules 
The economic analysis of law is based on the basic idea that legal rules should 
promote economic efficiency and lead to an optimal social equilibrium by providing 
efficient incentives to the parties who interact in the society. The parties who interact 
in the context where liability rules can be applied are at least two: a potential injurer 
whose harmful activity risks inflicting damage on a potential victim. There are two 
costs that the law should minimize in a such a case: on one hand, the cost of the 
damage caused by the harmful activity; on the other hand, the costs of practicing the 
appropriate amount of precaution in order to prevent the damage from occurring. In 
fact, when performing a potentially harmful activity, as the level of precaution 
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increases, the risk of causing damage decreases. Yet, there is also to consider that the 
costs of precaution increase as well. 
According to Calabresi (1970), the principal function of law is to ensure an optimal 
level of precaution to the point where the marginal cost of exercising precaution 
equals the related marginal benefit. Thus, the law should favour an optimal 
equilibrium where the social costs of accidents are minimized by adopting a legal rule 
offering the best incentives to take an optimal level of precaution. This precautionary 
level should be such that it minimizes the sum of the costs of the expected accidents 
and the costs of avoiding the accidents. In general, three variables should be 
considered when deciding the more appropriate rule of law to be applied: the costs 
related to the number of accidents, which can be thought of as  proportional to the 
level of activity; the costs related to the entity of the damage, which depend on the 
level of precaution; and finally the administrative costs related to the legal rule which 
has been adopted and the number of court cases in which it could result. 
After having determined the variables that need to be balanced in order to identify the 
optimal equilibrium, it becomes necessary to determine which legal rule can induce 
the private agents to achieve this optimal outcome at the lowest cost. The emergence 
of an environmental liability regime is aimed at granting an optimal level of 
precaution by pursuing two interrelated goals: compensating the victim for the 
damage caused by the polluting activity and deterring the polluter from performing 
inefficient activities in order to avoid the pollution that is not cost-justified (where the 
marginal costs of pollution exceed the marginal benefits). While lawyers tend to stress 
the compensation goal of accident law, thus focusing the attention on the injured 
parties, economists tend to attach greater importance to the deterrent function of a 
liability rule, thus mainly taking into account the role of the potential polluter and the 
need to provide them with appropriate incentives.  
Of course, these policy goals are interrelated and tend to combine an ex-post vision of 
the law, which grants compensation to the victim after the accident has occurred, with 
an ex-ante role of the law aimed at deterring socially undesirable activities.  
As it has been previously argued, the perspective under which a liability rule is 
analysed by the Law & Economics approach tends to stress its market oriented 
approach (e.g. Faure 2008). In fact, under a liability regime, the polluters are either 
required to take a pre-defined level of precaution or to grant compensation in the case 
that damage occurs, but the law does not force the polluters to take precise measures 
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aimed at reducing pollution and the risk of accidents. Polluters remain free to decide 
how to behave as long as they comply with the environmental principle according to 
which they should bear the cost of pollution, in this case paying damages to the 
victim.  
The legislator can apply two different liability rules: strict liability and the negligence 
rule. According to strict liability, the injurer has always to compensate the victim for 
the damage inflicted and independently of the level of precaution he or she took when 
performing the activity. Under a negligence rule, when an accident occurs the injurer 
has to compensate the victim only if the damage has resulted from an activity 
performed with an insufficient level of precaution.  
The type of liability rule that can grant an optimal level of precaution, where the 
marginal cost of taking precaution equals the marginal benefit of reducing the 
probability of a damage, depends on the nature of the potential accident—whether it is 
a unilateral or a bilateral accident. We speak about a unilateral accident when the 
potential injured party cannot adapt his or her behaviour in order to influence the risk 
of the accident, while the probability of bilateral accident depends on, and can be 
influenced by, both the potential injurer and the potential victim’s behaviour. 
The Law & Economics literature has reached the general conclusion that, while a 
negligence rule is more tailored to be applied in case of bilateral accidents, a strict 
liability rule is efficient only in the case of a unilateral accident. The explanation can 
be quite intuitive: a strict liability rule allocates all the risk of an accident to the tort-
feasor, who in the case of a unilateral accident is also the only agent who can 
influence the probability of causing the accident. On the contrary, a negligence rule 
spreads the risk and the costs of the accident between the injurer and the victim; 
therefore, it should be applied in the case of bilateral accidents where the behaviour of 
both the involved parties can influence the risk, the cost and the probability of the 
accident. 
Negligence rule and strict liability differ not only in the conditions under which the 
injurer is required to compensate the victim in the case of an accident, but also in the 
manner by which they allocate the duty of performing a cost-benefit analysis to 
different parties. Under a strict liability regime, the cost-benefit analysis is performed 
directly by the potential injurer who balances internally the costs he or she should 
afford when taking precaution with the probability of incurring harmful damage and 
of paying the costs of the victim’s compensation. In this case of unilateral accident, 
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strict liability is an efficient rule because it allocates the duty to balance costs and 
benefits to the most informed party. In fact, the potential injurer is the only agent who 
can influence the probability and the amount of the damage; hence, he or she knows 
better than any other the costs of taking precaution and the costs of the damage. Under 
a strict liability regime, the court does not have to set any standard. Nor does it have 
to assess any cost-benefit analysis since the injurer is always liable (lower information 
cost). It does, however, have to determine the relation of causality between the 
damage and the dangerous activity performed by the polluter, which could involve 
substantial costs as the number of court cases increases (Shavell 1980). 
The information costs sustained by the public institutions increase substantially in the 
case of negligence rule, which is more suitable for bilateral accidents. Bilateral 
accidents are an example of interdependent choices since the probability of the 
accident depends on the level of precaution taken by both the potential injurer and 
injured party. In order to define what optimal incentives to the parties are, the law 
must take into account this aspect of interdependent strategies and choices: normally, 
by giving a direct incentive to one party there arises the risk of creating an indirect 
disincentive to the other party. For instance, by making the potential injurer strictly 
liable in the case of bilateral accidents, the law would not give the potential victim 
any incentive to take some level of precaution. A strict liability rule would exacerbate, 
rather than balance, this trade-off, by inducing the potential injurer to take an 
excessive level of precaution (over-deterrence) while at the same time giving an 
incentive to the potential victim to take an insufficient level of precaution (under-
deterrence). The risks and the costs would not be allocated efficiently, and the level of 
precaution generated by a strict liability applied to the case of bilateral accidents 
would not be optimal. On the contrary, a negligence rule is considered an effective 
mechanism to spread risks and costs among the two parties. The negligence rule 
entails higher administrative costs since the judge has to collect information and 
perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine directly the optimal level of precaution. 
Once this threshold has been officially defined, the negligence rule implies that, in the 
case that an accident occurs, the injurer will have to compensate the victim for the 
damage inflicted only if he or she took an insufficient level of precaution (lower than 
the threshold). While if the injurer is performing a dangerous activity in compliance 
with the negligence standard, then the costs of the accident will be borne by the victim 
who is not entitled to any compensation. Of course, differently from the strict liability, 
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by granting only limited protection to the potential victim, the negligence rule 
provides incentives not only to the potential injurer but also to the potential victim to 
take some level of precaution. If the negligence standard is set by the regulator at an 
optimal level, also the level of precaution to be taken will be allocated between the 
two parties in an efficient way.  
The negligence rule has also some side effects. First, while it creates incentives with 
respect to diligence in performing a potentially harmful activity, the negligence rule 
does not give any incentive regarding the frequency of the activity. The probability of 
an accident occurring depends on both the level of precaution and the frequency of 
performing the activity. However, under a negligence rule the potential injurer who 
takes an optimal level of precaution is free to perform the dangerous activity as many 
times as he or she wants without incurring any risk of being considered liable in the 
case that the accident occurs. Second, a negligence rule is efficient only if the judge 
has sufficient information to balance the costs and benefits in order to set the standard 
of precaution at an optimal level. Only in this case are the risks and the incentives to 
take precaution correctly allocated between the two parties. On the contrary, an 
official standard lower (or higher) than the optimal level of precaution will elicit 
under-deterrence (or over-deterrence) from the potential injurer and over-deterrence 
(or under-deterrence) from the potential victim. The third major point to be 
considered is that the negligence rule is efficient only if the judge is able to measure 
the level of precaution taken by the injurer and to compare it with the negligence 
standard defined ex-ante. 
In the case of environmental pollution negligence cannot be an efficient rule. First, 
pollution represents a case of unilateral accident where the potential victim is not able 
to modify the risk of an accident through his or her own behaviour. Secondly, the 
legislator normally faces substantial information asymmetries impeding him or her 
from setting the negligence standard at an optimal level which in turn balances the 
marginal costs and benefits linked to the potentially harmful activity.  
Moreover, it has been generally recognized that, although strict liability is superior to 
negligence in the cases of unilateral environmental pollution, also a strict liability 
regime would fail to be an efficient instrument to internalize the cost of pollution, 
particularly in the case of climate change. It has been shown that the main feature of a 
liability regime—whether strict liability or negligence—is to intervene ex-post or 
after damage has occurred and to require the polluter to compensate the victim. This 
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mechanism in turn creates a deterrence effect. In particular, in the case of unilateral 
accident and under a rule of strict liability all the costs are shifted to the injurer. It is 
duty of the polluter, who is retained always liable, to perform a cost-benefit analysis 
aimed at defining the optimal level of care. This mechanism is effective if the judge is 
able to assess a causal relationship between the damage and the harmful activity 
performed by the polluter. In the case of climate change, this assessment risks 
constituting a probatio diabolica: the effects of climate change are uncertain and, 
moreover, they are spread in time and space, thus making it difficult to collect 
substantial evidence of the causal relationship between the damage incurred by the 
victim and the polluting activity of the potential injurer.  
Other fundamental aspects make an ex-post kind of intervention a costly and hardly 
effective instrument to mitigate the risk of climate change. First, climate change is 
characterized by a magnitude of potential injurers and by a plenitude of potential 
victims. Proving the causal link between the harmful activity and the damage 
becomes increasingly difficult as the number of potential victims and injurers 
increases. Second, climate change is characterized both by a long passage of time 
before the effects of releasing emissions in the atmosphere become visible and by 
wide-spread effects in space. Moreover, the risk of insolvency should be mentioned: 
climate change involves a high risk of destruction, and the potential damage results so 
high that the potential injurer would not be able to compensate the victim for it. Being 
that the feasible compensation is lower than the magnitude of the potential damage, an 
ex-post intervention would cause under-deterrence on the part of the polluter. 
Given the features characterizing climate change, it is possible to conclude that ex-
post intervention through a liability regime is not the most suitable legal instrument to 
promote an optimal internalization of the global warming externality. However, in 
spite of these shortcomings, it should also be mentioned that the last decades have 
experienced a rising number of liability claims against states responsible for global 
warming, showing that the application of a liability regime to the case of climate 
change is costly but not impossible (Faure and Nolkaemper 2007). 
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4. Command and Control Type of Regulation  
The shortcomings that have been previously listed constitute a strong argument in 
favour of an ex-ante legal approach toward the problem of climate change. In fact, in 
addition to the ex-post liability regime developed in the field of private law, 
environmental law is characterized also by an ex-ante type of regulation which has 
been developed in the field of public law. In the particular case of climate change and 
GHGs emissions, whose risks have been recognized only recently, a type of ex-ante 
public legal regulation has been preferred instead of a private law liability regime, 
given the latter’s shortcomings previously described.  
Environmental public law was initially developed through a Command and Control 
type of regulation, for instance either by forbidding certain dangerous activities, by 
requiring some particular behaviour or by imposing some quality standards. As 
reflected in the name itself, this form of regulation is developed in the two following 
steps which both require the collection of a large amount of information on behalf of 
the regulator. First, the regulator has to perform a cost-benefit analysis in order to 
assess the optimal level of activity where the marginal costs of pollution are aligned 
with the respective marginal benefits. Among them the regulator should know the cost 
linked to the activity and the cost of the foregone activity; it should also know the cost 
of alternative technologies which can reduce the externality and the cost of the 
externality, determined by the difference between the marginal private and social cost 
functions. Moreover the authority has to know also the social benefits of the activity 
in order to assess the optimal level of pollution. The collection of all this information 
tends to be highly costly since private parties rarely find it convenient to disclose 
spontaneously the private information they have. To the contrary, private agents 
might be tempted to adopt a strategic behaviour by hiding their private information or 
revealing biased information that would favour their competitive position against 
potential competitors.  Therefore, when applying Command and Control, the 
regulatory mechanism should be designed in order to give private agents an incentive 
to reveal their private information, and to reveal them correctly. 
Moreover, not only should the information costs be considered to assess the 
desirability of this type of highly interventionist form of regulation, but also the 
administrative and enforcement costs, which are the costs of implementing the 
regulatory standard and of imposing sanctions in case of non-compliance after the 
regulation has been commanded. Thus, two necessary conditions for Command and 
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Control to work effectively are, first, an optimal standard ex-ante and, then, optimal 
enforcement ex-post through the application of optimal civil or penal sanctions. In 
fact, the polluter tends to balance the cost of investing required to comply with the 
imposed standard with the cost of incurring a sanction in the case of non-compliance 
weighted by the probability of being discovered; this probability decreases as the 
number of regulated agents increases. 
The disadvantages of Command and Control have been extensively described by the 
economic literature (Kolstad et al. 1990). Its other major shortcomings lie in the fact 
that this form of regulation fails to give efficient incentives to invest in research to 
develop new technologies beyond the standard set by the regulator, thus failing to 
promote dynamic efficiency. Moreover the major criticism of Command and Control 
concerns its incapacity to induce an equalization of the marginal abatement costs 
among different polluters. In fact, standards cannot be specifically tailored to the 
regulated agents and they tend to be quite general. Due to these two qualities the 
standards fail to exploit the differences in abatement opportunities among private 
parties. 
While the economic literature has mainly focused on the shortcomings and 
disadvantages of this strong form of interventionism and therefore been more in 
favour of a more market-oriented type of regulation, it is important to stress also the 
advantages of Command and Control. First, direct regulation promotes certainty in the 
market: agents know that as long as they comply with the standard they cannot be 
held liable (like in the case of negligence), and thus they receive clear information and 
incentives to undertake long-term investment in order to improve their technology. 
This condition is particularly important for the energy and industrial sectors which are 
characterized by long-term intensive investments. Moreover, it is important to 
highlight under which conditions Command and Control type of regulation results 
effective. Obviously, it can be effective when the cost of commanding and controlling 
are low enough, costs which implies a limited number of polluting sources to regulate. 
Moreover, the more homogeneous the regulated sectors are, the easier it is to equalize 
their abatement costs; thus, the second requirement for an effective regulation is 
determined by the low variability among the regulated sectors. Finally, in order to 
promote dynamic efficiency it should be possible to adapt and update the imposed 
standard whenever new information and technologies are available. 
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Stavins (2004) argues that when “costs are similar among sources, command-and-
control instruments may perform equivalent to (or better than) market-based 
instruments, depending on transactions costs, administrative costs, possibilities for 
strategic behavior, political costs, and the  nature of the pollutants” (p.9). Indeed, the 
literature has also reported empirical evidence of many cases where Command and 
Control has resulted in an effective type of regulation (Oates 1990). 
An obvious case when Command and Control is the most effective form of regulation 
is when the marginal costs of a dangerous activity always exceed its marginal 
benefits, thus implying that this activity should be always forbidden. However it does 
not seem the case with climate change: obviously there are great benefits deriving 
from the industrial and energetic production. These benefits have to be balanced with 
the highly uncertain costs of releasing GHGs in the atmosphere. 
 
5.   From Command and Control to Market Based Incentives: the Case of Taxes 
Only in the last decades has the theoretical and institutional debate tended to stress not 
only the market failure in granting an optimal level of environmental protection, but 
also the failures and deficiencies of public regulation. An excessive rigidity and 
uniformity of the rules create inefficiencies which fail to take into account different 
geographical and technological situations. Overly rigid regulatory constraints do not 
foster innovation and tend to protect the status quo. As will be discussed below, a 
large amount of literature of political economy has shown that the regulated sectors 
prefer to lobby for the imposition of a command and control regulation which tends to 
protect the competitiveness of the incumbent firms against the potential competition 
of new and more efficient entrants (Buchanan and Tullock 1975). In fact, the 
imposition of a direct form of regulation historically tended to put more costs on the 
new entrants, thus preserving the inefficient competitive position of the incumbent 
firms which are successful in their lobbying activity (Kehoane et al. 1996). 
In the last two decades, the theoretical debate has moved toward the possibility of 
adopting more market-oriented types of regulation which are more flexible and thus 
able to grant an internalization of the costs of pollution at lower costs. The first 
instrument that can be adopted instead of Command and Control is a pollution tax, as 
it was formulated and presented by the English economist Arthur Pigou in 1920. 
While in the case of direct regulation, the authority has to perform a cost-benefit 
analysis in order to set the optimal standard, in this alternative scenario the regulator 
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(only) has to collect the information necessary to set a tax equal to the negative 
externality, which is determined by the difference between social and private marginal 
costs. Thus, contrary to the previous case of Command and Control, the public 
authority does not have to collect any information concerning the benefits. Like in the 
Command and Control system, under the tax system the regulator has to build a 
system of ex-post control to safeguard against tax evasion which entails some costs. 
However, some economies of scope can be done with the existing national tax 
framework, implying lower administrative costs and a lower risk of tax evasion 
compared to the case of Command and Control.  
Once the pollution tax is set, the duty to perform a cost-benefit analysis of pollution is 
shifted to the private agent, who is also the most informed party and thus in a better 
position to balance the benefits and costs of polluting. Differently from the previous 
case, the regulated sector does not face any strict constraint, and as long as he pays the 
environmental tax, he can produce and pollute without any limitation. Without the 
imposition of any taxes, the polluter will continue to produce (and to emit GHGs in 
the atmosphere) as long as its marginal benefits from pollution are greater than zero. 
Conversely, if a tax is set at a level which equals the cost of the externality, the 
regulated agent will produce and pollute up to the optimal equilibrium where the 
marginal costs (increased by the tax) and benefits of pollution are balanced and 
equalized.  
Thus, differently from the Command and Control case, a Pigouvian tax gives the 
polluters an indirect incentive to reveal its private information about its benefits and 
strategies: once the tax is established, the private agent is called to decide between 
changing the technology, reducing the production or continuing to produce and to pay 
the tax. In general, while in the short run the imposition of a tax tends to cause a 
reduction of production and pollution up to the static efficient outcome, in the long 
term the tax gives an indirect incentive to invest in cleaner technologies with a lower 
carbon intensity, thus promoting also dynamic efficiency.  
When the tax is set at an optimal level this soft form of regulation generates optimal 
deterrence: not all the externality is eliminated but just the inefficient externality 
above the point where the social marginal costs of production exceed the social 
marginal benefits. Moreover, when a tax is set at an optimal level, it can exploit the 
differences in abatement costs among the different tax payers, creating in the long run 
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an equalization of the abatement costs that cannot be easily achieved by a Command 
and Control direct regulation. 
The tax solution shows the trade-off between quantity and price: on one hand, the 
price to be paid  is known and stable; the lack of price volatility is an important 
incentive that can help private agents to formulate long-term strategies aimed at 
investing in and developing less carbon-intensive technologies. On the other hand, the 
quantity of emissions that will be released in the atmosphere is not known and cannot 
be fixed. Under a tax system, the polluter can pollute as much as he or she wants as 
long as he or she continues to pay the tax, and the regulator cannot put a cap on the 
overall emissions level. Thus, in order to reach an efficient outcome it is crucial to set 
a tax that is proportional to the level of externality, and this process may be difficult. 
First, it is possible that the cost of the externality is not fixed (i.e., private and social 
marginal costs vary at the same rate, so they are parallel functions with a fixed 
distance, that is the externality), but it can also vary at an increasing marginal rate. 
Both marginal production costs and the marginal cost of the externality can be 
increasing, but they can vary at different rates. For instance, as production increases 
both the marginal cost of producing and the marginal cost of emitting an extra-ton of 
GHG in the atmosphere increase; however, the latter can increase faster (or slower) 
than the former. In this case, the difference between the private and the social 
marginal cost function is not fixed but rather increases (decreases) as the level of 
production increases. In this case, the environmental pollution externality can be 
internalized efficiently only by applying a variable pollution tax. This tax should 
equal the increasing difference between the private and social marginal cost functions; 
however, such a tax is difficult to apply because of the prohibitive costs of detailed 
pollution data requirements. Fixed pollution taxes are more pragmatic and easier 
instruments to apply, but in this case they would constitute a second best solution as 
they fail to induce the internalization of the externality at an efficient level. 
Another problem of the pollution tax is related to the question “what to tax?” In 
theory the tax should be proportional to the amount of GHGs released in the 
atmosphere, but this is a variable that is difficult to monitor on a small scale 
suggesting that it might be more convenient to link the tax at another variable that can 
be considered a proxy of the emissions. Since emissions derive mainly from the 
combustion of fossil fuels, one might tax directly the input at the top of the production 
process. This kind of substitute tax provides an indirect incentive to improve the 
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technology: by introducing more efficient technologies, which can produce the same 
amount of output with a lower amount of input, the polluter has to pay less taxes and 
indirectly the amount of emissions produced decreases as well. However, this tax fails 
to provide any incentive to promote pure, less carbon-intensive technologies that 
present the same input/output ratio. For instance, some kind of emissions may be 
captured by installing a filter which entails some investment costs. In this case, the 
energy intensity and efficiency of the technology would not be strictly improved since 
the same amount of input would continue to be required in order to produce the same 
amount of output. In this case, the producer would continue to face the same tax 
burden in spite of the installation of the filter which would lower the plant carbon 
intensity (i.e., less emissions released per ton of production, or per ton of input). Other 
technologies, like the Carbon Capture and Storage can reduce the amount of 
emissions that is produced, but they require the employment of a higher amount of 
energy. This means that the technology carbon intensity improves, but its energy 
efficiency expressed by the input/output ratio would worsen (more input is required to 
produce the same amount of input) and the tax burden would increase despite 
emissions are reduced. In these cases, taxing just the input (i.e., fossil fuel tax) or 
taxing just the output (i.e., consumption tax) risk to not provide optimal incentives to 
develop pure, less carbon-intensive technologies. 
Moreover, the enhancement of dynamic efficiency requires the adaptation of the tax 
rate after the introduction of new technologies that can reduce the rate at which the 
pollution externality changes at the margin. If a new technology which abates the 
marginal social costs of pollution is introduced and the regulator continues to impose 
the old tax rate which is referred to as the old marginal social cost, it would result in 
an inefficient equilibrium where the externality is reduced to a level where the 
marginal cost of abatement exceeds the marginal social benefit. Conversely, if the tax 
rate is not adapted and the regulated agents know it, no incentive is provided to 
develop this kind of technology. 
Like in the previous cases, the imposition of an efficient tax requires some 
information that might be difficult to collect. Thus it becomes difficult to impose an 
optimal tax, and there is the risk of inducing over or under-deterrence. However, it 
could be argued that the first goal of a Pigouvian tax is to establish a system aimed at 
reducing the market failure in a context where externalities are difficult to assess with 
precision. Under this perspective, taxes do not have to be perfect, but they can be 
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thought of as a second best solution; such a solution is aimed at providing incentives 
to improve production and consumption in order to reduce the market failure and 
grant higher environmental protection. According to the environmental principle of 
prevention (i.e., preventing environmental danger rather than reacting to 
environmental harm that already has taken place) and to the principle of precaution 
(which states that in front of an environmental risk the lack of scientific certainty and 
consensus about the possible consequences is not sufficient to postpone intervention 
aimed at lowering that risk), it might be more effective to move to a second best 
solution by applying an imperfect tax rather than doing nothing until an optimal tax is 
determined with certainty. 
 
6. From Pigouvian Taxes to a Coasian Cap and Trading Solution 
While the Pigouvian tax is considered a price solution to the problem of the 
externality, the establishment of an artificial market of emissions property rights is 
considered a “symmetric” quantity solution. Dales (1968) can be considered the 
founding father of the tradable emissions rights scheme, but his work can be traced 
back to the property rights school in economics, according to which externalities are a 
consequence of a lack of property rights and can be avoided through the establishment 
of a system aimed at creating and protecting property rights (Demsetz 1967). In 
addition, it would not be too ambitious to assert that the idea of substituting a price 
system with a quantity system of property rights can already be found in the seminal 
article of Ronald Coase “The Problem of Social Costs” (1960). The environmental 
externality has for a long time been considered a consequence of the unilateral 
polluter’s harmful activity. Coase changed this approach moving toward a bilateral 
causation approach, by stressing the reciprocal nature of the harm. While in the 
traditional framework, direct protection should be given to the victim of pollution, 
Coase argues that the protection of one party—the victim—inevitably imposes an 
indirect cost on the other party who then ends up facing some limitations on its 
freedom to produce. Once the bilateral nature of the harm has been recognized, 
Coase’s famous theorem shows that, as long as the transaction costs related to the 
private bargaining solution are zero, the establishment of a system of property rights 
is an effective legal and economic instrument to achieve an efficient outcome where 
the externality is internalized up to an optimal level. Transaction costs can be 
considered as the costs of designing, bargaining and enforcing a contract. They also 
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entail  information costs and strategic costs incurred by the opportunistic behaviour 
that the parties might be in place to adopt. When transaction costs are negligible, an 
efficient allocation of resources results from private bargaining regardless of the 
initial legal assignment of property rights. 
This conclusion is very powerful and challenging: since efficiency is pursued through 
private bargaining independently on the initial allocation of property rights, the 
tradable emissions rights can be initially assigned according to other criteria and 
priorities that are different from efficiency. Since efficiency is reached anyway, the 
regulator can assign property rights in order to reach, in addition to efficiency, and not 
instead of efficiency, other goals like fairness or distributive justice. 
The conditions set forth by the conclusion of the positive version of the Coase 
theorem can be met under the necessary conditions of zero transaction costs. The 
obvious normative implication is that, when transaction costs are positive, then the 
initial assignment of property rights might be crucial to granting an efficient 
allocation and use of resources. When transaction costs are positive, first the policy 
maker should design legal rules aimed at reducing them and then leave private parties 
to bargain about property rights among themselves until the efficient equilibrium is 
reached. For instance, the legal rules should be set in order to induce private agents to 
reveal their information and to reduce the adoption of strategic behaviour. If 
transaction costs cannot be lowered through legal intervention, then it becomes crucial 
to collect information in order to assign the property rights directly to the party who 
values them most and who can use them in the most efficient way. 
When transaction costs are high and cannot be lowered, then it becomes necessary to 
question the desirability of the property rights solution, which should be preferred 
only if it entails lower transaction costs than the administrative costs of an ex-post 
intervention through a liability regime. 
In light of the principle of the Coase theorem, this section analyses the property of a 
mechanism of tradable permits under the assumption of zero transaction costs, 
highlighting conditions that have to be satisfied in order to grant an efficient allocation 
of resources through bargaining. 
First, it is necessary to recall an important difference between the scheme of tradable 
permits and the classic Coasian framework. While Coase describes a system where the 
victim and the injurer are called to privately bargain property rights according to their 
private information about costs and benefits, a system of tradable emissions rights 
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focuses only on the polluters (i.e., the victims of pollution are not called to participate 
actively within the scheme). In this scheme the regulator puts a cap on the emissions 
and distributes (according to a particular criterion) an equivalent number of tradable 
emissions rights among the polluters. Then, Coasian bargaining of tradable permits 
ensures the achievement of a optimal social equilibrium at the lowest marginal 
abatement cost, where the agents’ marginal costs are equalized and the market price of 
the permits equals the cost of the externality. Unlike other cases, such a market for 
pollution tradable permits is an artificially designed market, whose supply and demand 
functions depend on the volume of allowances artificially created and allocated by the 
regulator. A functioning market requires the existence of scarce goods. Without 
scarcity there is no market; permits would not have any positive market value and the 
system would fail to give polluters any incentive to reduce their emissions: 
 
Emissions trading can help achieve a given level of emission 
caps efficiently by setting an appropriate price, but this 
requires that policymakers set the caps consistent with the 
desired – and scientifically credible – level of environmental 
performance (Capoor and Ambrosi 2007, p. 6). 
 
Thus at least two conditions need to be satisfied for a cap and trade system to work 
effectively: (1) the total level of permits to be allocated in the market (the cap) should 
equal the optimal amount of GHGs to be emitted, determined by the point where the 
social marginal cost equals the social marginal benefit of polluting, and (2) monitoring 
shall be effective in guaranteeing that economic agents do not produce more emissions 
than the number of permits they own. Under this perspective it is possible to compare 
a cap and trade system to a soft form of Command and Control: in both cases the 
regulator has to collect information to set a limit, and in both cases a form of ex-post 
control is necessary to ensure compliance with the regulation. However, the Cap and 
Trade system is a more market-oriented form of regulation.  First, the regulator does 
not have to know the private marginal costs of abatement of the regulated firms; it 
(only) has to know the marginal cost and benefit of emissions in order to set the 
emissions cap at an optimal level that ensures scarcity. After the cap is set at an 
appropriate level, the mechanisms grant flexibility leaving the private parties to decide 
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how to comply with the law according to their private information concerning 
marginal abatement costs and benefits. 
When these conditions are satisfied, cap and trade is an effective system because, 
given the permits scarcity in the market, if one polluter wants to cover its emissions 
gap (i.e., the difference between emissions and permits initially allocated) by acquiring 
permits in the market, then another economic operator will have to abate these 
emissions on behalf of the first polluter in order to sell him or her the permits needed.  
Moreover, the market allowances’ free bargaining will make sure that tradable permits 
will be allocated to those who value them the most, while emissions will be reduced by 
those who can do it at the lowest marginal abatement cost. Indeed, in a cap and trade 
system, economic agents can comply with the regulation either by “making or 
buying”: they can cover their emissions gap either by abating internally the emissions 
they produce (i.e., make) or alternatively by acquiring in the market the permits they 
need to cover their gap (i.e., buy). Compared to a more centralized Command and 
Control type of regulation, a cap and trade system is a market-oriented mechanism 
giving economic agents higher strategic investment freedom in deciding how to 
comply with the environmental regulation; plants operating on the energy efficiency 
frontier, whose marginal abatement costs are higher than the permits’ market price, 
will find it more convenient to buy permits in the market, while less efficient plants 
will opt for abating emissions internally and selling their permits’ surplus at a price 
higher than their MAC. According to this perspective, a cap and trade system is not 
only effective, but also efficient:  emissions will be reduced where the marginal 
abatement costs are the lowest, thus at the minimal marginal social costs; as a 
consequence, the permits’ price will equal the lowest marginal abatement costs and in 
the long run the marginal abatement costs among different polluters will be equalized. 
Flexible economic instruments, such as a system of tradable permits, are likely to 
result in significant efficiency gains, since the social optimum equilibrium can be 
reached by minimizing the costs of compliance. This is true for the potential buyers 
with high marginal abatement costs and who can select the cheaper option of acquiring 
permits in the market instead of reducing emissions internally. It is also true for selling 
agents who can balance their costs in abating emissions internally with the revenues 
from selling the permits surplus they own. These economic principles have been 
included in the European legislation; in fact, as stated in the EC Directive 87/2003/EC 
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art.1, the EU ETS has been established “in order to promote reductions of GHG 
emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner.” 
However, the EU ETS effectiveness and efficiency in inducing emissions reduction 
has not been proved yet and, on the contrary, the partial results (in terms of CO2 price 
and emissions reduction in Europe) reached some years after the ETS implementation 
seem to suggest that the ETS is far from being an effective mechanism. The next 
chapters will analyze the legal design of the ETS in order to assess to what extent it 
can be considered an effective mechanism and, in the case inefficiencies have been 
discovered, to assess to what extent they can be considered a result of its legal and 
institutional framework. The analysis will focus mainly on the two variables that 
influence the correct functioning of a cap and trade scheme. First, the stringency of the 
ETS cap is discussed and, secondly, the criterion adopted to allocate free permits, 
which has been mainly grandfathering. 
 
7.    Comparative Analysis of Market Based Incentives: Prices vs. Quantities 
The previous sections have explained why and under which circumstances market-
based instruments should be preferred to a Command and Control type of regulation: 
they are incentive driven, they are more flexible, they can achieve an optimal 
internalization of the externality at lower marginal costs, and they require lower 
administrative and information costs. This chapter has underlined both the advantages 
and weaknesses linked to each form of regulation. However, it has failed to explain 
why in many circumstances, and in particular in Europe, the instrument of tradable 
permits has been preferred to other forms of regulation, and to a tax system in 
particular, to address the problem of climate change and to induce a reduction of 
emissions necessary to comply with the Kyoto target. The substantial symmetry 
between these market-based instruments has been previously highlighted by the 
economic literature (Weitzman 1974). Under a tax system, the regulator fixes the 
price, and under this constraint, the private parties determine the quantity of 
emissions; while the price is fixed and known, the quantity of emissions is uncertain. 
On the other hand, under a cap and trade scheme the regulator sets the quantity of 
emissions, while private parties in the market determine the price corresponding to the 
cost of the externality, thereby raising the problem of price volatility. Moreover, it has 
been shown that, without uncertainty, taxes and permits are fully equivalent if the 
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government can update these instruments after the introduction of more efficient 
technologies has occurred (Denicolò 1999). 
However, in both cases the regulator has to collect a certain amount of information to 
set either a tax equal to the externality, or to cap the emissions at an optimal level; in 
both cases, if the tax or the cap is not set an optimal level, the regulation will induce 
under-deterrence and the achievement of a non-optimal equilibrium where the 
marginal costs of pollution differ from the marginal benefits. Thus, while under 
circumstances in which there is perfect information both instruments should ensure 
the achievement of an optimal equilibrium, under circumstances of uncertainty there 
might be a divergence of results. In his comparative analysis, Weitzman (1974) 
demonstrates that when there is a lack of information regarding the marginal 
abatement costs, the desirability of one instrument over the other depends on the 
shape of the marginal benefit function. In other words, when the costs are uncertain, a 
tax system is less (or more) desirable than an alternative cap and trade system when 
the marginal benefits of reducing the externality are relatively steep (or flat) compared 
with the shape of the marginal cost function. 
Hepburn (2006) applies these results to the case of climate change: in theory a carbon 
tax should be preferred to a cap and trade scheme if the marginal costs of abating 
emissions increase very fast and new technologies have to be developed in order to 
induce further emissions reduction and if the marginal benefits from abatement are 
relatively flat. Actually it seems the case considering that climate change depends on 
the stock of emissions in the atmosphere, which is determined by the flow of 
emissions produced each year. This condition  implies that the reduction of emissions 
in the short term has little impact on mitigating climate change. This does not imply 
that the reduction of emissions does not bring any environmental benefits—which can 
be high— but only that such benefits become evident only after the reduction of a 
substantial amount of emissions.  
Thus, while according to the shape of the marginal cost and benefit function, a carbon 
tax should be preferred to a system of tradable emissions rights, Hoel and Karp (2002) 
show that the preference for a system of cap and trade increases by increasing the 
time horizon of the regulatory policy. 
The shape of the marginal cost and benefit function jointly with the time horizon of 
the regulatory policy are important variables to be considered in the comparative 
analysis of prices and quantities types of instruments. The main conclusion to be 
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drawn after applying the Weitzman analysis to the case of climate change is that a tax 
system should be preferred under a relatively short time horizon of the policy and in 
the case that the marginal abatement costs increases quickly, nevertheless the benefits 
of emissions reduction are quite insensitive to emissions over a short period. Being 
that all these clauses are verified in the real context, it becomes natural to ask why a 
tradable permits scheme has been preferred to a carbon tax system. Other factors need 
to be taken into account in order to explain the emergence of a cap and trade system 
over the alternative option of a carbon tax. 
 
7.1 International Issues 
First, it is important to recall that climate change is a global problem which requires a 
global approach promoted by international cooperation. National policies have to be 
coordinated and in compliance with supranational law, namely EU directives, and 
international law. The choice of the regulatory instrument can depend on and be 
influenced by international agreements. Yet, it is also important to determine the 
regulatory instrument that can promote international cooperation in the most effective 
way. One can argue that according to this perspective a tax system presents two 
shortcomings. First, fiscal policy typically belongs to the realm of national 
sovereignty. As some of the most important and influential political and economical 
instruments, individual nations are rarely willing to give up their fiscal independence 
and freedom by delegating the right to develop a common fiscal policy to 
supranational institutions like the European Union. In 1992, the European 
Commission advanced the possibility of introducing a carbon tax system among MS. 
Given that they would involve lower administrative costs, taxes were thought to be 
more effective than a command and control direct regulation and cheaper than a cap 
and trade system; however, different countries, among them Great Britain, strongly 
blocked this proposal, fearing that this would constitute the first legal precedent 
allowing the European Commission to develop a supranational fiscal policy in other 
fields different from the environmental one. In a context where the supranational 
power does not have the faculty to set a centralized and harmonized fiscal policy 
among different European MS, it would be possible to think of a second-best 
alternative where each MS could fix its own carbon tax, thus maintaining national 
sovereignty over this strategic political instrument. However,  and the examples from 
other fields abound, it is easy to argue that the cost of creating a harmonized and 
68 
 
effective fiscal policy increases as the number of national sovereign authorities to be 
coordinated increases as well. Like in the case of the Prisoner Dilemma, despite the 
fact that the cooperation outcome would be superior, each MS faces a strong incentive 
to impose a lower tax rate that would attract foreign investments. The risk of 
normative opportunism and fiscal arbitrage increases as the number of MS to be 
coordinated increases beyond the European borders. 
The risk of triggering competition to the bottom cannot be neglected, implying that a 
carbon tax is not an effective—as far as mechanisms promoting global cooperation 
go—to face and mitigate the problem of Climate Change.  
Under this perspective, the system of tradable permits, as it has been designed in the 
Kyoto Protocol, seems to be a more effective instrument in promoting a different kind 
of cooperation that combines a top-down approach typical of the direct regulation 
with a bottom-up approach that characterizes voluntary agreements. For the purpose 
of this research it is sufficient to mention that on one hand we are experiencing an 
increasing tendency to link the different cap and trade schemes that have emerged all 
over the world. The coordination and connection of different trading schemes is likely 
to bring about some important efficiency gains. A cap and trade scheme is developed 
according to the idea that room for bargaining and consecutive efficiency gains 
increase as the heterogeneity of the bargaining parties’ marginal abatement costs 
increases as well. Thus by linking different cap and trade schemes both the scope of 
the market and the number of private agents who can bargain tradable permits 
increase. As the variability in marginal abatement costs is likely to increase as well, it 
is possible to conclude that the extension of a cap and trade scheme results in 
important efficiency gains which in turn facilitate international cooperation.  
The second important feature that facilitates cooperation is determined by the flexible 
mechanisms established in the Kyoto Protocol, like the joint implementation and the 
clean development mechanisms, which can induce global cooperation from the 
bottom through the establishment of a system of voluntary agreements among private 
parties monitored and certified by supranational institutions. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol and to the previous Rio Declaration, the non-Annex I countries (i.e., less 
developed countries which did not contribute to generating the problem of climate 
change) were not required to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and to commit to any 
emissions reduction target. On one hand, this decision seems to be coherent with a 
principle of justice and fairness: less developed countries did not cause global 
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warming so they should not face the cost burden deriving from the duty to mitigate 
climate change. On the other hand, this decision does not seem economically efficient 
since the firms operating in developing countries are more carbon intensive, thus 
presenting lower marginal abatement costs and higher abatement opportunities. As a 
result, despite posing some problems concerning distributive justice, the same amount 
of emissions could be reduced more effectively, at lower marginal costs, by 
intervening in those countries characterized by obsolete technologies and low 
marginal abatement costs. This would be an alternative to reducing these emissions in 
developed countries which are characterized on average by a cleaner energy resources 
mix and more efficient technologies and thus producing at a lower carbon intensity 
rate than developing countries.  
According to this perspective, nowadays the definition of international project-based 
crediting mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), seems to 
be the most concrete answer to the problem of global cooperation and, in addition, to 
the promotion of emissions abatement at lowest marginal costs. The Linking Directive 
2004/101/CE defines a link between the countries participating in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and other countries that did not ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. The Directive establishes that firms operating in the ETS can obtain 
“certified emission reductions” (CERs) by carrying out emissions reduction projects 
in the countries that did not ratify the Protocol (non-Annex 1 countries). It also allows 
firms to use those credits to cover their exceeding emissions into the ETS. The credits 
obtained by CDM projects (CERs) are equivalent to the Emissions Unit Allowances 
(EUAs), and they correspond to one ton of CO2. In practice, it means that CERs can 
increase the total number of available permits and thus contribute in a substantial way 
to the achievement of Kyoto targets.  In fact, the inclusion of credits deriving from 
CDM projects is strongly contributing to the Emissions Trading Scheme’s 
development. Point Carbon estimated that in 2005 CDM certificates covered the 
biggest part of the market, in terms of exchanged volumes but not in terms of 
monetary value. Compared to 362 millions of EUAs exchanged, for a total value of 7. 
2 bill. €, in 2005 CDM projects have been signed (emissions reduction purchase 
agreements, ERPAs) for a total amount of 397 millions of CO2 tons. However, the 
total value of these project corresponds only to 1.9 bill €. In fact, the CER’s lower 
value is due to the higher risk that international CDM projects must discount. 
Different factors can explain the risk involving CDM projects: the Linking Directive 
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establishes that CERs can be used only starting from the second ETS phase (2008 – 
2012); current CDM have been signed so far without any effective (i.e., physical) 
available credits transactions (i.e., forward and futures); project- based transactions 
pay a higher risk premium because these credits can be assigned only if the project is 
positively achieved; and finally most of these long-term projects are implemented in 
countries that face high political instability. Given that the Kyoto emissions reduction 
target is the main goal to be achieved, Law & Economics tends to evaluate positively 
such Coasian bargaining solutions. In fact, instruments such as the CDM can 
contribute substantially to achieving this target by both inducing the negative 
externality’s internalization by promoting cost-effective emissions reduction projects 
and by overcoming the political inertia in approaching environmental issues at a 
global level. Pizer defines the CDM as a useful international mechanism to induce the 
achievement of short-term goals: “there is an unusual alliance of support for project-
based crediting in developing countries: Environmental advocates see this as 
maintaining environmental integrity, businesses see this as a cheaper alternative to 
domestic compliance, brokers and dealmakers see profit opportunities, developing 
countries see foreign aid, and industrialized country governments see opportunities to 
complement domestic mitigation. Given the inevitable need to channel mitigation 
resources from industrialized to developing countries, more thought should be given 
to how these mechanisms can be expanded and improved” (Pizer, 2005, p.2). To 
summarize, in an international context, a cap and trade instrument is likely to be 
superior to a carbon tax on different grounds: first it involves higher political 
acceptability than carbon taxes on behalf of MS which are not willing to give up their 
sovereignty in this strategic field. Second, while taxes are subjected to the risk of 
fiscal arbitrage which might cause a race to the bottom, a cap and trade system is 
more likely to favour and induce international cooperation according to both a top-
down approach (i.e., a linking of different cap and trade schemes)  and a bottom-up 
approach (i.e., voluntary agreements in the form of certified emissions reductions). 
 
7.2  Political Economy Approach and Private Preferences toward a Cap and 
Trade System 
Another important reason that could explain the general preference in Europe toward 
a cap and trade scheme over a tax system comes from the “political economic theory 
of regulation”  developed within the Chicago School by prominent scholars as George 
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Stigler, Richard Posner, Sam Peltzman and Gary Becker. In brief, rather than focusing 
on the potential failures of the market, the Chicago School tends to stress the failure 
of regulation, which is likely to be captured and influenced by private interests. 
According to this approach, it is unrealistic to assume that once the risk of a market 
failure is detected, the government intervenes in order to regulate the market and to 
correct its failure in order to pursue the public interest. Quite the opposite, it is not the 
government which imposes a regulation on the firms, but rather the firms, aggregated 
in the form of private interest groups, that are likely to demand regulation. The reason 
why regulation is more likely to be demand-driven, rather than supply-driven, is that 
private interest groups tend to use it as a strategic instrument as a way of creating a 
barrier to entry in the market and as a way of preserving their competitiveness: when 
asking for regulation, private groups will lobby in favour of a regulation type whose 
benefits are going to be highly concentrated within the group, while its costs are going 
to be imposed and widely dispersed outside the interest group. 
This general theory is supported by empirical evidence. Keohane et al. (1998) observe 
that at the time of deciding which economic and legal instrument should be chosen in 
order to achieve the desired level of environmental protection in a cost-effective way, 
the positive political decisions developed in the United States have strongly diverged 
from the recommendations of normative economic theory. In the last decades, 
Command and Control has been adopted more extensively than market-based 
instruments, despite the fact that economic theory unequivocally demonstrates the 
economic superiority of the latter over the former type of regulation. This superiority 
is due to the fact that the latter type can ensure environmental protection at lower 
marginal costs and it promotes dynamic efficiency by providing more effective 
incentives to develop more efficient technologies. Moreover, many authors 
(McCubbins et al. 1989, Maloney & Brady 1988, Nelson et al 1993) underline that 
when environmental standards have been adopted, they have tended to penalize, 
rather than reward, more efficient firms since the requirements to reduce marginal 
amounts of pollution have generally been more stringent for new pollution sources—
and on average characterized by modern and more efficient technologies—than for 
incumbent firms. This has therefore created a distortive incentive to keep old and 
more polluting plants in operation. 
The evidence that the standards for new sources have been on average more stringent 
than the standards applied to incumbent firms is coherent with the analysis of Tullock 
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and Buchanan, according to which incumbent firms tend to prefer Command and 
Control over taxes because the imposition of standards can work as a barrier to entry 
in the market.  
Revesez and Stavins (2004) observe that market-based instruments have been 
increasingly adopted and that the form of tradable permits has been extensively 
preferred to the adoption of taxes, despite the fact that economic theory suggests that 
they are equally efficient and their appropriateness depends on case specific factors, 
such as the shape of marginal cost and benefit functions. Under a political economy 
perspective, the reason why public authorities have generally preferred tradable 
permits over taxes can be found in their different distributive effects. It has been 
previously argued that, under some circumstances, both taxes and tradable permits are 
efficient, flexible mechanisms that induce an optimal internalization of the pollution 
cost. However, while a tax system implies a transfer of money from the private to the 
public sector, in a cap and trade scheme, where allowances are initially allocated for 
free (as in the European case of ETS), this potential tax revenue is kept by the private 
parties, implying opposite impacts on public finance. As it will be more thoroughly 
analysed in chapter 6, under distributive terms a cap and trade scheme can be thought 
of as a tax system able to generate tax revenue. However, if the permits are initially 
grandfathered to the regulated installations, this tax revenue is kept by the private 
installations. On the other hand, under auctioning the tax revenue is shifted to the 
public finance, implying the same distributional effects as a tax system. Auctioning 
permits or imposing a carbon tax implies that firms are required to pay not only for 
the emissions they abate but also for the pollution they generate. Grandfathering, 
contrarily, means that the emission rights are allocated for free to polluters according 
to their historical level of emissions. This implies that emitters only have to pay for 
the costs of emission reduction and not for their emissions as in the case of 
auctioning. Consequently, compared to auctioning, the advantage of grandfathering is 
that it increases the political acceptability of an emissions trading scheme (e.g. 
Baumol and Oates, 1998; Tietenberg et al., 1999). For this reason, grandfathering 
proves the prevalent method of allocating emission allowances (e.g. Revesz and 
Stavins, 2004). In addition, firms may also have an incentive to pollute in order to 
receive more allowances (e.g. Egenhofer and Fujiwara, 2005). Although this can be 
prevented by choosing a historical base year that polluters cannot influence anymore, 
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companies will try to lobby in favour of a different or updated base year if this 
provides them with more allowances. 
A system of cap and trade where allowances are initially grandfathered according to 
historical emissions is likely to be preferred to both a tax system and to a cap and 
trade system where allowances are auctioned because, on one hand, it entails lower 
compliance costs, and on the other hand it tends to increase the costs of potential new 
entrants that would not be entitled to any free allocation (i.e., they do not have any 
historical emissions). As a result, regulation works as a barrier to enter the market. 
 
8. Conclusions  
This chapter has provided a taxonomy of different legal and economic instruments 
aimed at internalizing the cost of pollution in an effective way. Different instruments 
have been briefly discussed and their related advantages and weaknesses have been 
highlighted through a comparative analysis. First the ex-post liability regime within 
the field of private law has been presented. Then the ex-ante forms of regulation have 
been discussed: first, the direct regulation in the form of Command and Control, and 
then the more market-oriented types of regulation. Pigouvian taxes and Coasian cap 
and trade schemes have been explained and compared, and their efficiency and 
different distributive effects have been evaluated, as has their capacity to promote 
international cooperation in order to address the difficult task of mitigating climate 
change at a global level. 
Under a perspective of political economy, it has been argued that a cap and trade 
scheme has been preferred to other instruments as a main mechanism to promote the 
reduction of emissions in Europe because it ensures higher political acceptability in 
the eyes of the regulated sectors. 
Despite not presenting an exhaustive analysis, this chapter has attempted to introduce 
the instrument of cap and trade which constitutes the core of this research. In fact, 
rather than developing an exhaustive comparative analysis between regulatory 
instruments, the thesis focuses on how to improve the ETS that has been chosen (for 
one reason or for another) as the main regulatory instrument to address the problem of 
climate change.  
This decision is supported by pragmatic evaluations. It would be possible to discuss 
whether and under which circumstances a tax system is superior to a cap and trade 
scheme or vice-versa; however, this thesis has been developed in light of the legal, 
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formal and binding decision of establishing a market for tradable permits (Directive 
87/2003/EC) in Europe. While this scheme is far from perfect and entails some costs 
that could be avoided by a more effective legal design, under a path dependency 
perspective one could argue that the costs of abandoning this institutional framework 
in order to switch to another regulatory mechanism aimed at pursuing the same 
emissions reduction target would be probably higher than the costs linked with the 
improvement of this existing mechanism. Therefore, given that the ETS has been 
chosen as the principal regulatory instrument in Europe, the aim of this research is to 
analyse how effective this mechanism is in reaching the emissions reduction target, 
whose efficiency is not questioned. The general aim of this thesis is hence to focus on 
the biggest experiment of a cap and trade system ever established in order to identify 
the eventual inefficiencies deriving from the legal design of the ETS framework and 
to indicate how the law should be reformed in order to improve the overall 
functioning of the ETS. 
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Chapter 4. Legal and Economic Aspects of the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme 
 
1. Introduction 
Taking both the European emissions reduction targets as given, and without 
questioning the European decision of opting for a cap and trade scheme among 
different possible regulatory options, this research starts by observing how the ETS is 
performing and develops an economic analysis of the institutional and legal 
framework of ETS. The general purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether the 
ETS has been designed in an effective way and, in the case that fallacies are 
identified, to offer some normative prescriptions to improve the ETS’ effectiveness by 
reforming its institutional framework according to economic principles.  
This chapter is aimed at introducing the economic and legal background of the ETS. 
Starting with a brief reminder of the important experience of the American SO2 
emissions trading program, section 2 of this chapter describes the origin of the EU 
ETS within the legal framework of the Kyoto Protocol and the role it covers within 
the European climate policy. The ETS is based upon the institution of emissions 
allowances, artificially created by the public authority and assigned to the regulated 
agents that are free to trade them within the ETS. Therefore, the legal nature of the 
allowances within the field of property law is briefly discussed.  
Section 3 contextualizes the ETS in a temporal and special framework. The length of 
the ETS regulation and its subdivision in different trading periods are specified 
together with its scope: the amount of emissions and sources that fall within the ETS. 
This specification is important to underline that the ETS regulates only a subset of the 
GHGs and emissions sources covered by the Kyoto Protocol. This difference suggests 
that compliance with the ETS European legislation does not necessarily imply 
compliance with the Kyoto emissions reduction target. 
Section 4 introduces the National Allocation Plans (NAPs): the public document that 
MS have to design and submit to the European Commission. NAPs specify how many 
allowances the MS intend to allocate to their national ETS sectors and installations, as 
well as the criterion according to which they intend to distribute those allowances. 
This section underlines the responsibilities delegated at a decentralized level. It is 
necessary to introduce the role that MS have to carry out within the ETS. This topic is 
discussed in the fifth section which describes the areas where the application of the 
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principle of subsidiarity, jointly with the lack of clear guidelines, has led to different 
interpretations and implementations of the common European Directive across MS, 
thus limiting the internal harmonization within the ETS. Four areas have been 
identified: the definition of the national ETS cap, and thus the emissions reduction 
burden imposed on the national ETS sectors; the criterion to distribute the allowances 
among ETS national installations; the definition of the installations that should fall 
within the ETS; and the possibility of bringing some ex-post adjustments, like the 
case of closures and the definition of the baseline year according to which allowances 
are grandfathered. Most of the issues that are introduced in this paragraph will be 
extensively discussed in the next chapters in order to assess whether and to what 
extent the delegation of many duties to MS according to the principle of subsidiarity 
has compromised the internal harmonization of the ETS and, if so, whether it has 
limited the effectiveness of the ETS.  
Section 6 intends to use a practical case to illustrate how the ETS can impact the 
secondary market—in this case, the electricity generation market—by inducing a 
reduction of emissions through a switch to less carbon-intensive fuels. First, the 
properties and specificities of the electricity markets are shortly recalled (sections 
6.1). Then section 6.2 describes the process according to which quantities and prices 
are set at equilibrium, while section 6.3 explains how such equilibrium might change 
after CO2 emissions have been monetized within the ETS. The indicator of the CO2 
theoretical coal-to-gas switch price is introduced. 
2. The Launching of the EU ETS and the Nature of the Emissions Allowances 
The mitigation of climate change constitutes one of the most important, ambitious and 
shared European goals. First, in 2002 the former fifteen MS of the European Union 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, committing to reduce their emissions by 8% below the 
1990 level by 2012. Then, in 2007 the European Commission expressed its firm 
intention to strengthen this goal, and in December 2008 the European MS finally 
approved the Climate Package, committing themselves to a unilateral 20% reduction 
of GHG emissions below the 1990 level by 2020. 
In light of these ambitious commitments, a cap and trade scheme—namely, the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)—has been established to 
promote a reduction of GHGs emissions required to comply with the Kyoto target in 
an efficient and cost-effective way. 
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The ETS constitutes the most important pillar of the European climate policy. It was 
established in 2003 by the European Directive 87/2003/EC when entry into force of 
the Kyoto Protocol was still uncertain, and it became operational in January 2005.  
This scheme is now up and running. More or less similar emissions trading schemes 
have been already in use in Denmark (since 2001) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
(since 2002). Also outside the EU, various countries, such as Norway, Japan and 
Canada, intend to build national tradable emission rights systems, which could 
eventually be linked to the EU scheme provided that they mutually recognize their 
transferable units. The Norwegian government, for instance, decided in early 2006 to 
approve such a link.  
More than 11,000 energy and industrial installations—which are collectively 
responsible for almost half of the European GHG emissions—participate in the ETS, 
which thereby constitutes the largest multi-country and multi-sector experiment of a 
Cap and Trade scheme for GHGs in the world. The EU ETS has been developed in 
light of some previous important experiences, particularly the Sulphur Dioxide (SO2) 
allowance program, launched in the United States in 1990 to promote the national 
reduction of sulphur dioxide gases, which are responsible for the environmental 
problem of acid rains. Moreover, the possibility of building a multi-national cap and 
trade scheme to reduce GHG emissions had already been foreseen in 1997 by the 
Kyoto Protocol. In fact, Art. 17 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes that the ratifying 
Parties “may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their 
commitments […]. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the 
purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.” The 
Annex on emissions trading in the subsequent Marrakech Accords enabled 
governments to authorize legal entities to transfer and/or acquire emissions under Art. 
17.  
The European scheme is interesting in light of the American experience with market-
based instruments because the EU has copied most design features of the US SO2 
emissions trading scheme (e.g. Christiansen and Wettestad, 2003; Damro and 
Méndez, 2003). In particular, both programs allocate allowances for free and 
proportionally to historical emissions, instead of auctioning them. In the European 
context, Art. 10 of the aforementioned Directive ensures that every MS  has allocated 
at least 95 per cent of its allowances free of charge in the period 2005-2007 and at 
least 90 per cent for the period 2008-2012. Moreover, both the SO2 emissions trading 
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program in the US and the CO2 emissions trading scheme in the EU define tradable 
emission rights as allowances. Art. 3 of the European Directive states that “allowance 
means an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified 
period, which shall be valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this 
Directive and shall be transferable in accordance with the provisions of this 
Directive.” In the SO2 emissions trading scheme in the US, an allowance is defined as 
follows: “The term ‘allowance’ means an authorization, allocated to an affected unit 
by the Administration under this title, to emit, during or after a specified calendar 
year, one ton of sulphur dioxide […] Allowances allocated under this title may be 
transferred among designated representatives of the owners or operators of affected 
sources under this title and any other person who holds such allowances (…)” 
(CAAA, 1990, Title IV Acid Deposition Control, section 402 (3) and section 403 (b) 
respectively). 
Although most economists see tradable emission rights as property rights, and 
although it is clear that these allowances have common features with the property that 
is freely alienable and tradable, the Directive that establishes the Scheme of emissions 
trading does not specify the precise legal nature of the allowances that can be traded 
within the ETS. Therefore, it becomes important to clarify the nature of the European 
Union Allowances.  Art. 9 of the ETS Directive establishes that MS have to create a 
limited number of allowances to be distributed among national sectors and 
installations; this is done with an appropriate national allocation plan. This article 
implies that allowances are issued exclusively to each installation that is entitled to 
receive a certain number of individually identifiable allowances. Art. 12(1) of the 
Directive establishes that allowances can be freely exchanged within a trading period, 
whereas art. 12(3) establishes that by April 30th of each year the regulated sectors 
have to surrender to the competent authority a number of allowances equivalent to the 
verified emissions produced each year. Otherwise, they must pay a penalty as 
described by Art. 16.  
These articles ensure the creation of allowances that are unique, exclusive and 
transferable through trading between private parties. All these features characterize 
the concept of private property according to which allowance holders have a right to 
the exclusive use of this asset while third parties have the duty to not interfere with 
this property. However, Anttonen et al. (2007) argue that “although an allowance 
holder may be said to have property rights, this does not translate into allowances 
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constituting private property” (p.98). In fact, the EU ETS presents some features that 
are typical of central and direct regulation: first, the public authority determines top-
down a limit to emit GHGs; then the central authority assigns some permits to 
produce emissions that the parties can freely trade, but that they have to surrender 
each year; next, the authority monitors the produced emissions and verifies that the 
amount of surrendered allowances equals the amount of produced emissions. The 
processes of licensing, monitoring, verification, enforcement and penalty are all 
similar to those of the Command and Control type of regulation. All these features 
may lead one to speak about regulatory property rather than private property.  
It is worth mentioning that the lack of an official clarification concerning the legal 
nature of the emissions trading allowances has induced different MS to attribute a 
different role to them—one with different features. A survey developed among some 
MS highlights that while the Finnish Government Bill classifies the European Union 
Allowances as intangible rights which are comparable in nature with intellectual 
property rights—including, patents, trademarks and licenses—the Swedish Authority 
attributes a different nature to the allowances; it classifies the allowances as financial 
instruments, thereby coming to an opposite conclusion concerning the applicability of 
the securities laws to the carbon allowances (Anttonen et al. 2007). The United 
Kingdom’s approach tends to combine these different views: in the Re Celtic 
Extraction case, the Court found that a waste management license given exclusively 
to the Celtic Extraction Ltd under the Environmental Protection Act could be 
categorized as property for the purposes of the Insolvency Act. This was because the 
Court of Appeals established that the conditions required to have the status of 
property had been satisfied. Similarly, the United Kingdom recognizes the possibility 
to use the allowances as security assets. Under this legal regime, allowances constitute 
an intangible property as in the case of intellectual property. They can, however, 
simultaneously be used as a security in the assets of the operator holding them, which 
can be also mortgaged. Although allowances are intangible rights, they constitute a 
tangible part of the installations’ assets.  
In the case of the American SO2 allowance program, a legal provision was adopted to 
specify that ‘allowance’ does not constitute a property right [in section 403(f) of the 
CAAA]. This formulation was chosen to avoid compensation payments to polluters 
for ‘taking’ allowances when the government lowers the annual emission caps. Both 
in the US and in the EU, an emission right is basically defined as an allowance that 
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authorizes a legal entity to emit a certain amount of pollution during a specified 
period. This is not so much a permanent, private property right, as it is an 
authorization that can be terminated or limited by the government. Therefore, the Law 
& Economics literature prefers to characterize allowances as mixed, hybrid or 
regulatory property rights (e.g. Rose, 1999; Yandle, 1999). Emission rights contain 
elements of both public and private property rights: allowances are non-permanent, 
government-mandated rights that combine state control over the emission quotas with 
private freedom for polluters to choose how to comply (sometimes referred to as 
‘command-without-control’). Moreover, although allowances are not property rights 
themselves, property rights in allowances are, in fact, recognized since emitters can 
receive, hold and transfer them while excluding all others—except for the 
government—from interfering with their possession, use and disposition of them 
(Cole, 1999: 113-4).  
3. The Length and Scope of the EU ETS 
The EU ETS was designed in 2003, and it was officially launched in January 2005. 
The EC Directive divides the duration of the Cap and Trade system in different 
trading periods. The first one is a three-year pilot phase (2005–2007), while the 
second phase started in January 2008 and lasts 5 years (2008-2012). This second five-
year phase coincides with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
second ETS Directive approved in 2009 amends the first ETS Directive and 
establishes that a third trading period will start on 2013 and will last eight years,  until 
2020. This third phase goes beyond the Kyoto Protocol deadline and coincides with 
the EU emissions reduction self-committed period as it has been specified in the 
European Climate Package, finally approved at the end of 2008. 
It is possible to observe that the three ETS trading periods with different lengths have 
been developed within a learning-by-doing framework. In fact, the ETS remains one 
of the world’s first experiments of cap and trade schemes for greenhouse emissions 
allowances. The Scheme  was developed in an uncertain context (as it could not count 
on previous experiences) and was lacking a great deal of important information (for 
instance, CO2 emissions data). In this scenario the European Commission tried to 
balance the difficult trade-off between building a credible policy aimed at favoring 
long-term investments (which would call for long trading periods) while at the same 
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time avoiding too strict regulation that would require ex-post adjustments (and which 
call for shorter trading periods to be adjusted phase by phase). 
At the beginning of any phase, the ETS installations are entitled to receive a yearly 
amount of permits that they can freely trade within the same ETS trading period. 
Thus, the first ETS Directive establishes that during the first and second trading 
period banking and borrowing of allowances are only allowed on a year to year basis 
within a trading period; conversely, trading of allowances has been forbidden across 
different trading periods. In fact, the EC Directive decided against the inter-period 
transfer of permits (art.13): permits are allocated phase by phase, and they cannot be 
banked and transferred from one phase to another. Thus, at the end of one phase, the 
number of exceeding permits that have not been delivered is cancelled and removed 
from the ETS.  
The effective functioning of the ETS requires also the establishment of a system of 
monitoring and verification of the emissions produced each year by the installations 
operating in the ETS, as well as a system of enforcement of penalties in the case on 
non-compliance. Art. 12 of the EC Directive 87/2003 specifies that by 30 April of 
each year the ETS installations have to surrender a number of permits equivalent to 
the amount of emissions produced during the preceding year.  
Art. 14 of the ETS Directive delegates to MS the duty to monitor the ETS 
installations, while Art. 15 requires that the emissions reports are verified in 
accordance with the criteria established in Annex V of the Directive. Further 
guidelines for monitoring and reporting published by the European Commission on 29 
January 2004 state that: 
 The operator shall submit the emissions report, a copy of 
its permit for each of its installations, plus any other 
relevant information to the verifier. The verifier shall assess 
whether the monitoring methodology applied by the 
operator complies with the installation's monitoring 
methodology as approved by the competent authority, the 
principles for monitoring and reporting presented in section 
3, and the guidelines laid down in this and subsequent 
Annexes. On the basis of this assessment the verifier shall 
conclude as to whether the data within the emissions report 
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contains omissions, misrepresentations or errors that lead 
to material misstatement of the reported information. 
 
Thus, MS have first the duty to verify whether the emissions have been reported by the 
ETS installations in compliance with the monitoring and reporting methodology 
established by the competent authority; moreover, MS have to verify whether material 
errors have been made, where “materiality” is defined as: 
The professional judgment of the verifier as to whether an 
individual or aggregation of omissions, misinterpretations 
or errors that affects the information reported for an 
installation will reasonably influence the intended users’ 
decisions. As a broad guide, a verifier will tend to class a 
misstatement in the total emissions figure as being material 
if it leads to aggregate omissions, misinterpretations or 
errors in the total emissions figure being greater than five 
percent. 
 
Moreover, Art. 16 establishes that the ETS operators who do not surrender sufficient 
allowances to cover their emissions are liable for the payment of an excess emissions 
penalty. In the first ETS phase spanning 2005-2007 this penalty equaled 40 Euros for 
each ton of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted by that installation for which the 
operator did not surrender allowances, while for the second phase 2008 – 2012 the 
penalty equals 100 Euros for each unsurrendered permit. It is important to notice that, 
according to the EC Directive, the payment of this penalty does not release the 
operator from the obligation to surrender the amount of allowances equal to those 
excess emissions that have not been covered.  
For the purposes of this research it is important to highlight also the scope of the EU 
ETS, stressing from the beginning the differences between the GHG emissions and the 
emissions sources regulated respectively by the EU ETS and the Kyoto Protocol.  
The MS that ratified the Kyoto Protocol committed to reduce all the GHGs produced 
by all the emitting sources located in the Protocol-ratifying Parties; the GHGs included 
in the Kyoto Protocol are CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs and HFC, which are produced by 
all the emitting sources, mainly energy and industry sectors, and transport, household 
and tertiary services, and agriculture. 
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On the contrary, the Directive 2003/87/EC regulates (at least during the first ETS 
phase 2005 – 2007)13 only the CO2 emissions produced by the installations located in 
the EU MS belonging to one of these broad energy and industrial sectors listed in the 
Annex I of the Directive: 
 Energy activities and combustion installations with a rated thermal input 
exceeding 20 MW; 
 Mineral oil refineries; 
 Coke ovens;  
 Production and processing of ferrous metals (iron and steel);  
– Mineral industry (such as cement, glass and ceramic production);  
 Pulp and paper. 
These emitters are defined as “ETS sectors”, while the emitters not regulated by the 
EC Directive (mainly, agriculture, household, tertiary services, and transport) are 
defined as “non-ETS sectors”. 
In light of these considerations, it should be clear that the EU ETS includes and 
regulates only part of the overall GHG emissions and emissions sources covered by 
the Kyoto Protocol.  
The important consequence to be kept in mind is that complying with the ETS 
regulation does not necessarily mean complying with the Kyoto emissions reduction 
target. In fact, the ETS intends to cover only part of the national emissions gap 
(determined by the difference between national emissions and the national emissions 
reduction target as defined by the European burden sharing agreement), while other 
national policies have been developed in order to promote the reduction of emissions 
in the remaining non-ETS sectors. Obviously the achievement of the national 
emissions reduction target requires coordination between the European climate policy 
implemented within the ETS and the national climate policies in order to ensure that 
the sum of the emissions reduction burdens imposed on the ETS and non-ETS sectors 
is equal to the emissions gap that each country has to cover.
The choice of circumscribing the EU ETS to only a part of total GHGs and emissions 
sources regulated by the Kyoto Protocol has some implications. On one hand, this 
choice raises an information problem. GHGs emissions have been historically 
monitored mainly at a national level; thus, before the establishment of the ETS, public 
                                                 
13 The second ETS Phase 2008 – 2012 regulates all the six greenhouse gas emissions, while for the end 
of the second phase the EU ETS will cover also the aviation sector 
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authorities did not know exactly the amount of emissions produced by the ETS 
installations (ETS share). De facto, the initial amount of emissions had to be regulated 
by the ETS; it was uncertain and could only be estimated. In particular, the European 
Commission reported that before its establishment the EU ETS most likely covered 
almost 45% of the overall European emissions (CEC 2005a: 7), or about 30% of the 
European overall GHG emissions (CEC, 2005b). On the other hand, this 
circumscription is aimed at containing the respective monitoring and transaction costs. 
Indeed, being mainly released by fossil fuels combustion, CO2 is the easiest GHG to 
monitor and, in fact, most countries had already developed emissions by fossil fuels 
monitoring systems to levy national energy taxes even before the establishment of the 
ETS (Kemfert et al, 2006). Moreover, administrative, regulatory and transaction costs 
would have sharply increased if the EU ETS had been extended from the almost 
12,000 installations actually covered to all the European emissions sources, 
comprising transportation and residential sources which are widely dispersed and 
fragmented. 
 
4. The National Allocation Plans 
According to art. 9 of EC Directive 2003/87, every MS has the duty to develop for 
each ETS phase a national allocation plan ( NAP) “stating the total quantity of 
allowances that it intends to allocate for that period and how it proposes to allocate 
them.” By tallying all the permits reported in the NAPs that each MS intends to 
allocate to their national ETS installations, we can derive the level of the ETS cap. 
The NAPs are the basic documents that have to be analyzed in order to assess whether 
the EU ETS can be considered an effective economic instrument to induce CO2 
emissions reduction. In fact, the NAPs provide the basic information required to 
evaluate to what extent MS rely on the mechanism of tradable permits—compared to 
other national and European climate policies— to achieve their respective Kyoto 
target (e.g. Betz et all 2006). In fact, the amount of emissions the ETS sectors have to 
reduce is determined by the difference between the emissions they produce and the 
ETS cap. Thus, when MS decide how many permits should be allocated to their 
national installations covered by the ETS, they indirectly establish how the national 
emissions reduction burden derived from the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is 
shared among ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
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The EC Directive establishes that the NAPs designed by MS must be submitted to the 
EC for final approval. The Commission has to analyze each NAP, accepting, 
modifying or rejecting it according to the allocative criteria set out in the EC 
Directive’s Annex III. 
For the purpose of this research, it can be useful to recall and analyse some of the 
criteria listed in the Annex III of the European Directive. Among all the criteria 
established in the EC Directive Annex III, the Commission has to assess the NAPs 
also according to these principles: 
– Consistency with the MS’ EU Burden-Sharing Agreement and national 
climate change program (Criterion 1);  
– Consistency with assessments of historical and projected emission trends 
towards achieving the required emission targets (Criterion 2); 
– Consistency with potential to reduce emissions (Criterion 3); 
– Non-discrimination and non-favoring of certain companies or sectors 
(Criterion 5); 
Criterion 3 asserts that emissions shall be reduced efficiently where the marginal 
abatement costs (MACs) are lower; however, it is the most vague and least objective 
criterion because the ETS sectors and installations’ MACs are not publicly known. As 
a consequence, Criterion 3 grants the regulator high discretion in deciding how many 
permits shall be allocated to the ETS sectors, and consequently how the emissions 
reduction target should be divided among ETS and non-ETS sectors. The other 
criteria suggest that the ETS cap should be consistent with MS emissions reduction 
targets and take into consideration the emissions reduction policies applied in the non-
ETS sectors (e.g., Betz and Stato, 2006).  
Despite that the Directive has set some general rules to establish how many (and how) 
permits shall be allocated, MS still have a high degree of freedom in determining the 
number of permits to be allocated to their national ETS installations. After some 
criticism about the Annex III criteria vagueness has been raised, the Commission has 
published non-binding guidelines on how it will interpret these criteria in its NAP 
assessment (CEC 2004a, CEC 2005b). Also in the communication on the 2008-2012 
NAPs assessment, the EC confirmed the principle according to which “to determine 
the required reduction, the proportion of overall emissions that the trading scheme 
represents is relevant in comparison with emissions from sources not covered by the 
Directive”  (CEC (2006a): 7). It means that the ETS cap should take into account how 
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the emissions reduction burden will consequently be divided between ETS and non-
ETS sectors. 
5.  The Role of the Member States 
It has been previously argued that the cap and trade scheme, and the EU ETS in 
particular, presents many typical aspects of a direct form of regulation. These are 
mainly the top-down imposition of a limit on the emission of GHGs and the ex-post 
phases of monitoring and the enforcement of penalties in the case of non-compliance, 
with the duty to surrender an amount of allowances that is equal to emissions and that 
has been produced and verified by the competent authority. However, in Europe the 
central regulatory approach that characterizes the cap and trade scheme has been 
combined with the principle of subsidiarity, expressed in Art. 5 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community, according to which the central 
authority should limit itself to perform only those tasks that cannot be performed 
effectively at a decentralized and local level. From the previous sections it should be 
clear that, at least during the first and second trading periods of the ETS, many 
responsibilities have been decentralized and delegated to the MS. Indeed, the ETS 
Directive specifies that MS have the duty to implement the EU ETS at a national 
level, both on the ex-ante side, when the initial number of permits has to be 
determined in the NAP and distributed among the national ETS installations, and on 
the ex-post side, when national authorities have to monitor the amount of emissions 
produced by national installations, and collect them in a registry to be submitted at a 
central level. Thus, the administrative function of the MS is absolutely necessary for 
the implementation of the EU ETS. 
The delegation of many regulatory duties to the MS according to the subsidiarity 
principle has led to a different interpretation and implementation of the common 
European Directive. Indeed, in this decentralized context it becomes important to 
investigate whether and to what extent the application of the principle of subsidiarity 
within the ETS combined with the lack of clear and objective rules has limited the 
internal harmonization within the ETS, and if this is the case, whether this practice 
has limited somehow the effectiveness of the ETS. For this purpose, it can be useful 
from the very beginning to briefly indicate in which areas some divergences in the 
implementation of the ETS have emerged among MS, while a deeper analysis will be 
offered in the next chapters. 
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First and foremost, the criteria adopted to assess the amount of allowances to assign 
(and thus the emissions reduction burden imposed on national installations) and the 
criteria to determine how to distribute these allowances among the regulated agents 
have diverged among MS. In particular, this research attempts to assess to what extent 
this divergence has occurred among MS and to understand whether this lack of 
harmonization has influenced the capacity of the wider European scheme to promote a 
cost-effective reduction of emissions in order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. One 
of the other divergences that have emerged across MS regards the definition of the 
scope of application of the Directive within national borders. In particular, it was not 
clear which installations should have fallen within the ETS. For instance, the meaning 
and the interpretation of the words “combustion installation” has diverged across MS. 
As explained above, the Annex I of the Directive establishes that the installations with 
a thermal capacity of combustion higher than 20 MW have to be subjected to the ETS. 
The first NAPs highlighted that many differences existed concerning how this term 
should have been interpreted. While some countries have adopted quite a general 
definition, according to which any combustion installation, regardless of the sector 
they belong to, have to be included in the ETS, even in those cases where those 
installations did not belong to the energy sector and their principal purpose was not to 
supply heat or power. In contrast, other MS, like the United Kingdom, have adopted a 
narrower interpretation, deciding to include in the ETS only those combustion 
installations belonging to the energy sector and of which the principal purpose was to 
generate power or heat. As a consequence, similar plants operating in the same 
relevant market have been subjected to the EU ETS in one country but not in another. 
The potential distributive effects in the secondary markets are quite clear: some 
installations could have had a competitive disadvantage artificially created by the 
European legislation in the case that they were subjected to a costly regulation, while 
their competitors could have been exempted simply because they were located in a 
different region.  
When this different interpretation of the term “combustion installation” has become 
manifest, the European Commission has clarified this concept in order to grant higher 
internal harmonization within the ETS. In the communication “Further Guidance on 
Allocation Plans for the 2008 to 2012 Trading Period of the EU Emission Trading 
Scheme,” the Commission stated that any process resulting in the oxidization of fuels 
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should have been considered a combustion installation, and therefore it should have 
been regulated by the ETS in the case its thermal capacity was exceeding 20 MW. 
Another divergence that has emerged among MS regards the possibility of bringing 
some ex-post adjustments to their NAPs. Some countries have attempted to increase 
the total number of allowances to be allocated to national installations, while others 
proposed—and succeeded—to change the criteria according to which allowances 
should have been assigned to new entrants, to installations intending to close their 
plants and to incumbent installations among different trading periods. In such a cases, 
MS have adopted a strategic and opportunistic behaviour aimed at preventing their 
own national industries to afford environmental costs that would worsen their 
competitiveness. However, ex-post adjustments risk to prevent a harmonized 
implementation of the EU ETS among MS and, by creating legal uncertainty, they 
might deter the regulated installations from undertaking long-term strategies and 
investments in a low-carbon economy. Moreover, they risk giving the ETS 
installations – especially firms with market power—an incentive to influence future 
regulation to their own advantage. More generally, a reversible regulation risks 
becoming an endogenous variable that firms internalize into their profit maximizing 
function, and this might distort the firms’ incentive to undertake optimal investments 
in emissions abatement. 
In conclusion, although some divergences in implementing the EU ETS across 
different MS might be desirable under the principle of subsidiarity, it becomes 
important to question whether and to what extent the administrative independence of 
MS has degenerated into the formulation of short-term opportunistic national policies. 
Furthermore, we might question if such policies thus deter firms from performing the 
emissions abatement required to comply with the Kyoto target and from preventing 
the achievement of a level of harmonization required to ensure the effectiveness of the 
ETS. One of the purposes of this research is to investigate if, how and to what extent 
the legal design of the ETS framework based on a principle of subsidiarity has 
promoted effective incentives to reduce emissions in an efficient and cost-effective 
way. 
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6. The ETS and Economic Incentives to Reduce Emissions:  
  The Case of Electricity Generation 
So far, it has been argued that the implementation of a cap and trade system where 
emissions are capped and the regulated operators are free to bargain for the right to 
emit will result in an efficient reduction of emissions. This emissions reduction is due 
to the fact that through free trading, allowances will be allocated to those who value 
them most. Conversely, emissions will be reduced by those who can abate them at the 
lowest marginal costs. While in the long run market-based instruments should ensure 
dynamic efficiency by promoting research and the development of cleaner and more 
efficient technologies, in the short run—when such technologies cannot be developed 
and adopted—economic instruments like the cap and trade scheme can induce the 
reduction of emissions by increasing the final price of polluting products. Thus, these 
instruments intervene indirectly in both the demand side by re-addressing the 
consumption preferences toward less carbon-intensive (and cheaper) products, and on 
the supply side by inducing a production switch toward less carbon-intensive 
technologies and fuels that after the implementation of the EU ETS will become 
relatively more economical. 
This section intends to illustrate these concepts with a practical case by showing the 
potential impact of the EU ETS on the electricity sector in terms of final prices, fuel 
adoption and reduction of emissions. The electricity market represents an interesting 
case worth examining because it accounts for more than 50% of the sectors regulated 
by the ETS and because it is characterized by a high variety of fuels and technologies 
with different carbon intensities. As a result, it presents huge abatement opportunities 
via fuel switching.  
First, the properties and specificities of the electricity and electricity markets will be 
shortly recalled (sections 6.1). Then section 6.2 will describe the process according to 
which quantities and prices are set at equilibrium, while section 6.3 shows how such 
equilibrium might change after CO2 emissions have been monetized within the ETS. 
 
6.1 Some Features to Know about Electricity   
In addition of being one of the most important primary goods sustaining economic 
production and consumption, electricity is characterized by some particular features 
that are reflected in the structure of the electricity generation market and in the way 
prices and quantities are set at equilibrium. 
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First of all, electricity has a double nature: On the demand side, electricity is a 
completely homogeneous good without any type of quality specification. On the 
supply side, electricity looks like a highly heterogeneous product, since it can be 
generated by a wide variety of technologies and fuels, which diverge depending on 
their fixed and variable costs, thermal capacity, carbon intensity, energy efficiency, 
and their degree of continuity and so forth. It is important to recall that, due to their 
intrinsic differences, these technologies cannot always be substituted for one another 
and, in some cases, they are completely alternative sources. For instance, nuclear 
generation plants are characterized by very high fixed costs, low variable costs and 
high start-up costs; as a result, they can generate electricity at very low marginal costs 
for long ranges of time, and in turn, they are tailored to satisfy the base load demand. 
On the contrary, it would be very costly and inefficient to start up a nuclear plant just 
to satisfy the peak load demand during a short time. This function can be better 
covered by technologies characterized by very low start up and fixed costs, which can 
also be called into operation for a short time. These technologies however, tend to 
produce electricity at a high marginal cost. 
Alternatively, there are also technologies, like coal and gas fired plants, that have 
similar characteristics and that can be substituted and called into operation 
alternatively depending on their marginal costs, which mainly depend on the variable 
prices of fuels established in the energy market exchanges. 
The second feature characterizing the electricity market is the inelasticity of the 
demand: electricity is a primary and indispensible good; moreover, it is difficult to 
substitute with alternative goods. As a consequence, the demand for electricity results 
quite rigid and variations in prices are not likely to greatly influence the quantity 
consumed. This implies that electricity can be sold even at very high prices, for 
instance in the case of supply shortage. 
The third important peculiarity of the electricity good is its non-storability. Electricity 
can be stored only in small quantities and at substantial economic costs. This implies 
that electricity cannot be acquired at low prices when the market experiences 
oversupply in order to be sold at higher prices during the shortage periods. According 
to the basic principles of thermodynamics, the amount of electricity that is put into the 
transmission has to be completely acquired and consumed. In a certain moment if the 
demand of electricity is not satisfied due to a supply shortage, the whole electricity 
system will experience a general blackout. Conversely, if the supply of electricity into 
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the grid exceeds the amount of electricity acquired, the system ends up being 
overloaded and faces a high risk of fusion. 
This peculiarity requires a high level of coordination and monitoring aimed at 
ensuring that in each instant of time the amount of electricity supplied equals the 
amount of electricity acquired. For this reason, in the electricity market a regulator 
has the role of ensuring a continual balancing between demand and the supply of 
electricity, whose wholesale equilibrium price and quantity is established in the 
exchange market each hour per day. The electricity planning and monitoring system 
entails high coordination costs that are also required to avoid the risk of bottlenecks in 
the electricity network due to a supply of electricity beyond the capacity of the grid.  
6.2 The Functioning of the Electricity Market 
Due to all the peculiarities of electricity, its market develops in different steps. First, 
the day before the delivery of electricity the equilibrium quantities and prices are 
determined hour by hour in a wholesale market. Quantities and prices can differ not 
only in time, but also in space because of the potential existence of different 
geographical zones, which are separated by transmission bottlenecks. The day after, at 
the time of delivery, the prices and quantities are adjusted in order to ensure a perfect 
match between demand and supply and to avoid any risk of imbalance between 
demand and supply that might arise from any possible inconvenience (e.g., 
unexpected bottlenecks, unavailability of a plant that was called into operation and so 
forth). 
Generation prices that are contracted at the exchange markets may thus differ from 
the retail price that consumers pay in practice also for other reasons. These reasons 
include the lack of competition in the final retail market or the presence of financial 
instruments (long-term contracts) aimed at sharing the risk and reducing the 
electricity price volatility, which mainly depends on the variable trend of the fuel 
prices. 
In order to analyse the impact of the ETS on electricity markets, prices and related 
emissions, it is better to refer to generation prices rather than retail prices, which 
might be influenced also by other variables which are not relevant for our research 
purposes. Moreover, rather than looking at future prices, this analysis focuses on spot 
prices which are influenced by fuel prices, plant availability, weather, temperature and 
climate conditions (which influence both the demand that some seasonal and daily 
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cycles present and the availability of renewable plants) and, after the establishment of 
the ETS, also by CO2 prices. 
Competition in electricity markets works differently from that in the economic models 
of Cournot, where firms compete in quantities, and from that in the model of 
Bertrand, where firms compete in prices. In order to determine the quantity to be 
supplied in each hour of the day—the equilibrium price at which plants are called to 
generate electricity— all the generators submit  a bid function (i.e., supply bid 
function competition) each hour of the day to a central dispatcher. This bid function 
contains one or more possible combinations of quantities and prices: for each owned 
plant the generator specifies the minimum price at which he or she is willing to supply 
energy, jointly with the maximum amount of electricity he or she is able to produce in 
that specific hour. The combinations of quantity and supply can differ depending on 
the plants’ available capacity and marginal production costs (Green and Newbery 
1993, Borenstein et al 1999, OECD 2003). Once all the bids have been submitted, the 
central dispatcher collects and classifies them in order of their capacity to build the 
hourly merit order supply function: the supply function is determined by ordering the 
different bids according to the price at which they can be supplied. The merit order 
criterion is aimed at minimizing the total cost for each level of production. The result 
is a supply step function where plants are called to operate according to their 
increasing marginal costs, i.e., generally nuclear, lignite, coal, gas, heavy fuel oil and 
light fuel oil (Feher and Harbord 1993, Armstrong et al. 1994). The demand curve, on 
the contrary, is determined by ordering all the potential demanders according to the 
maximum price they are willing to pay (i.e., the so-called reserve price). 
Once the dispatcher builds the supply and demand curves for each hour, the point 
where they cross determines the equilibrium quantity and price. Such a price is called 
the System Marginal Price because it corresponds to the price offered by the last 
marginal plant called to produce, the so-called marginal plant. Therefore, the market 
price is set by the marginal bidder who produces electricity in the least efficient way 
at the highest marginal cost and the same price is paid to all the other operators called 
to produce and who had offered a quantity at a price lower than the System Marginal 
Price. The merit order criterion determines which units are going to be dispatched in 
any hour, and, of course, the bigger the gap between the price bid and the market 
price, the higher the profitability of the operator. This criterion gives electricity 
generators an incentive to develop more efficient technologies since the probability of 
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being called to supply electricity and the relative profitability increases as the 
marginal costs of production decrease with respect to the marginal plant called into 
operation. 
 
6.3 The Merit Order Function after the ETS 
While in the long run emissions can be reduced by investing in cleaner efficient 
technologies, in the short term, when R&D investments cannot bring any substantial 
emissions reduction, emissions can be reduced basically either by producing less or 
by using less carbon-intensive fuels and technologies. Particularly, in the energy 
market, emissions can be reduced in the short run by switching electricity generation 
from coal to gas burning. Indeed, coal is a more carbon intensive fuel than gas.  
Therefore, in order to establish ex-post how effective the ETS has been in promoting 
emissions reduction in a cost effective way, it can be useful to investigate whether the 
CO2 price has been sufficiently high to induce a fuel switch from coal to gas within a 
plant that can burn both fuels or, equivalently, to promote a switch in the merit order 
function between the coal plants and the gas fired plants. Before a price has been 
attached to the emissions of CO2, ceteris paribus and depending on the level of 
demand, a coal plant could be called to generate electricity instead of a gas fire 
plant—or vice versa—depending on their relative prices. According to the historical 
trend of gas and coal prices, generating electricity using coal has been on average 
cheaper than burning gas, and, consequently, it has been more convenient to produce 
electricity burning coal and emitting more CO2 rather than switching to gas and 
reducing GHG emissions. Coal plants have usually preceded gas fire plants in the 
merit order supply function; however, after the ETS was established, the economical 
benefits of burning gas or coal now depends, among other factors, on the price to be 
paid for any CO2 ton released into the atmosphere. Coal is more carbon-intensive than 
gas, so as the CO2 price increases, gas becomes relatively more economical than coal. 
In fact, it has been previously recalled that ETS installations can adopt a make or buy 
strategy: plants operating in the power generation sector can alternatively decide to 
burn the more carbon-intensive coal and buy in the ETS the additional permits they 
need to cover their emissions gap. Alternatively, they can switch production from coal 
to gas, emitting a lower amount of GHGs and thus lowering the number of permits to 
acquire in the ETS. Hence, as it will be argued more extensively in the next chapters, 
in spite of being initially assigned at no charge, grandfathered permits have an 
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opportunity cost equivalent to their market price which firms have to internalize and 
pass through to the final price that is proposed in the supply bid function. Different 
arguments have been generally provided by private industry to explain why the value 
of allowances assigned at no cost cannot be incorporated in the final price. First, 
European installations are not able to increase the final price because they would 
loose market share to extra-EU firms that are not subject to any environmental cost 
and that would offer the same good at a lower price. Second, the elasticity of the 
demand works as a natural limit to the ability of increasing final prices since 
consumption would shift to more economical products. These arguments can be valid 
for many industrial sectors, and will be analysed more extensively when describing 
the risk of carbon leakage. They do not, however, hold in the case of electricity 
markets simply because, due to transmissions constraints, electricity generators are 
naturally protected against international competition (imports constitute a limited 
percentage of the consumed electricity). Moreover, the demand of electricity is 
particularly rigid and inelastic when it comes to increases in prices.  
Once it has been recognized that freely allocated allowances have an opportunity cost 
determined by the potential revenue that could have been earned by reducing 
emissions and selling the exceeding amount of allowances at the ETS market price, it 
becomes clear that, after the ETS has been launched, the economical benefit of 
burning gas instead of coal depends, among other factors, on the price to be paid for 
any ton of CO2 released into the atmosphere. 
Depending on the gas and coal fuel prices and on how expensive it is to cover the 
production of an extra-ton of CO2 with the acquisition of an allowance in the ETS, 
firms that have the technological possibility of an internal fuel switch will decide 
whether to burn coal or switch to gas. At the same time, the central dispatcher will 
evaluate if, once the costs of CO2 are incorporated in the final electricity prices, coal 
plants are still more efficient than gas plants, thus preceding them in the merit order 
supply function, or vice versa.  
Based on the real gas and coal prices, it is possible to calculate the theoretical price of 
the allowances that would make generating power from a 38% efficiency coal 
generator and from a 53% efficiency gas generator comparable. This indicator is 
called theoretical coal-to-gas indifference switch price. Then, whenever the real CO2 
price exceeds the coal-to-gas switch price, burning gas is more economical than using 
coal. This means that the ETS is effective in giving an incentive to switch to less-
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carbon intensive fuels. As a consequence, the amount of emissions released per 
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated decreases, and it would be possible to 
conclude that the ETS is creating effective incentives for reducing emissions in the 
electricity generation market by promoting a switch of production toward less carbon 
intensive fuels. Vice-versa, whenever the CO2 price—determined within the ETS and 
depending on the dynamics of the allowances’ demand and supply functions—is 
lower than the theoretical coal-to-gas switch price, it implies that the ETS has failed 
to give an incentive to reduce emissions via fuel switching. Finally, a theoretical 
switch price lower than zero implies that, according to the real gas and coal prices, 
burning gas would be the most economical option even in the absence of a trading 
scheme that attaches a price to the emissions of GHGs. If this were the case, burning 
coal instead of gas would be more economical only if the CO2 prices were negative. 
In addition to analyzing the effects of the CO2 prices on the economic benefits of 
adopting one technology over the other, the economic literature has also investigated 
the impact of the CO2 prices on the final market prices and on the firms’ profitability. 
Sijm et al (2006) define the CO2 costs’ pass through as “the average increase in 
power price over a certain period due to the increase in the CO2 price of an emission 
allowance” (p. 4). However, many empirical studies have demonstrated that after the 
first year of the ETS, the correlation between electricity and CO2 price was lower than 
1, implying that pass through occurred at a rate lower than 100%. Many scholars have 
tried to explain the potential reasons behind this divergence. Sijm et al (2006) argue 
that, while the generators add-on the full opportunity costs of CO2 allowances into the 
electricity price, still the increase of the final market price could be lower than the 
allowances opportunity costs for different reasons. First, it is possible – but not 
probable – that higher power prices reduce the demand, thus moving the market 
equilibrium up to a point where the marginal price would be set by a cheaper 
generator. In this case, the electricity price marginal increase is lower than the CO2 
opportunity cost because of the response of the market demand. This phenomenon can 
also be explained in the case that the real CO2 price incorporated in the generation 
marginal costs is higher than the theoretical coal-to-gas switch price, a situation that 
then induces a switch of the plants’ merit order in the supply curve. Moreover, the 
electricity price might increase less proportionally than the CO2 price in the case that 
markets are not competitive. This argumentation will be further discussed in the next 
chapters, but intuitively it can be useful to consider that in perfectly competitive 
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markets—where the market price equals the production marginal costs—a variation in 
marginal costs is always reflected in an equivalent variation in prices. Meanwhile, in 
non-competitive markets, prices might increase less proportionally than the cost 
increase because they are already kept at an artificially high level, and it would be not 
profitable to increase them by the same amount of the increase in marginal costs (Kate 
and Niels 2005; Levy 2005; Derek and Fezzi 2007). 
 
7. Conclusions 
This section has introduced the economic and legal background concerning the ETS 
that is important to know for the purpose of this research. First, the origins of the ETS 
have been introduced, and the nature of the European Union allowances has been 
discussed within the field of private property law. While different MS have given 
different interpretations of the emissions allowances, highlighting on one hand their 
similarities with intangible intellectual property and, on the other, their  nature of 
financial instruments which can be adopted as securities.  This chapter has stressed 
that allowances are different from a permanent and private property right; rather, they 
are the result of an authorization that can be terminated or limited by the government. 
Therefore, the law and economics literature prefers to characterize allowances as 
mixed, hybrid or regulatory property rights. Moreover, the length and scope have 
been introduced in order to explain the substantial differences that emerge between 
the ETS and the Kyoto Protocol, suggesting that compliance with the ETS European 
legislation does not necessarily imply compliance with the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment. Then this section has discussed the role of MS, which—according to the 
principle of subsidiarity— are called to design a national allocation plan where the 
amount of allowances to be assigned at a national level and the criteria of distributing 
them have to be specified and submitted to the European Commission. In many areas 
the delegation of the decision-making procedure at a decentralized level has limited 
the harmonization of the market for tradable permits. This research is aimed precisely 
at investigating to what extent this lack of internal harmonization can distort the ETS’ 
effectiveness in promoting emissions reduction in an efficient and cost-effective way. 
Finally, this section has described the potential impact of the EU ETS on the 
electricity market, illustrating with a practical example how the monetization of the 
CO2 can promote the reduction of emissions in the generation of electricity by 
inducing a switch from most polluting to less- carbon intensive technologies and 
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fuels. For this purpose, the indicator of CO2 theoretical coal-to-gas switch price is 
introduced. The purpose of this section has been to provide the background 
information required to develop an analysis of the ETS’ effectiveness in the next 
chapters. 
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Chapter 5. Analysis of the Effectiveness of the EU ETS: Assessing the Stringency 
of the ETS Cap14
1. Introduction  
With the 2002 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the former fifteen MS of the 
European Union committed to reduce European GHG emissions to 8% below the 
1990 emissions level by 2012. In this context, the European Directive 87/2003/EC has 
established a system of tradable allowances (the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
– EU ETS) in order to promote “reductions of GHG emissions in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner”(EC, 2003: Art. 1). The EU ETS covers only part of 
the GHG polluting sources; thus, compliance with the terms of the first ETS Directive 
does not necessarily imply compliance with the Kyoto targets.  
The general purpose of this chapter is to bring new insight to the wide-spread debate 
aimed at assessing the effectiveness of the ETS in promoting emissions reduction in a 
cost-effective way, as stated in the ETS Directive. In particular, this chapter analyses 
the extent to which MS are effectively relying on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto 
commitments. This analysis is then used to determine whether the emissions reduction 
burden deriving from the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has been divided between 
ETS and non-ETS sectors in a cost-effective way. Therefore, this chapter focuses 
mainly on the ETS cap and on its stringency, where the ETS cap indicates the 
proportion of emissions that the ETS sectors are legally required to abate and, 
consequently, the amount of emissions that the non-trading sectors have to reduce to 
comply with Kyoto commitments. The stringency of the ETS cap is assessed by 
investigating whether allowances have been over-allocated during the first and second 
ETS trading periods. Different methodologies have been suggested to measure the 
size of allowances over-allocation and to assess the effectiveness of the EU ETS. 
Notably Ellerman and Buchner (2006) have compared the ETS verified emissions 
with the Business as Usual (BAU) emissions (i.e., the theoretical amount of projected 
emissions that should have been produced in the absence of the ETS) showing that 
during the first ETS year both the ETS cap and the emissions produced by the ETS 
sectors were lower than the emissions that would have been produced in the absence 
of the ETS. The authors conclude that permits have not been over-allocated and that 
                                                 
14 Part of this chapter has been published as a research article in the international review Climate 
Policy. For major details see: S. Clò (2009), “An analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Effectiveness,” 
Climate Policy, 9, 227–241. 
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the ETS is effective in promoting emissions reduction. 
Based on a different methodology, this chapter reaches different conclusions. Over-
allocation is defined here as occurring when the ETS cap exceeds a theoretical ETS 
cap that would impose an emissions reduction burden on the ETS sectors proportional 
to the share of European emissions they produce. This chapter finally analyses the 
inefficiencies, which emerge in the MS where over-allocation is detected. There is no 
doubt that the emissions produced by the ETS sectors have been lower than their 
counterfactual BaU emissions, as Ellerman and Buchner clearly show, and thus 
emissions have been reduced to a certain extent since the establishment of the ETS. 
Nevertheless, this analysis shows that during the first and second trading periods of 
the ETS over-allocation took place, implying that so far the ETS has not been 
sufficiently effective in inducing the emissions reduction required to comply with the 
Kyoto Protocol emissions reduction target. Moreover, this ETS cap stringency 
analysis clarifies how the Kyoto emissions reduction burden has been divided 
between ETS and non-ETS sectors, highlighting to what extent the EU and different 
MS rely on the ETS flexible economic mechanism to comply with the Kyoto target.  
This analysis assesses whether the emissions reduction burden has been split among 
ETS and non-ETS sectors in a cost-effective way and then identifies which 
inefficiencies emerge when permits are over-allocated to the ETS sectors. 
The chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the partial results achieved 
by the ETS during its first phase (2005–2007), while section 3 presents the 
methodology that Buchner and Ellerman (2006) adopted to assess whether allowances 
had been over-allocated. Then section 4 briefly describes the content of the second 
NAPs. In section 5, the stringency of the ETS cap is assessed according to an 
alternative methodology; then, the required data and sources of information are 
discussed. Section 6 assesses the ETS first and second phase cap stringency at a 
national and European level, determining which MS over-allocated allowances. In 
section 7, the inefficiencies linked with over-allocating allowances are analysed. 
Finally, section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Interpreting the EU ETS Results During the First Trading Period  
On January 2005, after the EU ETS was officially launched, allowances could be 
purchased at a price of 7 Euro per ton (monthly average). In the following months, the 
price constantly increased, exceeding the 20€/ton threshold. In 2006, the market for 
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tradable permits experienced a liquidity explosion: the permit volume traded between 
January and April 2006 was higher than the overall quantity of permits traded in 
2005, and the CO2 price progressively increased to its maximum peak—the  highest 
ever registered during the ETS first trading period. In spite of bullish expectations 
across the European exchanges,15 after peaking at 29.7 €/ton, in April 2006 the CO2 
price suddenly diminished by 20 €/ton in correlation with the publication of the EC 
“Verified Emissions data”, according to which in 2005 the ETS sectors emitted 80 
million tons of CO2 less than the amount of assigned permits.  
  
                                                 
15 On April 21st the EUAs price was 29.1 Euro/ton, and Pointcarbon, the recognized world-leader 
carbon market analyst, published in its Carbon Market Europe weekly reports an editorial by the UBS 
Investment Research’s executive director entitled “CO2 price still too low”. 
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Table 4 - 2005 Allocated Permits and Verified Emissions (Mt CO2)
  
2005 
Permits 
Allocation 
2005 ETS 
Verified 
Emissions 
Gross 
Short16 
Gross 
Long17 
Net Long (+)/Net 
Short (-) 
Austria 32.4 33.4 3.3 2.3 -1 
Belgium 58.3 55.4 9.9 12.9 3 
Cz Republic 96.9 82.5 0.16 14.6 14.4 
Denmark 37.3 26.5 0.1 10.9 10.8 
Estonia 16.7 12.6 0 4.1 4.1 
Finland 44.7 33.1 0 12 12 
France 150.4 131.3 4.2 23.3 19.1 
Germany 495 474 25.2 46.2 21 
Greece 71.1 71.3 5.3 5.2 -0.1 
Hungary 30.2 26 1.2 5.4 4.2 
Ireland 19.2 22.4 4.2 1.1 -3.1 
Italy 215.8 225.3 28.4 18.9 -9.5 
Latvia 4.1 2.9 0 1.2 1.2 
Lithuania 13.5 6.6 0 6.9 6.9 
Luxembourg 3.2 2.6 0 0 0 
Netherlands 86.5 80.4 6 12.2 6.1 
Poland 235.6 205.4 0.5 28.6 28.1 
Portugal 36.9 36.4 1.8 2.2 0.4 
Slovakia 30.5 25.2 0 5.2 5.2 
Slovenia 9.1 8.7 0.1 0.5 0.4 
Spain 172.1 182.9 34.8 24 -10.8 
Sweden 22.3 19.3 3.1 6.1 3 
UK 206 242.5 50.9 14.5 -36.4 
Total 2,087.8 2,006.6 179 259 79
Source: European Commission 2006; Ellerman and Buchner 2006 
                                                 
16 Gross short is the sum of the permits’ shortage taking into account exclusively those plants that in 
2005 produced more emissions than the permits they had 
17 Gross long is the sum of all the permits surplus just taking into account those plants that in 2005 
produced less emissions than the permits they initially owned 
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Figure 7 - Difference Allocation - Verified Emissions (Mt CO2) 
 
 Source: CITL 
 
After this unexpected crash, the spot price of allowances fluctuated in a volatile range 
between 14 and 19€ until September 2006.  As shown in table 4, this price volatility 
can be explained by the significant room for bargaining that was still of interest to the 
ETS operators; indeed, in spite of the aggregate permit surplus in the market, different 
players were still in a gross short position, thus having to acquire some permits in 
order to cover their long position and comply with the ETS Directive (figure 7). 
Given this huge excess of permits combined with the impossibility of banking 
allowances to the next trading period, after September 2006 the CO2 price started to 
fall progressively toward zero, where it stayed until the end of the first phase. Figure 
below depicts the CO2 spot price trend during the first ETS phase. 
 
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
A
us
tri
a
B
el
gi
um
B
ul
ga
ria
C
yp
ru
s
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
D
en
m
ar
k
Es
to
ni
a
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
H
un
ga
ry
Ir
el
an
d
Ita
ly
La
tv
ia
Li
ec
ht
en
st
ei
n
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
M
al
ta
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
N
or
w
ay
Po
la
nd
Po
rtu
ga
l
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sp
ai
n
Sw
ed
en
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
EU
-1
5
EU
-2
5
2005 total 2005-2007
104 
 
Figure 8  – CO2 Spot Price and Traded Volume during the 1° ETS Trading 
Period  
Source:  elaboration from PointCarbon 
 
The unexpected collapse of the CO2 price toward zero has compromised the ETS 
effectiveness in promoting emissions reduction in a cost effective-way. In spite of 
being quite intuitive, this assertion needs to be supported by appropriate data and 
arguments. First, it can be argued that the CO2 price established in the ETS can be 
considered a proxy of the cost of the environmental externality that the industrial and 
energy installations are required to internalize in the marginal production cost. 
However, as long as the CO2 price tends toward zero, then this implies that the 
European climate policy is failing to induce any internalization of the external costs of 
climate change. Second, the incentive to reduce emissions that is given by the ETS 
and by the CO2 price can be roughly estimated by comparing the CO2 price with the 
CO2 theoretical coal-to-gas switch price. 
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As explained in the previous chapter, emissions can be reduced in the short run by 
switching production from more polluting to less carbon-intensive fuels and 
technologies. In the energy market, electricity can be generated alternatively by coal 
plants and by cycle combined gas turbine (CCGT) fired plants. Gas plants are leaner 
than coal plants because they are more efficient (i.e. they have a higher thermal 
performance) and because they burn a less carbon-intensive fuel; however, coal plants 
tend to be more economical, since coal is on average cheaper than gas. Therefore, 
private companies tend to prefer coal over gas, while the central dispatcher tends to 
call into operation first the coal plants. This in turn results in a higher level of 
emissions. The establishment of the ETS can have a significant impact on the merit 
order between gas and coal plants: after the CO2 emissions have been monetized and 
the electricity generators have been required to internalize this cost, coal plants—
which are more carbon intensive—have to pay a higher environmental cost, 
worsening their competitiveness against gas plants. 
Based on the historical prices of coal and gas weighted by the plants thermal 
efficiencies and by the fuels CO2 emissions factors, it is possible to calculate the 
theoretical CO2 price that would make the generation of electricity through the 
burning of gas or fuels equally preferable. Then, the comparison between the real CO2 
price and the theoretical CO2 switch price allows us to infer whether the ETS has 
succeeded in giving electricity generators an incentive to reduce emissions by 
switching from coal to less carbon-intensive fuels. In fact, whenever the real CO2 
price is lower than the theoretical CO2 coal-to-gas switch price, then generating 
electricity by using coal instead of gas is more economical. As a result, in this case it 
is clear the ETS has failed to give substantial incentives to reduce emissions. On the 
contrary, when the real CO2 price is higher than the theoretical CO2 switch price, then 
the electricity generators will find it more economical to use gas instead of coal, and 
the electricity merit order supply function will experience a shift between the gas and 
coal plants. In this case, the ETS has succeeded in giving substantial incentives to 
reduce emissions, promoting a win-win strategy: after the CO2 emissions have been 
monetized, the less carbon intensive technology becomes also the most efficient one. 
The switch toward less carbon-intensive fuels is both economically rational and 
environmentally compatible.  
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The following figure compares the real and the theoretical CO2 prices, while 
Appendix I illustrates how the theoretical CO2 coal-to-gas price has been calculated 
and reports the data that has been used to develop this comparative analysis. 
 
Figure 9 – Theoretical Coal to Gas CO2 Switch Price and CO2 Real Spot and 
Future Prices (€/Mwh) 
 Source: own elaboration  
 
The following figure reports the difference between the CO2 real and the theoretical 
coal to gas switch prices: whenever the difference line is greater than zero, then the 
ETS has induced emissions abatement through a fuel switch, while in the opposite 
case, the ETS has failed to give sufficient incentive to promote emissions abatement 
in the electricity market. 
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Figure 10 – Difference between CO2 Real and the Theoretical Coal to Gas Switch 
Prices (€/MWh) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
According to this comparative analysis, in the period that goes from the second half of 
2005 through the first half of 2008 the real price is higher than the switch price only 
during a few periods (summer 2005, October 2006—which, however, presents a 
negative switch price implying that gas was more economical even without taking 
into account the cost of CO2 emissions—and after April 2008 when the 2007 
allowances were finally surrendered and the first ETS trading period was officially 
closed). During all the periods then CO2 prices crashed toward zero, the ETS did not 
give any incentive to abate emissions. 
 
 
3.  Assessing Over-allocation: The Ellerman and Buchner Analysis  
The CO2 price collapse toward zero and the 80 million tonnes gap between the ETS 
cap and the amount of emissions produced by the ETS sectors seem to suggest that 
during the first ETS trading period the ETS regulation did not work properly.  
However, prima facie, there is no evidence showing that the 80 million permit surplus 
is effectively a consequence of the over-allocation of permits by the competent 
regulatory authorities. In theory, emissions abatement on behalf of the ETS sectors 
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could explain the 80 million gap between the ETS emissions and the ETS cap. 
In the latter case, it would be possible to assert that the ETS is promoting an 
emissions abatement on behalf of the ETS installations, whereas the CO2 price drop is 
just a consequence of the correct functioning of ETS market fundamentals. Therefore, 
an assessment of the ETS cap stringency is required to understand if over-allocation 
took place, to assess the effectiveness of the ETS in inducing emissions reduction and 
to evaluate to what extent the ETS sectors are contributing, with respect to non-ETS 
sectors, to the Kyoto target’s achievement. 
“Over-allocation” is not a clearly defined concept: while the term implies that too 
many allowances have been allocated, it does not give any precise indication 
regarding how many excess allowances have been given out. To assess whether, and 
to what extent, over-allocation has occurred, a benchmark needs to be defined; that is, 
a theoretical cap that reflects the optimal amount of allowances should be assigned. 
Any amount above this cap implies over-allocation. Once such a benchmark has been 
determined, it becomes possible to establish whether over-allocation took place and, if 
this is the case, to assess its magnitude.  
Different studies evaluate whether allowances have been over-allocated. Notably, 
Buchner and Ellerman (2006) have chosen as their benchmark the level of 2005 
“Business as Usual” (BaU) emissions: the hypothetical amount of emissions that 
would have been produced in 2005 by the ETS sectors if the EU ETS had not been 
established. The authors explain this choice by arguing that “all would agree that 
handing out more allowances than BaU emissions would constitute over-allocation” 
(Buchner and Ellerman, 2006: 6). This observation is unquestionably true; however, 
as the authors themselves recognize, the chosen benchmark is a counterfactual value 
that can never be observed and that can only be estimated (e.g. Grubb and Ferrario 
2006). The authors assume that, in the hypothetical absence of the ETS, the amount of 
emissions produced by the ETS sectors would have increased at an annual rate 
determined by the product of the real GDP growth rate and the annual rate of change 
of carbon intensity. The authors estimate the level of ETS BaU emissions by 
multiplying the estimated  baseline of the ETS historical emissions, as reported in the 
MS NAPs,18 by the annual GDP growth rate observed in each MS between 2002 and 
                                                 
18 Official and reliable data of the ETS emissions was published only after the ETS’ establishment; the 
amount of emissions produced by the ETS installations before the ETS was launched is unknown and 
can only be estimated. 
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2005; finally, they adjust this value with the CO2 intensity change rate that was 
experienced between 2000 and 2004 in each MS (Appendix II). The authors estimate 
that the counterfactual 2005 BaU emissions produced by the ETS installations would 
have been 143 million higher than the amount of CO2 emissions produced in 2005.  
Obviously, the size of permit over-allocation, determined by the difference between 
the 2005 ETS BAU emissions and the level of allocated permits in the same year, 
differs depending on how BaU emissions are calculated: being an estimation that can 
never be observed, the counterfactual risks being biased in both upward and 
downward directions.19 Of course, Ellerman and Buchner are perfectly aware of this 
problem, and, after taking into account the possible biases, they adjust the 
counterfactual concluding that, compared to the BaU emissions scenario, ETS 2005 
verified that “emissions were reduced by an amount that was probably larger than 50 
million tonnes and less than 200 million tonnes” (p. 34). 
Moreover, in 2005, the number of allocated permits was lower than the level of BaU 
emissions projections (Appendix II). Thus, according to the benchmark chosen by 
Ellerman and Buchner, over-allocation should not have taken place. In the following 
citation, Parsons et al (2009) returns to this topic, arguing that:  
 
the gradual drop in the spot price for the first phase (…) led to many 
ill-informed statements that the European system had been 
“overallocated” allowances and that the EU-ETS was a failure in 
reducing carbon emissions. The zero price is not a reflection of the 
allocation. Instead, it reflects the seam between 2007 and 2008 built 
into the EU-ETS’s use of discrete phases without any banking or 
borrowing allowed between the phases. The cap remained what it had 
always been, and aggregate emissions were below the cap due to some 
combination of error in estimating baseline emissions, abatement and 
the randomness of actual emissions. So, in the first phase, the EU-ETS 
succeeded in capping emissions exactly where it had started out to cap 
emissions, and there was no failure from the perspective of the 
                                                 
19 For instance, the ETS historical emissions baseline reported in the MS’ NAPs might be upwardly 
biased as the data collected in the NAP were prominently voluntary submissions by the industries. The 
fact that the allowances were grandfathered proportionally to historical emissions gives industries an 
incentive to resolve uncertainties in favour of higher emissions: the more emissions were produced in 
the past, the higher the number of allocated permits would have been (Ellerman Buchner 2006) 
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original system’s goal. (p.9)
There is no question that, after the establishment of the ETS, emissions have been 
reduced compared with the BaU scenario, and the idea that prices dropped toward 
zero mainly because of the impossibility of banking allowances from one trading 
phase to the next has been widely accepted; however, this information is not sufficient 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the ETS in any exhaustive manner. Parsons et al 
(2009) conclude that the ETS succeeds in capping emissions and that there was no 
failure from the perspective of the original system’s goal, but they do not assess how 
much the ETS is contributing to the achievement of the Kyoto Protocol target. Rather 
than estimating how much of the emissions has been abated after the establishment of 
the ETS, this chapter aims at understanding how much the ETS is contributing to 
emissions reduction compared with the non-ETS sectors, and to what extent MS are 
relying on the ETS to achieve their Kyoto emissions reduction targets in a cost-
effective way. With these goals, the following section introduces an alternative 
methodology to assess over-allocation. 
4.  The ETS Cap for the Second Trading Period 
The European Directive 2003/87/EC divides the ETS in different phases: beginning in 
2008, a five-year phase follows the first three-year pilot phase (2005-2007). Art. 9 of 
the EU ETS Directive specifies that “for each period [...] each MS shall develop a 
national plan stating the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate for that 
period.”  Moreover, Art. 13 establishes that “allowances shall be valid for emissions 
during the period [...] for which they are issued.” These articles imply that for any 
new phase MS have to specify with a new NAP the amount of the permits they intend 
to allocate to each plant every year within that specific ETS phase (e.g. Neuhoff, 
Martinez and Stato 2006). Therefore, the emissions rights surplus registered during 
the first ETS phase (2005-2007) cannot be banked and transferred from this phase to 
the next one. Thanks to this temporal subdivision, national and European legislators 
had the possibility to ensure permit scarcity for the second phase independently of the 
permit surplus registered during the first phase. 
After these NAPs were submitted, the EC imposed in total a permit cut of 245 million 
per annum.  
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Table 5 -  2008-2012 Proposed and Approved National Allocation Plans 
 First 
Period 
Cap 
2008 – 
2012 
Proposed 
Cap 
2008 – 
2012 
Approved 
Cap 
EC Cut to 
2008- 2012 
Proposed 
NAPs 
 (Mt Co2) 
EC Cut to 
2008- 2012 
Proposed 
NAPs  
(%) 
Austria 33 32.8 30.7 -2.1 -6.4 
Belgium 62.1 63.3 58.5 -4.8 -7.6 
Bulgaria 42.3 67.6 42.3 -25.3 -37.4 
Cyprus 5.7 7.12 5.48 -1.64 -23 
Czech Rep. 97.6 101.9 86.8 -15.1 -14.8 
Denmark 33.5 24.5 24.5 0 0 
Estonia 19 24.38 12.72 -11.66 -47.8 
Finland 45.5 39.6 37.6 -2 -5.1 
France 156.5 132.8 132.8 0 0 
Germany 499 482 453.1 -28.9 -6.0 
Greece 74.4 75.5 69.1 -6.4 -8.5 
Hungary 31.3 30.7 26.9 -3.8 -12.4 
Ireland 22.3 22.6 22.3 -0.3 -1.3 
Italy 223.1 209 195.8 -13.2 -6.3 
Latvia 4.6 7.7 3.43 -4.4 -57.1 
Lithuania 12.3 16.6 8.8 -7.8 -47.0 
Luxembourg 3.4 3.95 2.5 -1.25 -31.6 
Malta 2.9 2.96 2.1 -0.86 -29.1 
Netherlands 95.3 90.4 85.8 -4.6 -5.1 
Poland 239.1 284.6 208.5 -76.1 -26.7 
Portugal 38.9 35.9 34.8 -1.1 -3.1 
Romania 74.8 95.7 75.9 -19.8 -20.7 
Slovakia 30.5 41.3 30.9 -10.4 -25.2 
Slovenia 8.8 8.3 8.3 0 0 
Spain 174.4 152.7 152.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Sweden 22.9 25.2 22.8 -2.4 -9.5 
UK 245.3 246.2 246.2 0 0 
SUM 2,298.5 2,325.31 2,079.85 -245.46 -10.7 
Source: CEC 2007c 
 
While the 2008-2012 cap proposed by MS (2,320 million permits) would have 
allocated almost 200 million permits more than the amount of ETS 2005 verified 
emissions (2,122 million), the cap approved by the European Commission (2,080 
millions permits) is lower than both the first period cap and the 2005 ETS emissions.  
It is interesting to observe that the EC’s stricter intervention in the second phase 
NAPs had a significant influence on the trend of the CO2 future prices relative to 
December 2008. As shown in the figure below, after September 2006, while spot 
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prices started their path toward zero, future prices started to increase above the 
threshold of 20 Euros per ton of CO2. 
 
Figure 11 – Trend of CO2 Spot and Future Prices during the First ETS Trading 
Period (€/ton) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Pointcarbon 
 
However, this consideration is not sufficient to conclude that over-allocation has not 
occurred during the second phase. The ETS 1st and 2nd cap data just presented will be 
compared with a new benchmark that is different from the BaU emissions level 
proposed by Ellerman and Buchner. In the next section, we propose an alternative 
methodology built to assess the stringency of the ETS 1st and 2nd cap.  
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5. A Benchmark for Evaluating the Stringency of the ETS Cap 
The 2008–2012 NAPs submitted to the European Commission have proposed that 
almost 200 million allowances more than the amount of ETS 2005 verified emissions 
should be allocated during the second phase. However, in order to ensure that 
allowances have a scarcity value, the EC has reduced the proposed cap by 245 million 
allowances per annum (–10.5%) to a level that is lower than both the first period cap 
and the 2005 ETS emissions (Table 5). To assess whether over-allocation took place, 
both the ETS first and second phase caps are going to be compared to a theoretical 
benchmark. 
The ETS 2005 BAU emissions benchmark does not give us any further information 
about how far European MS are from their emissions reduction target and to what 
extent European MS are relying on the ETS—compared to other national climate 
policies—to achieve their emissions reduction target. 
Therefore, the alternative theoretical benchmark to assess the ETS cap stringency 
should refer to the emissions reduction target MS shall achieve by 2012. 
The Kyoto target cannot be a benchmark since it applies to the overall European GHG 
emissions, whereas the ETS covers only part of them. A criterion is required to 
identify which part of the target can be directly compared to the ETS cap.  
The first-best candidate is the cost-effectiveness criterion, which equalizes the 
marginal abatement curves (MACs) between trading and non-trading sectors, ensuring 
that emissions are reduced cost-effectively at the minimal marginal cost and 
independently of the efficiency of the Kyoto target, whose assessment goes beyond 
the scope of this analysis.  
In the extreme case that the non-ETS sectors did not have any abatement possibility 
(i.e., MAC tending toward infinite), then the cost-effectiveness approach would call 
for all the emissions reduction burden to be borne by the ETS sectors. Vice versa, if 
the ETS sectors had no abatement possibility (i.e., MAC tending toward infinite), then 
it would be efficient to impose the entire emissions reduction burden on the non-ETS 
sectors, dispensing the ETS from any emissions reduction obligation.  
If ETS and non-ETS sectors had the same MACs then the emissions reduction burden 
would be equally split between ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
However, the ETS and non-ETS sectors’ aggregate MAC data are not publicly 
available and the ETS cost-effective cap cannot be determined with precision. 
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A second-best option is the proportional reduction approach, according to which 
emissions of the trading and non-trading sectors should be reduced proportionally to 
their emissions share—down 8% compared with 1990 levels—to meet the overall EU 
target. The ETS proportional cap would impose on the ETS and non-ETS sectors an 
emissions reduction burden proportional to the EU target and to the amount of 
pollution they generate. 
According to the EC, this approach is effective and consistent with the EU target (EC, 
2008). Indeed, the Commission has declared that it “considers it necessary for a MS  
with a gap to close to use the second-period allocation plan to achieve at least a fair 
proportion of the outstanding effort, i.e. a part reflecting the share of EU ETS 
installations in total greenhouse gas emissions” (EC, 2006a: 5). 
 
5.1. Data Required and Sources of Information 
The theoretical benchmark consistent with the proportionality criterion (hereafter the 
ETS proportional Kyoto target) is calculated by multiplying the MS (EU) emissions 
reduction target by the share of emissions produced by the ETS sectors at the national 
and European level (ETS share).  
 
ETS proportional Kyoto target = EU Kyoto target * EU ETS share 
 
While national emissions reduction targets, as defined by the European Burden 
Sharing Agreement (BSA), are publicly available (Table 6), until 2007 the share of 
ETS European and national emissions could only be estimated. 
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Table 6 - Burden Sharing Agreement and Distance from the Kyoto Target 
(Mton  CO2)
Base Year 
Emissions 
Burden 
Sharing 
Agreement  
Kyoto  
Target 
2005 
GHG 
Emissions 
Distance 
from the 
Target 
Austria 78.9 – 13% 68.68 93.3 -24.62 
Belgium 146.9 – 7.5 % 135.87 143.8 -7.93 
Czech Rep. 196.3 – 8% 180.58 145.6 34.98 
Denmark 69.3 – 21% 54.77 63.9 -9.13 
Estonia 42.6 – 8% 39.23 20.7 18.53 
Finland 71.1   0% 71.1 69.3 1.8 
France 567.1   0% 567.09 553.4 13.69 
Germany 1,230 – 21% 971.67 1,001.5 -29.83 
Greece 111.1 + 25% 138.82 139.2 -0.38 
Hungary 122.2 – 6% 114.89 80.5 34.39 
Ireland 55.8 + 13% 63 69.9 -6.87 
Italy 519.6 – 6.5 % 485.83 582.2 -96.37 
Latvia 25.9 – 8% 23.82 10.9 12.92 
Lithuania 50.9 – 8% 46.86 22.6 24.26 
Luxemburg 12.7 – 28% 9.14 12.7 -3.56 
Netherlands 214.3 – 6% 201.45 212.1 -10.65 
Poland 565.3 – 6% 531.34 399 132.34 
Portugal 60.0 + 27% 76.15 85.5 -9.35 
Slovakia 73.2 – 8% 67.36 48.7 18.66 
Slovenia 20.2 – 8% 18.6 20.3 -1.7 
Spain 289.4 + 15% 332.79 440.6 -107.81 
Sweden 72.5 + 4% 75.35 67 8.35 
UK 767.9 – 12.5 % 671.9 657.4 14.5 
EU-15 4,266.4 – 8% 3,925.11 4,192 -266.89 
EU-23 5,363.2 No common 
target 
4,946.3 4,940.1 6.22 
  Source: EEA 2006: 61, EEA 2007 
 
Before the EU ETS establishment, emissions data were mainly aggregated at a 
national and sector level; official and exact data concerning the pre-2005 ETS 
emissions share are not available. Nevertheless, different attempts have been made to 
estimate these values. 
Georgopoulou et al. (2006) estimated the pre-2005 ETS emissions share for each MS 
by dividing the ETS historical emissions baseline (as reported in the NAPs) by the 
national GHG emissions (as reported by the European Environment Agency - EEA). 
As recognized by Georgopoulou et al. (2006), this estimation might be biased: ETS 
historical emissions data have been collected in the NAPs from self-reported 
submissions on behalf of ETS installations, which had an incentive to postpone 
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emissions abatement and to signal higher emissions in order to receive more 
grandfathered allowances.20  
Finally, in 2007, both the 2005 ETS and the overall GHG (trading and non-trading 
sectors) emissions data were published. For the first time the exact share of European 
and national emissions produced by the ETS sectors in the same year can be 
calculated from official and publicly available data. Indeed, according to Art. 14 of 
Directive 2003/87/EC (EC, 2003), every year (t) MS have the duty to monitor and to 
report the amount of emissions produced in the previous year (t–1) by each ETS 
installation. The collected data are aggregated at a national level and officially 
published by the EC. Moreover, according to Council Decision 280/2004/EC (EC, 
2004), each year (t) the EEA has to report the amount of national GHG emissions 
produced by each MS in the year before last (t–2). The EEA inventory reports (EEA, 
2004, 2007) cover all the trading and non-trading sectors, as well as the GHG 
emissions. 
On June 2007, the EEA published the “Annual European Community GHG inventory 
1990–2005 and inventory report 2007” reporting the overall 2005 GHG emissions 
data for each EU MS. Therefore, two years after the ETS establishment we can refer 
to reliable, official and publicly available data regarding the ETS emissions and 
national GHG emissions produced in the same year. For the first time it has become 
possible to calculate the precise ETS share and its marginal change year by year. 
However, albeit precise, the 2005 ETS share cannot take into account the potential 
emissions reduction that occurred after the establishment of the ETS. 
    
  
                                                 
20 So far their analysis has been considered one of the most reliable assessments of the ETS emissions 
share calculated before the EU ETS establishment; also Neuhoff et al (2006), from the Cambridge 
Electricity Policy Research Group, has referred to this ratio to assess the ETS emissions projections 
2008 – 2012.
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Table 7 - The ETS Share (Mt CO2 eq.)21
    Sources: NAPs 2008-2012, EEA  2004a, Georgedopoulou et al. 2006, EC 2006, EEA 2007  
 
Given the potential problems of both pre-2005 and 2005 ETS shares (Table 7), 
referring to only one of them might lead to an imprecise assessment of over-
allocation. Instead of choosing between the pre-2005 and the 2005 ETS share, both of 
them are considered, resulting in two benchmarks: 
 
1. Benchmark 1: The Pre-2005 ETS Proportional Kyoto Target, determined by 
multiplying the MS Kyoto target by the pre-2005 ETS share (Appendix III).  
2. Benchmark 2: The 2005 ETS Proportional Kyoto Target is derived by multiplying 
for any MS its Kyoto target by the 2005 ETS share (Appendix III).  
                                                 
21 The pre-2005 ETS share (Georgedopoulou et al) is determined by the ratio “2002 ETS emissions/ 
2002 total GHG (ETS+non-ETS) emissions, while the 2005 ETS share determined in this article is 
calculated by the ratio: “2005 ETS verified emissions/2005 total GHG (ETS+non-ETS) emissions” 
 
(1) 
2002 
ETS  
emissions 
(2) 
2002 
GHG  
emissions
(3) 
Pre-005 
 ETS 
share  
(4) 
2005 ETS 
emissions 
(5) 
2005 
GHG  
emissions 
(6) 
2005 
ETS 
share 
Austria 30.2 86.4 35% 33.4 93.3 36% 
Belgium 63 145.3 47.5% 55.4 143.8 39% 
Cz Rep 89 142.9 60.3% 82.5 145.6 57% 
Denmark 30.9 69 44..8% 26.5 63.9 41% 
Estonia 12 19.5 61.5% 12.6 20.7 61% 
Finland 40.9 77.2 53% 33.1 69.3 48% 
France 132.4 554.1 23.5% 131.3 553.4 24% 
Germany 501 1,015.2 49.3% 474 1,001.5 47% 
Greece 71 133.6 52.8% 71.3 139.2 51% 
Hungary 29.4 80.8 36.4% 26 80.5 32% 
Ireland 20.6 69.4 29.7% 22.4 69.9 32% 
Italy 228.1 555 41.4% 225.3 582.2 39% 
Latvia 3.7 10.6 37.6% 2.9 10.9 27% 
Lithuania 8.5 19.6 35.7% 6.6 22.6 29% 
Lux 2.6 10.8 24.2% 2.6 12.7 20% 
NL 81.7 213.5 38.2% 80.4 212.1 38% 
Poland 219.8 370.2 57.1% 205.4 399 51% 
Portugal 36.6 86.1 42.5% 36.4 85.5 43% 
Slovakia 26.7 50.9 52.4% 25.2 48.7 52% 
Slovenia 20.6 69.5 48.9% 87 20.3 43% 
Spain 174.5 398.6 43.8% 182.9 440.6 42% 
Sweden 9.8 20.1 29.1% 19.3 67 29% 
UK 276.7 643.7 42.5% 242.5 657.4 37% 
EU 15 1,663.8 4,078 41% 1,636.8 4,192 38% 
EU- 23 2,073.5 4,842 43% 2,006.7 4,940.1 41% 
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These two benchmarks limit the ETS proportional target range. 
Assessing over-allocation in relation to a range rather than to a single benchmark 
generates more robust conclusions. Moreover, the unrealistic assumption of ETS 
constant emissions share (e.g. Betz et al. 2006; Georgedopoulou et al. 2006; Schleich 
et al. 2007) can be relaxed. 
 
6.  Assessing the ETS Cap Stringency 
6.1 EU-15 
To comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the old EU-15 MS have to emit 3,925 Mt CO2 
eq. by 2012. Given that the EU-15 ETS sectors emitted respectively 41% (pre-2005 
ETS share) and 39% (2005 ETS share) of the overall EU-15 GHG emissions, the EU-
15 ETS proportional caps limiting the ETS Kyoto proportional target range equal 
respectively 1,609 and 1,491 Mt. The stringency of the EU-15 ETS caps can then be 
derived. 
2005-2007 First Cap: during the first phase the EU-15 MS allocated 1,729 million 
permits, corresponding to 44% of the EU-15 target. This cap exceeds both 
benchmarks limiting the EU-15 ETS Kyoto proportional range. It is possible to 
conclude unambiguously that over-allocation took place: the EU-15 MS have 
assigned to the ETS sectors an amount of allowances more proportional than their 
ETS share.  
2008-2012 Proposed Cap: with the new 2008-2012 NAPs, the EU-15 MS proposed to 
allocate 1,636 million permits, almost 42% of the EU-15 target. This cap also exceeds 
both benchmarks limiting the EU-15 ETS proportional range. Also for the second 
phase, the EU-15 MS intended to over-allocate permits. 
2008-2012 Approved Cap: the 2008-2012 EU-15 ETS cap approved by the EC (1,568 
million permits or 40% of the EU-15 Kyoto target) is in between the two benchmarks 
limiting the EU-15 ETS proportional range. When compared to the pre-2005 ETS 
proportional Kyoto target, over-allocation would not be detected. On the contrary, 
when compared to the stricter benchmark—the 2005 ETS proportional target—the 
2008-2012 approved cap would constitute over-allocation. In this case, no univocal 
conclusion about the EU-15 second phase cap can be derived. 
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6.2 EU-23   
Based on the pre-2005 and 2005 ETS emissions data, the EU-23 ETS sectors have 
emitted respectively 43% and 41% of the overall EU-23 GHG emissions.22 The EU-
23 ETS proportional Kyoto target range can be calculated. 
2005-2007 First Cap: during the 2005-2007 first ETS phase, the EU-23 MS allocated 
2,172 million permits, almost 44% of the virtual EU-23 Kyoto target.23 Being higher 
than both the pre-2005 and 2005 EU-23 ETS shares, this cap constitutes over-
allocation.  
2008-2012 Proposed Cap: the amount of permits the EU-23 MS proposed to allocate 
to the ETS sectors (2,151) exceeds the ETS proportional target range. Indeed, the 
proposed 2008-2012 cap equals 43.5% of the EU-23 virtual Kyoto target. This 
percentage exceeds both the pre-2005 and 2005 EU-23 ETS shares. Without the EC 
intervention, the EU-23 MS would have over-allocated permits also in the second 
ETS phase. 
2008-2012 Approved Cap: on average permits have not been over-allocated during 
the second phase. Indeed, the final 2008-2012 cap approved by the EC (1,955 million 
permits, or 39.5% of the EU-23 Kyoto target) is lower than both the benchmarks 
limiting the EU-23 proportional Kyoto range. 
 
6.3 Member States 
This section analyses which MS over-allocated permits during the first and second 
phases. Two different values are presented: the first one compares the amount of 
permits allocated by any MS during the first phase (2005-2007) to the relative ETS 
proportional target range (figure 12). The second value compares the proposed and 
approved second phase ETS cap to the same range. To simplify this comparison, the 
pre-2005 ETS proportional Kyoto targets have been normalized; then the 2005 ETS 
proportional Kyoto target and the amount of ETS permits allocated during the two 
phases have been recalculated accordingly (Appendix III). 
                                                 
22 Cyprus and Malta do not have a target; therefore, they are not taken into account, while Romania and 
Bulgaria are excluded from this analysis since they joined the ETS after its beginning. 
23 The EU 23 MS do not have a common target. This virtual target is derived by aggregating national 
targets. 
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Figure 12 - ETS Proportional Target Range and ETS 2005-2007 Cap 
(Normalized Values) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
For the first ETS phase (2005-2007), MS can be classified into three categories: 
1. MS whose cap exceeds the ETS Kyoto proportional range;  
2. MS whose cap is within the range; 
3. MS whose cap is below the range. 
The first category includes all the former EU-15 MS except the UK and Belgium. All 
these MS assigned a number of permits that is more proportional than both the pre-
2005 and 2005 ETS shares. These MS over-allocated permits to their ETS national 
sectors. The same conclusion holds for the second category (Belgium and Slovenia) 
when the MS’ ETS cap is compared to the respective range’s upper benchmark, while 
the opposite would be true when compared to the range’s lower limit. In this case, no 
univocal conclusion is derived. 
Finally, the MS belonging to the third category allocated an amount of permits that is 
more proportional than both their pre-2005 and 2005 ETS emissions share. In this 
case, over-allocation did not take place. Not surprisingly, except for the United 
Kingdom, this category includes all the new MS.  
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Figure 13 - ETS Proportional Target Range and the ETS 2008-2012 Cap 
(Normalized Values) 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Figure 13 shows that before the EC intervention most of the EU MS proposed to over-
allocate allowances also during the ETS second phase. MS can be classified into five 
categories:  
1. MS whose both proposed and approved caps exceed their relative ETS 
proportional range (Austria, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden). Over-allocation occurred despite the EC intervention; 
2. MS that proposed to over-allocate permits, but which had to reduce their cap to a 
point included in the range (Finland, Germany, Greece, and Italy).  In this case, 
after the EC intervention, over-allocation did not take place. Thus, the cut 
imposed by the EC differs among MS; 
3. MS (Belgium, Denmark and Slovenia) whose both proposed and approved caps 
are included in their respective ETS proportional Kyoto ranges; 
4. MS that proposed to allocate an amount of permits lower than their respective 
range (France and the UK). France and the UK’s proposed caps have been 
approved by the EC without any imposition of a cut; 
5. MS whose proposed caps have been reduced below their respective ETS range 
(Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia). 
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Apart from Slovakia, these proposed caps either were already included or below 
their respective ranges. All these MS challenged the EC’s imposition of a cut 
before the European Court of Justice.  
 
7. Consequences of Permit Over-allocation 
The ETS cap indicates, directly, the maximum amount of GHGs the ETS sectors can 
totally emit and, indirectly, to what extent MS rely on the ETS flexible mechanism to 
reach the Kyoto target. Indeed, when MS determine in their National Allocation Plan 
the total amount of permits to be assigned among the ETS participants, they implicitly 
define to what extent the ETS sectors will contribute, with respect to the other non-
ETS sectors, to the abatement of pollution in order to comply with their national 
emissions’ reduction target established in the Kyoto Protocol. 
By construction, over-allocation implies that the ETS sectors have to bear an 
emissions reduction burden less proportional than the percentage of produced 
emissions. Therefore, where over-allocation has been detected MS will reach their 
emissions reduction target only if another agent—mainly non-ETS sectors—reduces 
the emissions that the ETS sectors are not legally required to abate. In this case, the 
main side effect of permit over-allocation is a shift of the reduction burden from ETS 
to non-ETS sectors. 
Non-ETS sectors have to bear an additional cost, which—according to the 
proportionality criterion—should be borne by the ETS sectors. This constitutes a form 
of cross-subsidization that is not cost-effective. According to different studies, the 
ETS sectors have on average lower MACs than non-ETS sectors (e.g. Criqui and 
Kitous 2003; Böhringer et al., 2005; Peterson, 2006). Moreover, the EC has 
established that 60% of the effort concerning the 2020 European emissions reduction 
target (20% less emissions than the 1990 level) must be achieved in the ETS sectors 
reflecting “the larger cost-effective potential in particular in the electricity sector 
compared to non-ETS sectors.”24 
According to the cost-effectiveness approach, the ETS sectors should bear a higher 
emissions reduction burden than non-ETS sectors, and not vice-versa.  
So far it has been assumed that the emissions the ETS sectors are not required to abate 
will be reduced by the non-ETS sectors; however, it is also possible that a third agent 
                                                 
24 EC 2008 
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different from ETS and non-ETS sectors will bear this burden. This third agent is 
most likely the national governments. Governments can reduce emissions through the 
direct acquisition of international credits deriving from Clean Development 
Mechanism projects. Schleich et al. estimated in the beginning of 2007 that 11 of the 
EU-15 MS’ national governments intended to purchase directly a number of credits 
deriving from international projects (Clean Development and Joint Implementation 
Kyoto flexible Mechanisms) equal to 109 MTon CO2 annually,25 “which represents a 
share of 7.3% of the Assigned Amount of these EU-15 MS” (Schleich et al. 2007, 
p.4). As Neuhoff et al. (2006) indicate, permit over-allocation to ETS sectors implies 
that these sectors will have a lower need to recur to international credits, which will 
be acquired in order to comply with national emissions reduction targets; thus, 
Finance Ministers and tax-payers would end up paying for these directly, 
transforming the international Kyoto flexible mechanism into a largely public-funded 
market. Also in this alternative case, permit over-allocation implies a form of indirect 
subsidy to the ETS sectors, which is not cost-effective since the government would 
have to abate on behalf of the non-ETS sectors and instead of the ETS sectors in order 
to comply with the Kyoto target. 
In the final case where nobody abates in place of the ETS sectors, MS would fail to 
comply with their emissions reduction target; this possible scenario is not evaluated as 
“efficient or inefficient”. Indeed, this thesis considers the emissions reduction targets 
as a given without questioning the efficiency of the targets themselves. It does, 
however, do this as it focuses on the tradable permits’ cost-effectiveness to reach such 
given targets. Yet, should the EU fail to achieve the Kyoto target, its political 
credibility would be seriously affected. Moreover, the ETS cap stringency analysis 
has highlighted that the size of over-allocation differs among MS because of both the 
lack of harmonized allocative criteria and the EC non-homogeneous evaluation of the 
submitted NAPs. As a consequence, despite being subjected to the same European 
regulation, national firms and sectors competing in the same European market face 
different reduction efforts and costs. The lack of a level playing field for ETS 
operators distorts competition in the European market under Articles 81 and 82 of the 
                                                 
25 Intended governmental use of Kyoto Mechanisms (in MtCO2e/a): Austria 9, Belgium 7, Denmark 4.2, Finland 
2.4, Ireland 3.6, Italy 19, Luxembourg 4.7, the Netherlands 20, Portugal 5.8, Spain 31.8 and Sweden 1.1.  
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EC Treaty. Moreover, the implications of State under Art. 87 become relevant (e.g. 
Johnston 2006; Weishaar 2007). 
 
8. Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated to what extent the EU and different MS are effectively 
relying on the ETS to comply with the Kyoto Protocol commitment. The ETS cap 
stringency has been assessed by comparing the total number of allocated permits to a 
theoretical ETS cap that would impose on the ETS sectors an emissions reduction 
burden proportional to the percentage of European emissions they generate. This 
analysis clearly demonstrates that most MS have an interest in supporting their 
national industry through permit over-allocation. Despite being economical at a 
national level, this opportunistic behaviour is not effective. Firstly, to the detriment of 
the environmental effectiveness of the system, MS have assigned more permits than 
would be allowed to ensure scarcity on the market. Moreover, by imposing on the 
ETS sectors an emissions reduction burden less proportional than their emissions 
share, permit over-allocation determines the transfer of the emissions reduction effort 
from trading to non-trading sectors, which is not cost effective. In fact, the ETS 
sectors, having on average lower MACs than non-ETS sectors, should bear a higher 
emissions reduction burden. 
Most importantly, this analysis shows that the size of over-allocation differs among 
MS. As a consequence, despite being subjected to the same European regulation, 
national firms and sectors competing in the same European market face different 
reduction efforts and costs. This lack of a level playing field distorts competition, 
creating undesirable economic consequences at the expense of an effective EU 
common market integration. The approach chosen to asses the ETS cap stringency 
highlights that the ETS, despite being the most important EU environmental 
mechanism, is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the Kyoto target. Rather, it 
must be coordinated with the national policies aimed at inducing emissions reduction 
in the non-ETS sectors. Indeed, compliance with the Emissions reduction target 
established in the Kyoto Protocol requires that the lower the emissions reduction 
burden imposed on the ETS sectors is, (the higher the ETS cap is) the stricter non-
ETS environmental policies must be, and vice-versa.  
Thus, permit over-allocation not only means that ETS sectors will have to abate an 
amount of emissions that is not cost-effective (i.e., direct consequence), but it also 
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implies that stricter national non-ETS policies need to be promoted in order to comply 
with the Kyoto target (i.e., indirect consequence). 
In conclusion, this analysis highlights that emissions trading is not an effective 
economic mechanism per se. Its effectiveness depends on the scarcity of permits in 
the market, which can be ensured by harmonized allocative criteria among MS and by 
a European policy that is homogeneous among MS and consistent with national 
emissions reduction targets and ETS shares. 
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Appendix I: Calculation of the Theoretical CO2 Coal-to-gas Switch Price 
 
The theoretical CO2 coal-to-gas switch price has been calculated using the day ahead 
price of National Balancing Point (NBP) gas traded in the British exchange market in 
pence per therm and the prices of the 1st month contract API#2 coal traded in dollars 
per ton. The cost of producing electricity by burning either gas or coal has been 
calculated assuming that coal plants have a 38% thermal efficiency while the 
Combined Cycle Gas Turbine plants have a 53% thermal efficiency. In addition to the 
fuel marginal costs, the cost of producing electricity is increased by the price of the 
CO2 which has to be weighted with the coal and gas fuels emissions factors for 
different power generation technologies, assuming that burning coal produces 950 
Kilograms of CO2 per MWh of electricity generated, while burning gas produces 450 
Kilograms of CO2 per MWh of electricity generated. 
Coal Plant: 
Electricity price (€/Mwh) = coal price ($/ton)/38% + CO2 price (€/tonCO2)* 0.95 
(ton CO2/MWh)
 
Combined Cycle Turbine Gas Plant: 
Electricity price (€/Mwh) = gas price (p/therm)/53% + CO2 price (€/tonCO2)* 0.95 
(ton CO2/MWh)
 
If we know the gas price and the coal price, we obtain two equations with one 
unknown (price of CO2). Thus, by equating the electricity prices we obtain the 
theoretical price of CO2, which would make generating power by burning gas or 
burning coal an equally preferable process. However, in order to develop this equation 
it is necessary to convert all the data with the same unit of measurement: 
– The price of coal has first to be converted from Ton to Kg (from $/ton to 
$/kg); then by adopting the coal heat of combustion (7,400 Kcal/kg), it is 
possible to pass from $/kg to $/Kcal and then to $/Gcal. Finally, we know that 
1 Gcal corresponds to 1.16 Mwh, and by converting dollars into Euros, we can 
express the price of coal as Euros per megawatt hour. 
– The price of gas has first to be converted from therm (p/Therm) to British 
Thermal Units (p/BTU). Then we know that 1 million BTU equals 0.29 MWh 
(p/MWh). Finally, pence are first converted in pounds, and then, according to 
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the appropriate exchange rate, they can be converted in Euros. In addition, the 
price of gas can be expressed in Euros per Megawatt hour. 
 
The theoretical CO2 price has been calculated on the basis of gas, coal and CO2 daily 
prices from mid July 2005 to mid July 2008. Due to the extension of the database, we 
limit ourselves to reporting some data just to illustrate how the prices have been 
converted in Euros per megawatt hour and how the theoretical switch CO2 price has 
been calculated. 
 
  Table 8 – Conversion of Coal Prices from $/ton to €/MWh 
  
COAL 1st Month Contract 
  $/Ton $/Kg $/Kcal $/Gcal $/MWh €/Mwh 
Exchange 
dollar/euro
24 Apr 06 63.00 0.06 0.000009 8.51 7.34 6.12 1.2
25 Apr 06 62.65 0.06 0.000008 8.47 7.30 6.08 1.2
26 Apr 06 62.60 0.06 0.000008 8.46 7.29 6.08 1.2
27 Apr 06 62.45 0.06 0.000008 8.44 7.28 6.06 1.2
28 Apr 06 62.40 0.06 0.000008 8.43 7.27 6.06 1.2
01 May 06 62.40 0.06 0.000008 8.43 7.27 5.59 1.3
02 May 06 62.40 0.06 0.000008 8.43 7.27 5.59 1.3
03 May 06 60.50 0.06 0.000008 8.18 7.05 5.42 1.3
04 May 06 60.25 0.06 0.000008 8.14 7.02 5.40 1.3
  Source: own elaboration on Fortis Bank data 
 
 
Table 9 – Conversion of NBP Prices from p/therm to €/MWh 
NBP GAS Day Ahead 
 
pp/therm 
p/Mil. 
BTU p/MWh pounds/Mwh €/Mwh 
Exchange 
pounds/euro
24 Apr 06 41.4 414.00 1,427.59 14.28 20.54 0.7
25 Apr 06 39.5 395.00 1,362.07 13.62 20.20 0.7
26 Apr 06 39 390.00 1,344.83 13.45 18.23 0.7
27 Apr 06 38 380.00 1,310.34 13.10 19.09 0.7
28 Apr 06 39.15 391.50 1,350.00 13.50 17.86 0.7
01 May 06 39.15 391.50 1,350.00 13.50 19.91 0.7
02 May 06 38.1 381.00 1,313.79 13.14 19.58 0.7
03 May 06 35.65 356.50 1,229.31 12.29 20.00 0.7
04 May 06 33.45 334.50 1,153.45 11.53 17.49 0.7
Source: own elaboration on Fortis Bank data  
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Table 10 – Calculation of the CO2 Theoretical Coal-to-gas Switch Price 
  
Coal 
€/Mwh 
Gas 
€/Mwh 
Coal 
38% 
€/Mwh 
Gas 53% 
€/Mwh 
Coal 
Emission 
Factor 
Gas 
Emissions 
Factor 
CO2 Coal-
to-gas 
Switch Price 
 
CO2 
Spot 
Prices 
CO2 
Future 
Price 
Dec 08
24 Apr 06 6.11 20.39 16.09 38.47 0.95 0.45 28.56 29.43 30.95
25 Apr 06 6.08 19.46 16.00 36.71 0.95 0.45 26.75 27.95 29.55
26 Apr 06 6.07 19.21 15.99 36.24 0.95 0.45 26.27 24.3 22.15
27 Apr 06 6.06 18.72 15.95 35.31 0.95 0.45 25.31 15.7 21.45
28 Apr 06 6.05 19.29 15.94 36.38 0.95 0.45 26.46 13.19 18.8
01 May 06 5.59 19.29 14.71 36.38 0.95 0.45 27.39 13.35 18.5
02 May 06 5.59 18.77 14.71 35.41 0.95 0.45 26.35 10.9 18.25
03 May 06 5.42 17.56 14.26 33.13 0.95 0.45 24.28 12 20
04 May 06 5.39 16.48 14.20 31.09 0.95 0.45 22.16 14.6 22.15
Sources: own elaboration on Fortis bank data 
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Appendix II: Relevant Data to Assess the ETS Permits Over-Allocation (Mt Co2) 
Source: Ellerman Buchner 2006 
MS 
Base 
 Period 
 ETS 
Emissio
ns 
Observe
d
Annual 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
2002-
2005 
Carbon 
Intensit
y
Assume
d
Annual 
Rate of 
Change  
2000-
2004 
CO2
Increa
se 
Annua
l
 Rate 
Counterfact
ual 
 2005 BAU 
Emissions 
Verified 
Emissio
ns 
 2005 
Permit  
Allocati
on
 2005 
Differen
ce 
 2005 –  
BAU 
Emissio
ns 
Differen
ce  
Permit 
Allocatio
n – 
 BAU 
Emissio
ns 
Austria 30.2 00.19 0.022 0.04 34 33.4 32.4 -0.6 -1.6 
Belgium 63 0.016 -0.009 0007 64.4 55.4 58.3 -9 -6.1 
Cz 
Repub. 89 0.048 -0.034 0.014 92.9 82.5 96.9 -10.4 4 
Denmark 30.9 0.02 -0.005 0.014 32.2 26.5 37.3 -5.7 5.1 
Estonia 12.4 0.088 -0.044 0.043 14.1 12.6 16.7 -1.5 2.6 
Finland 36.2 0.028 0.018 0.046 41.5 33.1 44.7 -8.4 3.2 
France 141.1 0.015 -0.008 0.006 143.8 131.3 150.4 -12.5 6.6 
Germany 501 0.006 -0.006 0.001 501.8 474 495 -27.8 -6.8 
Greece 70.1 0.046 -0.033 0.012 72.7 71.3 71.1 -1.4 -1.6 
Hungary 32 0.044 -0.037 0.007 32.7 26 30.2 -6.7 -2.5 
Ireland 20.9 0.049 -0.047 0.003 21.1 22.4 19.2 1.3 -1.9 
Italy 224 0.004 0.005 0.009 229.9 225.3 215.8 -4.6 -14.1 
Latvia 3.7 0.095 -0.06 0.034 4.1 2.9 4.1 -1.2 0 
Lithuania 9 0.09 -0.092 -0.002 8.9 6.6 13.5 -2.3 4.6 
Luxemb. 2.9 0.036 0.03 0.065 3.5 2.6 3.2 -0.9 -0.3 
Netherlan
ds 89.5 0.013 0.006 0.018 94.5 80.4 86.5 -14.1 -8 
Poland 219.8 0.043 -0.029 0.015 229.6 205.4 235.6 -24.2 6 
Portugal 36.6 0.001 0 0.002 36.8 36.4 36.9 -0.4 0.1 
Slovakia 26.5 0.055 -0.024 0.03 29 25.2 30.5 -3.8 1.5 
Slovenia 9 0.037 -0.024 0.013 9.4 8.7 9.1 -0.7 -0.3 
Spain 164.1 0.033 0.001 0.033 181.2 182.9 172.1 1.7 -9.1 
Sweden 20.2 0.028 -0.013 0.014 21.1 19.3 22.3 -1.8 1.2 
UK 245.9 0.027 -0.02 0.007 250.8 242.5 206 -8.3 -44.8 
EU23 2,078 - - 0.011 2,150.1 2,006.6 2,087.8 -143.5 -62.3 
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ETS 
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2005-
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2008 - 
2012 
A
ppr-
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C
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 2008-2012 
Proposed 
C
ap 
A
ustria 
68.68 
0.35 
0.36 
24.038 
24.7248 
33 
32.8 
30.7 
100 
103 
137 
127 
136.5 
B
elgium
 
135.8 
0.475 
0.39 
64.53 
52.98 
62.1 
63.3 
58.5 
100 
82.1 
96.2 
90.6 
98.1 
C
z. R
ep. 
180.6 
0.603 
0.57 
108.9 
102.93 
97.6 
101.9 
86.8 
100 
94.5 
89.6 
79.7 
93.6 
D
enm
ark 
54.77 
0.448 
0.41 
24.53 
22.45 
33.5 
24.5 
24.5 
100 
91.5 
136.5 
99.8 
99.8 
Estonia 
39.23 
0.615 
0.61 
24.12645 
23.93 
19 
24.38 
12.72 
100 
99.2 
78.8 
52.7 
101.1 
Finland 
71.1 
0.53 
0.48 
37.683 
34.128 
45.5 
39.6 
37.6 
100 
90.6 
120.7 
99.8 
105.1 
France 
567.0 
0.235 
0.24 
133.26 
136.10 
156.5 
132.8 
132.8 
100 
102 
117.4 
99.7 
99.7 
G
erm
any 
971.6 
0.493 
0.47 
479.03 
456.6 
499 
482 
453.1 
100 
95.3 
104.2 
94.6 
100.6 
G
reece 
138.8 
0.528 
0.51 
73.29 
70.79 
74.4 
75.5 
69.1 
100 
96.6 
101.5 
94.3 
103.0 
H
ungary 
114.8 
0.364 
0.32 
41.81 
36.76 
31.3 
30.7 
26.9 
100 
87.9 
74.8 
64.3 
73.4 
Ireland 
63.03 
0.297 
0.32 
18.71991 
20.16 
22.3 
22.6 
22.3 
100 
108 
119.1 
119 
120.7 
Italy 
485.8 
0.414 
0.39 
201.13 
189.473 
223.1 
209 
195.8 
100 
94.2 
110.9 
97.3 
103.9 
Latvia 
23.82 
0.376 
0.27 
8.95632 
6.4314 
4.6 
7.7 
3.43 
100 
71.8 
51.4 
38.3 
86.0 
Lithuania 
46.86 
0.357 
0.29 
16.72 
13.5894 
12.3 
16.6 
8.8 
100 
81.2 
73.5 
52.6 
99.2 
Lux. 
9.14 
0.242 
0.2 
2.21188 
1.828 
3.4 
3.95 
2.5 
100 
82.6 
153.7 
113 
178.6 
N
L 
201.4 
0.382 
0.38 
76.9539 
76.551 
95.3 
90.4 
85.8 
100 
99.5 
123.8 
111 
117.5 
Poland 
531.3 
0.571 
0.51
303.3951
270.983
239.1
284.6
208.5
100
89.3
78.8
68.7
93.8
Portugal 
76.15 
0.425 
0.43 
32.36375 
32.7445 
38.9 
35.9 
34.8 
100 
101 
120.2 
107 
110.9 
Slovakia 
67.36 
0.524 
0.52 
35.29 
35.0272 
30.5 
41.3 
30.9 
100 
99.2 
86.4 
87.5 
117.0 
Slovenia 
18.6 
0.489 
0.43 
9.0954 
7.998 
8.8 
8.3 
8.3 
100 
87.9 
96.8 
91.3 
91.3 
Spain 
332.8 
0.438 
0.42 
145.7 
139.771 
174.4 
152.7 
152.3 
100 
95.9 
119.6 
104 
104.8 
Sw
eden 
75.35 
0.291 
0.29 
21.9 
21.8515 
22.9 
25.2 
22.8 
100 
99.7 
104.4 
104 
114.9 
U
K
 
671.9 
0.425 
0.37 
285.5 
248.603 
245.3 
246.2 
246.2 
100 
87.1 
85.9 
86.2 
86.2 
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Chapter 6. Analysis of the Allocation Rules: Do Polluters Pay under 
Grandfathering?26
1. Introduction 
To create political acceptability, grandfathering has been used as the primary method 
to allocate the allowances. This means that polluters have received most emission 
rights free of charge primarily based on their historical emissions. As a result, they 
have not had to buy rights in an auction. As stated in Art. 10 of Directive 2003/87/EC, 
every EU MS was required to allocate at least 95 per cent of the allowances free of 
charge for the three-year period 2005-2007 and at least 90 per cent of the allowances 
free of charge for the five-year period 2008-2012. 
However, after the ETS was launched, different studies have shown empirically that 
in different regions the power sector has incorporated part of the value of free 
allocated emissions allowances into the price of electricity. For instance, Sjim et al. 
estimate a rate of CO2 price pass through into wholesale electricity price, which has 
varied between 60 and 100 percent in Germany and in the Netherlands.27 Honkatukia 
et al, found empirically with econometric analysis that in 2005, on average, 75 to 95 
percent of the variation of the price of emissions allowances had been transferred to 
the Finnish Nord Pool day-ahead prices. 
The possibility that producers generate the so-called windfall profits by passing 
through the market value of the allowances that they have received for free into the 
final product price raises the general argument that “grandfathering of allowances 
creates a government subsidy of polluters.” Under this perspective, the fact that 
consumers pay for what producers receive for free is perceived to be neither fair nor 
efficient. 
A popular perception in the economic and legal literature is that assigning allowances 
for free (i.e., grandfathering) is inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle. “Free 
allocation violates the polluter-pays principle […],” according to Sorrell and Sijm 
(2003: 427). Also Nash (2000: 13), based on a thorough analysis of the issue, 
                                                 
26 Part of this chapter has been originally published as a research article written jointly with Edwin 
Woerdman and Alessandra Arcuri and appearing in the Review of Law and Economics. For major 
details see: E. Woerdman, A. Arcuri and S. Clò (2008), “Emissions Trading and the Polluter-Pays 
Principle:  Do Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?”,  Review of Law and Economics, 4(2). 
27 “Using numerical models we find that, at a CO2 price of 20 €/t, ET-induced increases in power 
prices range between 3 and 18 €/MWh, depending on the carbon intensity of the price-setting 
installation” (Sjim et al. 2006: 67). 
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concludes that “grandfathering […] runs contrary to the polluter pays principle’s core 
[…].” This suggests that the EU ETS is inconsistent with an important principle of 
environmental law.  
However, at the same time we see that grandfathering is allowed in legal practice, 
without the polluter-pays principle impeding the operation of these trading programs. 
After discussing the ETS’ effectiveness by assessing the ETS cap stringency at a 
macro-level, this chapter focuses on the allocation rule adopted during the first and 
the second ETS trading periods. The main purpose of this chapter, which is partly 
based on the work of Woerdman et al. (2008), is to assess whether grandfathering can 
be considered—in theory and in practice—an efficient and fair allocation rule by 
clarifying the conditions under which this allocation rule is consistent with the 
polluter-pays principle. The basic question is: do polluters pay under grandfathering, 
or not?  
This question is an interesting object of study for researchers of environmental law 
and economics because the polluter-pays principle, by mandating cost internalization 
in most of its versions, is an eminently economic principle (e.g. Faure and Grimeaud, 
2003). This observation makes the economic analysis directly relevant for legal 
scholars. Aware of the complexities inherent in the interpretation of principles, we 
also discuss other ways to define the polluter-pays principle. In particular, by 
distinguishing an economic interpretation from an equity interpretation, we aim to 
shed light on a sometimes confusing debate, which often treats issues of efficiency 
and distributive justice together. Part of the Law and Economics scholarship has 
analyzed the efficiency of different legal rules without disregarding other goals of 
law, such as equity (e.g., Calabresi, 1970). By combining a micro-economic analysis 
of law with an analysis of the nature of legal principles, we have followed this 
interdisciplinary tradition. 
In light of the different interpretations of the polluter-pays principle, this chapter 
develops a comparative analysis of grandfathering and auctioning in order to assess to 
what extent the different allocation criteria can be considered efficient and fair. 
Finally, this chapter analyses whether the theoretical findings concerning the 
efficiency and fairness of grandfathering can still be considered valid within the ETS. 
By highlighting the inefficiencies that emerged at the time of applying this allocation 
rule in the ETS, the chapter concludes determining various conditions that have to be 
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satisfied to ensure the consistency of grandfathering with the efficiency interpretation 
of the polluter-pays principle. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the second section, the economic origin and 
legal nature of the polluter-pays principle are described. Moreover, a taxonomy of 
possible interpretations of this principle, ranging from efficiency to equity, is 
presented. The third section analyses whether grandfathering is compatible with an 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle by focusing on the concepts of 
opportunity costs and lump-sum subsidies. The fourth section offers a comparison of 
grandfathering and auctioning. Both allocation rules are analysed to assess their 
consistency with the extended equity interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. 
The fifth section analyses the inefficiencies emerged at the time of applying 
grandfathering within the ETS. The problem of baseline year updating, the case of 
closures, the degree of harmonization and the case of over-allocation are analysed in 
order to define under which conditions grandfathering can be considered an efficient 
allocation rule.  In the final section, conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. The Origin and Nature of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
Principles are characterized by relatively vague formulations and do not work as legal 
rules: different outcomes might result from the application of a principle since it does 
not dictate any specific decision. Principles state “a reason that argues in one 
direction, but does not necessitate a particular decision” (Dworkin, 1977: 26). A 
similar characterization of principles (as opposed to rules) has been elaborated by 
Hart (1994: 260) who describes principles as being “broad, general or unspecific” and 
stresses that the term “principles” refers to the attainment of general goals or values 
for the good of society. In spite of their vagueness, principles are important legal 
guidelines helping to circumscribe the discretion of decision-makers and/or judges 
when they have to shape, apply or interpret the law. “Discretion, like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction” (Dworkin, 1977: 31). As such, principles can be seen as a belt of 
restriction. Therefore, it is first necessary to understand what the general goals of the 
polluter-pays principle are and how the principle constrains the discretion of the 
decision-maker or judge. To answer these questions, it can be useful to recall some of 
the most significant formulations of the polluter-pays principle.  
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The polluter-pays principle first appeared in 1972 in the Recommendation of the 
OECD Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic Aspects of  
Environmental Policies (reprinted in OECD, 1975: 11-14). This principle basically 
explains that polluters should bear the cost of pollution; thus, they should pay for 
pollution prevention and control measures as well as for the environmental damage 
they cause. Moreover, this has been interpreted with the additional principle that the 
government should not subsidize pollution. Although the OECD document itself is 
not a binding international law since it was never ratified by a government, the 
polluter-pays principle can now be found in an increasing number of international 
treaties and instruments. Most importantly, Principle 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, which “constitutes at present the most significant 
universally endorsed statement of general rights and obligations of states affecting the 
environment” (Birnie and Boyle, 2002: 82), reads as follows: “National authorities 
should endeavour to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in 
principle, bear the costs of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and 
without distorting international trade and investment.”  
Many international law treaties, including the 1992 Convention on the Protection and 
the Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area and 
the 1996 Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, endorse this principle in 
various ways. The polluter-pays principle has been included in many national legal 
systems. Although US domestic law has never codified the polluter-pays principle, it 
has influenced US environmental law, such as the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), which seeks to fulfil 
the polluter-pays principle by imposing liability for cleanup costs on those parties that 
are responsible for the pollution.  
In the European legal context, the polluter-pays principle has been formally adopted 
in Art. 174 of the EC Treaty. In this legal document, the principle is mentioned but 
not defined.28 A precise and generally accepted legal definition of the polluter-pays 
principle is lacking. As put by Verhoef: “the question of whether the polluter should 
                                                 
28 “Community policy on the environment […] shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the 
principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be 
rectified at source and that the polluter should pay” [EC Treaty, Title XIX Environment, Article 174 
(2)].  
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pay […] may often lead to different outcomes in terms of both allocation efficiency 
and equity. […] This ambiguity in the interpretation of the polluter pays principle is, 
unfortunately, often overlooked” (Verhoef, 1999: 206-207). To bring clarity to this 
issue, the alternative allocation rules are going to be analysed in light of two 
fundamental versions of the polluter-pays principle: (1) an efficiency interpretation, 
and (2) an equity interpretation. This distinction warrants further explanation. The 
efficiency interpretation reflects the idea that pollution costs should be internalized 
with the aim of achieving an efficient allocation of resources, irrespective of 
distributive issues. Equity has a wide variety of meanings, but in this context it is 
limited to the notion of the fair distribution of costs. The efficiency interpretation 
should be considered the core of the polluter-pays principle, while the equity 
interpretation can be framed as an as an extension of the basic form of this principle, 
which does not depart from, but rather includes the efficiency dimension. 
As emphasized by Faure and Grimeaud, “one can say that the polluter-pays principle 
is probably the most ‘economic’ of all environmental principles” (Faure and 
Grimeaud, 2003: 33). Conceptualizing the polluter-pays principle as an eminent 
“economic” principle is in line both with its origin (OECD, 1975) and with some of 
its most representative definitions, which explicitly endorse the criterion of cost 
internalization, such as the above-mentioned Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration. In 
addition, legal scholars concede that “it remains an economic principle that was 
turned into a legal principle and helps justifying policy decisions—whatever the 
decisions are” (Krämer, 2005).  
Yet, it is clear that in addition to efficiency also equity has been used as a criterion to 
impart meaning to the polluter-pays principle. In this context, Bugge (1996) 
distinguishes between the polluter-pays principle, on the one hand as an “economic 
principle (a principle of efficiency),” and on the other hand as a “legal principle of 
(just) distribution of costs.” In Bugge’s view, the efficiency principle is independent 
from the distributive principle. Alternatively, it is possible to conceive of the polluter-
pays principle as a principle endowed with dimensions of both efficiency and equity. 
This view is supported by several authors who have observed that the polluter-pays 
principle is a principle that allocates the costs to the polluter not only for reasons of 
efficiency but also equity (Pearson, 1994: 563; Parikh, 1993). The OECD’s 1975 
analysis of the principle confirms this viewpoint: “It should be noted that the problem 
of cost sharing calls for equity as well as efficiency […]. The question is now whether 
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there is a principle permitting the dual requirements of efficiency and equity to be 
satisfied together […]” (OECD, 1975: 25). Our equity interpretation of the principle, 
which subsumes the efficiency dimension, would satisfy this double requirement.  
In relation to the efficiency dimension of the polluter-pays principle, it is possible to 
further distinguish 1) a weak form (i.e., no subsidization) from 2) a strong form (i.e., 
cost internalization) of this normative doctrine. This distinction has been devised by 
Jonathan Remy Nash, building upon the work of Wirth (1995), in the context of an 
extensive and thorough study of the potential conflict between tradable allowances 
and the polluter-pays principle (Nash, 2000). The weak form of the doctrine prohibits 
governmental subsidies for pollution control equipment to ensure that product prices 
reflect the costs of pollution abatement. The strong form calls for governments to 
ensure the internalization of environmental costs (and not just to refrain from 
subsidizing pollution control equipment). This means that the strong form subsumes 
the weak form: both versions require that companies internalize pollution costs [Nash, 
2000: 31]. Therefore, both the weak and the strong form are manifestations of an 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. In summary, the efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle includes both a weak and a strong form. In 
addition, the equity interpretation is an additional criterion in addition to—and not 
instead of—efficiency, and it could be interpreted as an extended form of the polluter-
pays principle. It is possible to visualize the interpretation of the polluter-pays 
principle presented above as a system of concentric circles, as shown in figure 14.  
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Figure 14 - Graphic Interpretation of the Polluter-pays Principle 
 
According to the taxonomy outlined above, the initial research question can be shaped 
as follows: is grandfathering consistent 1) with a weak and strong efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle and 2) with an extended equity 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle? The next section addresses the first part 
of this question, and the section thereafter its second part. 
3. Grandfathering and the Efficiency Interpretation of the Polluter-Pays 
Principle 
Under auctioning, firms have to buy the allowances, which means that they pay for 
their emissions and for their emission reductions. Under grandfathering, polluters 
receive their emission rights for free proportionally to their historical level of 
emissions, which means that they do not have to pay for their emissions, but only for 
the reduction of their emissions.  
This raises the question of whether grandfathering (and auctioning) is an efficient 
allocation rule consistent with both the weak form and the strong form of the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. 
Based on the conceptual differentiation described above, Nash (2000: 13) finds that 
“grandfathering […] runs contrary to the polluter-pays principle’s core, violating even 
the principle’s weak form.” He states: “The core of the polluter-pays principle argues 
that neither the government nor society-at-large should subsidize pollution and 
EFFICIENCY
EQUITY
Weak 
Strong 
Extended 
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polluters and that polluters should internalize the costs of pollution abatement” (Nash, 
2000: 3). Nash presents two main arguments to support his claim. First, he says: 
“Grandfathering of allowances creates a government subsidy of polluters […]. The 
recipients are at liberty to sell the allowances, which they received at no cost, on the 
market for cash payments” (Nash, 2000: 13). Second, he argues that grandfathering 
“creates an artificial, and undesirable, incentive for existing market participants not to 
exit the industry by shielding them from new competition” (Nash, 2000: 13). The 
problem as he sees it is that grandfathering thus  “increases the incentive to keep in 
service older, less efficient plants […]” (Nash, 2000: 24). He then concludes that 
grandfathering is inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle.  
The purpose of this section is to show that, once the opportunity cost of free assigned 
allowances is properly taken into account, grandfathering proves consistent with the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. The concept of opportunity 
cost has to be taken into account any time a good has alternative uses. This concept 
corresponds to the foregone revenue that would have been earned by choosing the 
rejected option. Resources are allocated efficiently only if the first-best option is 
chosen, thus implying that the opportunity cost linked to the resources’ alternative and 
rejected option has to be a second-best. If the opportunity cost were a first-best and 
not a second-best, then the way resources are allocated would not be efficient. 
In the ETS context, grandfathered permits have two alternative uses: in the case that 
the ETS installation does not reduce its emissions, they can be used to cover the 
amount of released emissions; alternatively, in the case that the ETS installation 
reduces its emissions, the exceeding amount of grandfathered allowances can be sold 
in the ETS at the market price. Thus, if permits are used to cover the produced 
emissions, then the opportunity cost of these permits is determined by the foregone 
profit that could be earned by producing less and selling the surplus of permits at the 
market price. When these alternative options are taken into account, it follows that an 
ETS installation will continue to produce and to cover their emissions with the 
grandfathered permits only if it is the first-best option and if the opportunity cost of 
the alternative option is a second-best: they have to be sure that their productive 
activity can grant a profit that is at least as big as the one they could earn by shutting 
down their plant (or decreasing production) and selling the exceeding amount of 
allowances received at no cost. This (second-best) alternative use of tradable permits 
explains why firms have to internalize the market price of free assigned allowances 
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into their marginal production costs and then to pass them into final prices in 
secondary markets, in order to be sure it will earn at least the opportunity cost’s 
second best alternative. It is possible to conclude that the windfall profits the 
electricity generators earn from passing the permits’ opportunity cost to the final price 
are economically founded. 
So far this study has explained the reasons why the windfall profits that producers 
earn from passing the permits’ opportunity cost of free assigned allowances to the 
final price do not distort the market outcome efficiency. However,  it is necessary to 
further explain why producers should effectively pay in the case that permits are 
assigned for free and then transferred to the final price that consumers pay. We argue 
that when the grandfathered permits’ opportunity costs are passed through to the final 
price, not only do consumers pay in terms of higher product prices, but so do polluting 
producers in terms of loss of competitiveness in the secondary market. 
In fact, grandfathering permits according to historical emissions implies that firms 
that pollute more receive a higher amount of permits than less polluting firms; thus, 
the more a firm pollutes, the more allowances are assigned and the higher the 
opportunity cost to be internalized and to be passed through to the market price. Thus, 
after the ETS has been implemented and allowances have been grandfathered, firms 
producing with polluting plants face a higher marginal cost increase than those firms 
adopting clean technologies.  
When secondary markets are competitive, firms that pollute more have to compete at 
higher prices; thus, their competitiveness suffers, and in the long run polluting plants 
tend to be driven out from the market to be substituted by less carbon-intensive 
efficient plants.  
For instance, in the energy sector the internalization of the CO2 price into the 
production cost may induce a plant switch in the merit order supply function,29 thus 
giving polluting firms an incentive to invest in clean generation and to substitute 
obsolete plants with environmentally friendly technologies (Reinaud, 2007). This 
concept is illustrated by the following table. 
                                                 
29 The merit order function is the typical step supply function in the electricity market. Plants are 
classified according to their constant marginal cost of production, and the more efficient plants are 
called for production before the others. It implies that when demand is low only efficient plants enter 
the market, and as demand increases reaching its peak level, also the more inefficient plants are called 
for production.  
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Table 11 – Marginal Costs of Coal- and Gas-Fired Plants Pre- and Post-ETS 
 Coal Plant Gas-Fired Plant 
(CCGT) 
Thermal Efficiency 35% 50% 
Fuel Price (£/MMBTu) 1.2 2.3 
Fuel Cost (£/MWh) 11.7 15.7
CO2 Emission rate (tCO2/Mwh) 930 366 
Allowance Price (£/tCO2) 10 10 
Allowance Cost (£/Mwh) 9.3 3.6 
Post-ETS Marginal Fuel Cost (£/MWh) 21 19.3
   Source: Martinez Neuhoff 2004 
 
This table shows how the plants’ merit order in the electricity market can change after 
the ETS has been implemented. Coal is a more carbon-intensive fuel than gas. 
However, before a price was attached to the emissions of CO2, coal on average was 
also a cheaper fuel than gas; thus, before the ETS’ establishment, it was more 
convenient to produce electricity by burning coal and emitting more CO2 rather than 
switching to gas and reducing CO2 emissions. However, after the ETS’ establishment, 
the cost-efficiency to burn gas or coal depends, ceteris paribus, also on the price 
attached to each ton of CO2 released into the atmosphere.  
Under the ETS regulation, it must be evaluated whether it is more economical to call 
first the coal plants, which have to buy a higher amount of permits in the ETS to cover 
their emissions gap, or, alternatively, they should first call the less carbon-intensive 
gas plants, which have to buy a lower amount of permits. When the real CO2 price is 
higher than the theoretical CO2 switching price, the electricity supply function 
registers a switch in the merit order from coal to gas plants. At the off-peak level of 
electricity demand, gas plants are called for production instead of more polluting coal 
plants. 
This competitive mechanism explains why in the long run polluters passing through 
their permits’ opportunity costs to the final price pay—in terms of loss of 
competitiveness and market share—even when permits are free allocated. Thus, under 
grandfathering consumers pay higher prices and polluting producers pay as well 
because they face higher (opportunity) costs, which undermine their competitiveness, 
in turn lowering their market share. 
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In practice, this mechanism might not work properly in the case that (secondary 
electricity) markets are not fully competitive. In this case, it is possible that firms 
internalize the grandfathered permits’ opportunity cost increasing their final market 
price, but without worsening their competitive position or exiting the market.  
In the electricity markets, it has been observed that, although polluters should fully 
pass on the opportunity costs of grandfathered allowances in their product prices, 
electricity companies in the EU have done this only to a limited extent (Sjim et. Al 
2006). It can be argued that the main reason for a limited pass-through is the 
oligopolistic nature of the electricity market. According to economic theory, any price 
variation caused by a marginal cost change is greater in perfectly competitive markets 
than in oligopolistic ones. In a perfectly competitive market, price equals marginal 
costs; therefore, any widespread variation of the marginal costs is reflected in an equal 
variation of the market price. On the contrary, in a standard monopoly case, with 
constant marginal cost and linear market demand, precisely half of the variation of the 
marginal cost is passed into prices, independently of the parameters of demand and 
the initial cost level.30 
 This result can be explained on the basis of different market equilibrium conditions: 
marginal costs equal marginal revenues in both perfectly competitive and oligopolistic 
markets, but the equivalence between price and marginal cost is guaranteed only 
under perfect competition. Intuitively, in oligopolistic markets where prices are 
already above marginal costs, there is little opportunity for a further marginal price 
increase, but when markets become more competitive, prices tend to be aligned more 
closely with costs (e.g., Ten Kate and Niels, 2005). The implication is that the less 
competitive the electricity market is, the lower the pass-through rate will be. 
Consequently, the opportunity costs of free allowances are only partly incorporated in 
a higher power price when the electricity market is oligopolistic.   
In an oligopolistic scenario, polluters face lower risk of exiting the market and, thus, a 
lower incentive to adopt environmentally friendly technologies. In this case, the ETS 
installations receiving free allowances bear the cost of pollution only to a limited 
extent, and the consistency with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays 
                                                 
30 In the alternative case with a convex demand (i.e., positive second derivative) the slope of the 
monopolist Marginal revenue is less than twice that of inverse demand; thus, the monopolist passes into 
the final market price at least half of its marginal cost variation. Vice versa, if the demand is concave 
(i.e., a second derivative is negative) the slope of the marginal revenue function is more than twice the 
slope of the inverse demand, implying that the monopolist passes into the final market price at most 
half of its marginal cost change.  
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principle can be criticized. However, it should be noted that the main problem does 
not seem to be the pass through of the grandfathered permits’ opportunity cost into 
electricity prices, as generally claimed. Rather, the main problem consists of the 
artificial maintenance of electricity prices above production marginal costs in markets 
that are not competitive. According to economic theory, internalizing the cost of the 
environmental externality into electricity prices is correct; on the contrary, it is the 
presence of prices above marginal costs in oligopolistic markets that should be 
avoided.    
This analysis has clarified that firms receiving grandfathered allowances do have 
costs: opportunity costs, which have to be passed into the product price. The 
consequence is that the costs of pollution are internalized. This internalization makes 
grandfathering consistent with the strong form of the polluter-pays principle (i.e., 
“cost internalization”). Because the strong form subsumes the weak form (i.e., “no 
subsidization”), full compatibility with the polluter-pays principle is ensured.  
Under grandfathering, market efficiency is not distorted. This conclusion is consistent 
with the principles of the Coase theorem: as long as transaction costs tend toward 
zero, free bargaining of allowances will induce an efficient internalization of the 
externality. Tradable permits will be allocated to those who value them most, while 
emissions will be reduced where marginal abatement costs (MAC) are the lowest. The 
final CO2 price will equal the lowest MAC, and in the long run MAC among polluters 
will be equalized. This efficient equilibrium will be reached through Coasian 
bargaining independently of how permits are initially allocated. Thus, the market 
outcome will be the same when firms have to buy permits in an auction or when the 
government assigns them for free according to their historical emissions (i.e., 
grandfathering).  
Auctioning or grandfathering permits does not have any impact in terms of efficiency: 
the externality is internalized in the market price system, and the final market 
equilibrium is the same independently of the initial allocation rule.  
As stated by Reguant and Ellerman, “[g]iven that the allowances can be sold in the 
market, operators should recognize the full opportunity cost involved in emitting a 
unit of emissions in the same manner as they would if they had not been allocated 
allowances for free and had to purchase them in the market or at an auction” (Reguant 
and Ellerman 2008: 2). 
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3.1 Lump-sum Subsidies 
The internalization of opportunity costs of allowances makes grandfathering 
consistent with the strong form of the polluter-pays principle (“cost internalization”).  
Moreover, it can be argued that grandfathered allowances constitute lump-sum 
subsidies that do not distort competition. This implies that Nash’s analysis is 
incomplete on this point.  
Under grandfathering, firms receive their emission allowances for free, and thus have 
a lower cash outflow than under auctioning. Since grandfathering implies a capital gift 
to the firm, a firm with grandfathered allowances has more financial resources, or its 
own capital, than an identical firm, which has to acquire allowances in an auction. 
Grandfathering thus entails a transfer of wealth to firms since they receive an asset 
with a market value. This means, as also correctly noticed by Nash, that 
grandfathering allowances could be viewed as granting a subsidy to the firm (e.g., 
Hepburn et al., 2006b; Nash, 2000; Böhringer et al., 1998).  
However, this subsidy is a capital gift to the firm, and has the character of a lump-sum 
subsidy (e.g. Hepburn et al., 2006b; Hargrave et al., 1999). In other words, this 
subsidy is conceptually different from a subsidy that is directly linked to the costs of 
pollution control and prevention measures. If a firm receives its allowances free of 
charge, it obtains a non-distortionary windfall profit (e.g. Bohm, 1999). In efficiency 
terms, a lump-sum subsidy does not distort the market since it affects neither the 
marginal emission reduction costs, nor the output and price decisions of firms. 
Consequently, the incentive to abate is not distorted.  
As stated by Ellerman and Reguant, “it is clear that free allowances improve the 
profitability of the units so endowed, but as long as the endowment does not change 
according to the facility’s output or emissions, the lump-sum endowment should have 
no effect on operations” (Reguant and Ellerman, 2008: 2). 
Moreover, not only auctioning, but also grandfathering entails costs for firms, namely 
the opportunity costs that are part of the cost price and must be incorporated in the 
product price.  
Governments do not subsidize pollution when allocating emission rights free of 
charge. As a result, grandfathering is also consistent with the weak form of the 
polluter-pays principle (i.e., “no subsidization”). Product prices under an 
environmental regime of grandfathered allowances will reflect the costs of pollution 
abatement as the weak form of this principle requires.  
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This analysis has demonstrated that grandfathering does in fact induce internalization 
of pollution costs, which makes the free distribution of allowance consistent with the 
strong form of the polluter-pays principle. If consistency with even the strong form is 
demonstrated, grandfathering must logically be consistent with the weak form as well. 
Moreover, if we double-check consistency with the weak form, it turns out that 
grandfathering does not subsidize pollution but rather implies a lump-sum subsidy 
that does not affect marginal emission reduction costs and does not distort the ETS’ 
effectiveness. These considerations make it clear that emissions can be reduced 
consistently with the P.P.P even when permits are grandfathered for free. These 
considerations do not change the fact that a firm receiving allowances free of charge 
has more financial resources than a comparable firm with auctioned allowances. 
Because grandfathering implies a capital gift, Nash (2000: 24) fears that this 
allocation method tends to keep less efficient installations in service. We agree with 
him that such an undesirable incentive might exist. This problem, however, only 
arises under particular circumstances (e.g., the problem of updating the baseline year) 
which will be discussed in the following sections. 
4.  Grandfathering, Auctioning and Consistency with the Equity Interpretation 
of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
 
Although consistent with an efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle, 
grandfathering might have some undesired distributive effects, which raise the 
question of whether this allocation rule could be considered consistent also with an 
extended interpretation of the polluter-pays principle, which entails both efficiency 
and equity. This section tries to clarify this issue. According to the Coase theorem, 
when the ETS cap is set at a stringent level, the negative environmental externality 
will be internalized efficiently and independently of how permits have been initially 
assigned. This is because, once opportunity costs are taken into account, economic 
agents face the same marginal costs of emitting an extra ton of CO2 when permits are 
allocated for free or auctioned. Profit-maximizing firms will add the allowances’ 
opportunity cost to the final price even when allowances are freely allocated; 
therefore, the final price will be the same whether the permits are auctioned or 
grandfathered.  
Like grandfathering, auctioning is consistent with the efficiency interpretation of the 
polluter-pays principle; the reason is even more intuitive: no permits are assigned for 
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free and polluters need to buy an amount of permits equivalent to the emissions they 
produce. 
Despite that both allocation criteria are consistent with the polluter-pays principle 
from an efficiency perspective, opting for one particular allocative criterion (instead 
of another) has different distributional effects. In fact, the distribution of permits 
among participants affects the way permit trade takes place: who pays whom? 
To highlight this point, it can be useful to make a comparison between the allocation 
of tax and allowances under grandfathering and auctioning. In the case that polluters 
had to pay a carbon tax proportional to the emissions they produced, the increased 
marginal cost would be transferred to the final market price. However, the pass 
through of the carbon tax to the final price that consumers have to pay does not mean 
that producers are not paying at all. The higher final market price lowers the quantity 
sold at equilibrium, and the cost of the tax is borne both by consumers and producers 
depending on the elasticity of supply and demand. 
Auctioning could be thought of as a carbon tax imposed on the polluters, whose tax 
revenue is transferred from the private polluters to the State, while under 
grandfathering the tax revenue would be kept by the polluters themselves.  
Producers have to internalize the cost linked to the allowances they own and pass it to 
the final market price in both cases. Thus, different allocation rules have the same 
impact on the final market outcome, but they have different distributional effects. 
Under certain conditions, grandfathering is an efficient allocation rule consistent with 
the weak and strong form of the polluter-pays principle; thus, the claim that polluters 
do not pay under grandfathering can only be defended from an equity perspective 
since polluters do not actually purchase their allowances and the State does not raise 
any revenue. Grandfathering implies a wealth transfer from the public to the polluter. 
This transfer in turn improves the financial position of the shareholders. That is, the 
value of a share increases because the polluter has received an asset with a market 
value for free. The producer then includes the emission price in consumer prices 
(because it has to cover the opportunity costs of using the allowances). Moreover, the 
fact that polluters earn the so-called windfall profits—since consumers pay the value 
of allowances that producers have obtained for free—may be perceived as unfair from 
a polluter-pays perspective.   
Even if the polluter pays under grandfathering because of the opportunity costs he or 
she has to internalize, this allocation rule implies a sort of capital gift equal to the 
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revenue that the government would have obtained in an auction. Such a capital gift, 
while not distortive in efficiency terms, does have a redistributive impact, which is 
beneficial for the polluter. Grandfathering means that polluting firms do not have to 
purchase their emission rights and that their shareholders become richer. This 
situation may be perceived as unfair from a polluter-pays perspective.  
Only auctioning is consistent with the extended form of the polluter-pays principle—
which operates according to both efficiency and equity—since it induces the 
internalization of the pollution costs, and additionally it forces polluters to purchase 
their emission rights, thereby avoiding a rise in the so-called windfall profits, which 
are generally perceived to be unfair. 
The idea that auctioning provides a “better reflection” of the polluter-pays principle 
(noted in Egenhofer and Fujiwara, 2006: 25) can be defended based on an equity view 
of this normative doctrine.  
It is possible to conclude that, in theory, auctioning is superior to grandfathering: they 
are both consistent with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle 
and, in addition, auctioning is also consistent with its extended equity interpretation. 
Despite these arguments in favour of auctioning, Art. 10 of the first ETS Directive has 
established that during the first and second trading periods respectively, at least 95% 
and 90% of permits should have been assigned free of charge. In fact, given that 
auctioning entails higher private costs than grandfathering, the latter has increased the 
ETS’ political acceptability in the eyes of the ETS regulated sectors.  
 
5. Conditions for Consistency with the Polluter-Pays Principle 
Although it has been shown that grandfathering is consistent with the efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle, the implementation of this allocation rule 
in the ETS has raised some problems concerning market efficiency. Because of the 
lack of clear and harmonized allocation criteria (Annex III), the way grandfathering 
has been interpreted and implemented in different NAPs has had negative 
repercussions on the ETS’ functioning and effectiveness. Specific repercussions 
include reduced incentives to abate emissions and distortions of competition among 
installations belonging to the same European sector and operating in the same Cap 
and Trade mechanism but de facto regulated by different MS (e.g., Johnston 2006). 
The following subsections analyse in more detail the inefficiencies related to 
grandfathering that have emerged in the ETS and the conditions that have to be 
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satisfied in order to ensure the consistency of grandfathering with the Efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. 
 
5.1 Grandfathering and the Baseline Updating Problem 
The European Directive 2003/87/EC divides the EU ETS in different trading 
periods.31 Art. 9 specifies that “for each period [...] each MS shall develop a national 
plan stating the total quantity of allowances that it intends to allocate for that period 
and how it proposes to allocate them.”  Moreover, Art. 13 establishes that “allowances 
shall be valid for emissions during the period [...] for which they are issued.” These 
articles imply that allowances can be traded only within a phase, while they cannot be 
banked and transferred to the following trading period. 
MS have to specify with a new NAP the amount of permits they intend to allocate to 
each plant every year within the specific ETS phase (e.g. Neuhoff, Martinez and Stato 
2006). 
This temporal subdivision of the ETS in different phases creates the risk of 
inconsistency among different NAPs. In particular, the way permits are grandfathered 
might change from one phase to the other (e.g. Demailly and Quirion 2006). 
In both the EU ETS and US SO2 trading programs, allowances have been 
grandfathered among economic agents according to their historic emissions; however, 
the way permits have been allocated has differed substantially. In the SO2 emissions 
trading program, permits have been one-off grandfathered: the amount of allowances 
to be allocated according to historical emissions has been determined ex-ante at the 
beginning of the program without any ex-post adjustment. The amount of allowances 
to be assigned has decreased from one phase to the other proportionally to the 
progressive reduction of the total cap, but—differently from the European 
experience—independently of firms’ current behaviour. That is, the historic 
emissions’ year baseline adopted to assess how many allowances to assign free of 
charge has not been updated (Shmalensee et al. 1998). 
On the contrary, across the consecutive trading periods of the ETS, permits have been 
grandfathered proportionally to a baseline year that has been updated to recent 
emissions (e.g., Demailly and Quirion, 2006). In the first trading period, MS 
grandfathered permits to incumbents proportionally to the average of emissions 
                                                 
31 A five-year phase (2008 – 2012) follows the first three-year testing period started in 2005. 
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produced in a 3-5 year period between 1990 and 2002. Yet, after the publication of the 
emissions produced by the ETS installations in 2005, several MS  (including Estonia, 
France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia) extended their base 
period to 2005, which has been chosen as new baseline year to calculate the 
proportional amount of permits to allocate during the second phase 2008 – 2012 
(Neuhoff et al., 2006). The baseline updating process has a negative impact on the 
ETS’ functioning by reducing the ETS installations’ financial incentive to abate 
emissions. This process is not efficient, and it affects the consistency of 
grandfathering with the polluter-pays principle. As long as permits are one-off 
grandfathered and the future amount of allowances allocated free of charge does not 
depend on the regulated agents’ behaviour, the free allocated allowances’ opportunity 
cost does not vary, giving effective incentives to reduce emissions.  
On the contrary, if the historic baseline year is updated to the current emissions level, 
then the opportunity cost of abating emissions diminishes, distorting the polluters’ 
incentives to reduce emissions. In fact, if ETS’ installations anticipate that the policy-
maker intends to allocate future allowances according to the current level of emissions 
by updating the baseline year, they will be deterred from undertaking emissions 
abatement projects: the more emissions are reduced today, the less permits will be 
assigned tomorrow. 
When the baseline is updated, the amount of permits economic agents will receive in 
future ETS phases is no longer an exogenous parameter; rather, it becomes an 
endogenous variable that economic agents internalize into their profit-maximizing 
function: the marginal benefit from abating pollution decreases and the abatement 
opportunity cost decreases as well.  
The main consequence of an allocation criterion rewarding higher emissions today 
with more permits in the future is that it creates a perverse incentive to postpone 
investments in emissions reduction by making actual abatement less convenient. As a 
result,  it distorts the incentives to abate pollution efficiently. The baseline updating 
process generates an early action problem: “if future allowances are allocated as a 
function of present emission levels, firms have incentive to emit more now in order to 
extract a larger allocation in the future [...]; incentives are created for plant lifetime 
extension rather than plant modernization or replacement” (Hepburn et al. 2006: 142-
143). 
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Grandfathering is not consistent with the P.P.P. if firms have the possibility to 
influence the amount of permits they will receive in the future. This is because 
updating the grandfathering baseline to current polluters’ behaviour distorts abatement 
opportunity costs and thus economic agents’ incentive to abate pollution. 
Grandfathering is effective only if the amount of permits allocated free of charge does 
not depend on ETS installations’ current behaviour. Therefore, the historic emissions’ 
baseline adopted to calculate the amount of grandfathered permits should not be 
updated to current emissions.  
A necessary condition for grandfathering to be consistent with an efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle is that allowances should be on-off 
grandfathered without any update of regulated agents’ current emissions. As long as 
current behaviour does not affect the amount of free allowances to be allocated in 
future phases, the allowances’ opportunity cost will remain unchanged over time and 
the consistency between P.P.P. and grandfathering will be confirmed.  
On one hand, updating the historic baseline is inefficient, but on the other hand, 
continuing to allocate the same level of permits to firms that have reduced their 
emissions permanently might be perceived as unfair. Such a trade-off between 
efficiency and fairness is exacerbated in the case of closures, and, together with the 
case of windfall profits, it highlights the risk that grandfathering—despite being 
consistent with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle—might 
entail problems regarding fairness.   
 
5.2 Grandfathering and the Closure Rules 
The ETS has been established to induce polluters to internalize the emissions 
externality into their production cost. Once polluters have to pay for the emissions 
they produce, carbon-intensive technologies become relatively less economical and 
polluters have an incentive to reduce their emissions. In fact, the ETS installations 
have to internalize into their profit maximizing function both the marginal cost of 
increasing pollution (i.e., the need to buy more permits) and the marginal benefit of 
reducing it (i.e., selling permits received for free). Therefore, when permits are 
grandfathered, the permits’ opportunity cost (i.e., the possibility to reduce emissions 
and sell the exceeding permits) is the fundamental factor inducing emissions 
reduction. In the long run, an effective cap and trade scheme should promote 
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emissions abatement by favouring the progressive substitution of obsolete plants with 
cleaner technologies.  
Because grandfathering implies a capital gift, Nash (2000: 24) fears that this 
allocation method provides incentives to keep older, less efficient plants in service. 
This section is aimed at showing that this undesirable incentive could exist, but only 
under specific circumstances. 
It is important to analyse how the incentives to close inefficient and obsolete plants 
change under one-off grandfathering or baseline updating grandfathering. When 
permits are one-off grandfathered (i.e., independently of current plants’ emissions), 
economic agents are entitled to receive the amount of permits initially established 
independently of their current behaviour—even if they decide to shut down a plant. In 
this case, closing an obsolete plant is economical if the profits earned from selling the 
free assigned permits exceed the potential profits deriving from production. On the 
contrary, when the historic baseline for grandfathering permits is updated to current 
polluters’ emissions, the ETS installations do not receive any additional permits in the 
case that a plant is shut down. Compared to the previous case, the amount of permits 
that can be sold in the ETS decreases, and closing an inefficient polluting plant now 
becomes less cost-efficient.  
Also in this case, when the allocation of permits is ex-post adjusted, pollution 
abatement incentives are distorted. As a consequence, inefficient carbon-intensive 
plants will continue to operate even if closing them would be socially more efficient. 
Paradoxically, interrupting the allocation of allowances after a plant shuts down 
becomes a form of indirect subsidy to production because “the firm earns the 
allocation if and only if it continues to operate the installation” (Ahman et al. 2006: 
8). 
Such an ex-post adjustment stimulates plant lifetime extension rather than plant 
modernization or replacement and leads to the postponement of emission reductions 
(e.g. Hepburn et al., 2006a; Matthes et al., 2005).  These considerations support a 
strong argument against withdrawing permits in the case that closures take place. 
However, fairness considerations would suggest exactly the opposite: awarding 
indefinite emissions permits to closed plants that do not need them (i.e., those not 
producing emissions anymore) should be avoided. This argument seems particularly 
convincing in the case that obsolete, inefficient plants are closed and substituted with 
more efficient ones for economic reasons, and thus even in the absence of an 
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emissions reduction environmental policy. In this case, awarding indefinite tradable 
permits after the closure takes place is perceived to be an unfair subsidy that MS give 
to private installations to induce them to shut down inefficient plants (e.g. Ahman et 
al. 2006; Hepburn et al. 2006).  
When opportunity costs are taken into account, it is clear that this free allocation does 
not distort efficiency in the market. However, free allocation could have undesired 
redistributive effects. Fairness concerns support the proposal to impose some limits on 
the indefinite allocation of permits. In fact, most MS have included a closure rules in 
their NAPs stating that closed plants are not allowed to receive any allowances in the 
following years (e.g. Åhman et al., 2005). For instance, Germany has established that 
plants emitting less than 10% of their average annual emissions are not entitled to 
receive permits in the following years. 
 
5.3 Re-questioning Consistency with the Polluter-Pays Principle in the Case of 
Over-Allocation 
 
Arguing that both grandfathering and auctioning are consistent with the efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle does not necessarily imply that the whole 
cap and trade mechanism is consistent with this principle.  
So far it has been shown that both allocation rules are efficient under the implicit 
assumption that the whole cap and trade system works effectively, requiring that the 
cap is sufficiently stringent. 
If this condition is satisfied, the market allowances’ free bargaining will make sure 
tradable permits are allocated to those who value them most. On the other hand, 
emissions will be reduced by those who can do it at the lowest marginal abatement 
cost, independently of how emissions have been initially allocated. However, unlike 
other markets, the ETS is an artificially designed system in which scarcity has to be 
ensured by the regulatory authority; without scarcity, permits would not have any 
positive market value and the system would fail to give polluters any incentive to 
reduce their emissions.  
The analysis conducted so far has confirmed that the effectiveness of the ETS depends 
on the amount of permits created and allocated by the regulatory authority, rather than 
on the allocation rules, both of which prove consistent with the efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. It is thus interesting to extend the analysis 
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conducted so far by asking whether the results concerning the consistency of both 
auctioning and grandfathering with the weak, strong and extended interpretations of 
the polluter-pays principle can still be considered valid when the implicit assumption 
of the stringency of the ETS cap is relaxed.  
In chapter 5, we have previously proved that over-allocation of allowances has 
occurred to a certain extent during both the trading periods of the ETS. This implies 
(by construction) that the ETS sectors have to bear a part of the emissions reduction 
burden in order to comply with the Kyoto target, which is lower than their emissions 
share. It has been shown that the ETS cap has not been set at a stringent level, causing 
the price of allowances to fall toward zero. One might be tempted to conclude that 
there is no violation of the weak interpretation of the polluter-pays principle: de facto, 
no subsidy is given to the ETS sectors by allocating them free allowances since the 
allowances are literally worthless. On the contrary, it has been shown that over-
allocation of permits to ETS sectors has imposed on the ETS sectors an emissions 
reduction burden that is less proportional than their emissions share.  Although free 
bargaining of allowances within the ETS can ensure that the emissions reduction 
burden deriving from the level of the ETS cap is abated effectively, part of the 
emissions reduction burden deriving from the Kyoto Protocol ratification (confirming 
that the ETS sectors should bear the reduction burden consistently with the polluter-
pays principle) is transferred to the non-ETS sectors. Indeed, compliance with the 
Kyoto Protocol requires that, given the emissions reduction target, the lower the 
emissions reduction burden imposed on the ETS sectors is (i.e., the higher the ETS cap 
is), the higher the non-ETS emissions reduction burden has to be, and vice-versa. 
The transfer of the emissions reduction burden constitutes a form of cross-
subsidization from non-ETS to ETS sectors that is inconsistent with the weak 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle (i.e., no subsidization). In this case, the 
subsidy should be thought of in terms of avoided environmental costs from which the 
ETS sectors are exempted and which are transferred to the non-ETS sectors. In the 
case of over-allocation, consistency with the weak form of the polluter-pays principle 
is violated independently of the allocation rule. Indeed, the cross-subsidization in 
favour of the ETS sectors takes place independently whether the over-allocated 
permits have been grandfathered or auctioned. Moreover, it is interesting to analyse 
whether the strong interpretation of the polluter-pays principle is also violated in the 
case of over-allocation.  
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It has been previously asserted that the strong form of the polluter-pays principle calls 
for governments to ensure the internalization of environmental costs (and not just to 
refrain from subsidizing pollution control).
It is straightforward to show that when allowances are over-allocated, the strong 
interpretation of the polluter-pays principle is also violated. If the ETS cap is stringent 
and no over-allocation occurs, then the environmental cost to be internalized by the 
ETS sectors is proportional to the percentage of emissions they generate. On the 
contrary, when over-allocation takes place, then the ETS sectors have to internalize 
only part of the externality they generate and the remaining costs are shifted (or 
“externalized”) to the non-trading sectors outside the scheme. 
Moreover, it has been shown that within the ETS the allocation of an excessive amount 
of allowances has caused a fall in the CO2 prices toward zero. The price of one 
allowance is a proxy of the monetization of the externality that the ETS sectors have to 
internalize within their production cost and to pass through into the final market price. 
A zero CO2 price implies that the environmental externality has not been priced and, 
thus, that there is no cost internalization. This in turn leads to a violation of the strong 
form of the polluter-pays principle as well. 
It is worth noticing that inconsistency with the strong form of the polluter-pays 
principle holds independently of the allocation criterion adopted to distribute the over-
allocated permits. Indeed, according to the Coase theorem, at equilibrium the market 
price does not depend on how permits have been initially allocated; therefore, if 
permits have been over-allocated, the price of allowances would fall toward zero 
independently of the initial allocation rule. Thus, neither grandfathering nor auctioning 
is consistent with the strong form of the polluter-pays principle. 
From the previous analysis, it follows immediately that in the case of over-allocation 
also the consistency with the extended form of the polluter-pays principle is violated. 
Indeed, according to this interpretation, the equity criterion is used in addition to—and 
not instead of—efficiency. Therefore, since both the weak and strong efficiency 
interpretations are violated, then also the equity interpretation of the PPP is violated as 
well. Indeed, according to the polluter-pays principle, when permits are over-allocated, 
part of the environmental costs that the ETS sectors should bear in order to contribute 
in a proportional way to the Kyoto target achievement are transferred to another 
subject (i.e., the non-ETS sectors). While the ETS sectors bear an emissions reduction 
burden that is less proportional than their ETS share, the non-ETS will conversely 
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have to abate an amount of emissions that is excessive if compared to the percentage 
of emissions they generate. Clearly, in addition to being inefficient, this environmental 
cost transfer is also unfair. 
 
5.4  Harmonization of the Allocation Criteria  
It has been shown that as long as allowances are not over-allocated the free trading of 
allowances within the ETS should ensure a cost-effective abatement, independently of 
how allowances have been initially allocated. Both grandfathering and auctioning are 
consistent with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. The 
criterion according to which allowances are initially allocated has only a distributive 
effect, which does not affect the correct functioning of the ETS. However, this last 
section wants to stress that when allowances are not allocated according to a common 
and harmonized rule among sectors and across different MS, the resulting 
distributional effects might undermine the efficiency in the secondary market where 
the ETS sectors compete. 
It has been previously stressed that the costs imposed by the ETS on the regulated 
installations and sectors are inversely proportional to the amount of allocated 
allowances. These costs are then internalized and transferred to the final price in the 
market where the ETS installations compete, thereby indirectly affecting their 
competitiveness. Given the ETS cap (and assuming it is stringent), when MS decide 
how to distribute the total amount of permits among the firms and sectors involved in 
the ETS, they indirectly define the emissions gap that each sector and installation has 
to cover to comply with the European regulation and therefore the amount of costs for 
which the regulated sectors are responsible. Defining the criterion to distribute the 
permits becomes therefore a potential economic instrument MS wield to intervene and 
influence their competitiveness in the national sector.  
Harmonized allocation rules within the ETS are required to avoid the risk that MS 
will arbitrarily allocate allowances among ETS sectors in order protect particular 
sectors and to favour their competitiveness in the secondary markets, thus distorting 
competition. As previously mentioned, the allocative criteria mentioned in Annex III 
are quite vague and do not define clear guidelines for deciding how to grandfather 
allowances. The lack of harmonized allocation rules and non-homogeneous NAPs 
risks distorting free market competition. Indeed, the possibility of a decision to over-
allocate permits to some sectors in order to preserve their competitiveness and to 
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under-allocate to the other sectors that are less exposed to international competition 
can be thought of as a sort of cross-subsidization among ETS sectors. Such a cross-
subsidization may ultimately distort the competition in the European internal market. 
The delegation of the allocative criteria’s decision making policy to MS and the lack 
of any EC guidelines about how the allocative criteria should be applied 
homogeneously among sectors and countries, risks creating a problem of 
inconsistency among the different allocation criteria. Such inconsistency in turn risks 
generating obstacles to the integration and harmonization of the European internal 
market. Moreover, the discretion MS have in shaping the way to distribute permits 
among sectors may be used by MS to preserve some key sectors’ competiveness in 
the international market by creating a mechanism of cross-subsidization among 
sectors (i.e., the over and under-allocation of permits) 
This is the tendency we are observing currently in Europe where some countries, 
arguing they want to contain electric firms’ windfall extra-profits, intend to under-
allocate permits to the electric sector in order to over-allocate them to those industrial 
sectors that are more exposed to international competition.   
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Tradable emission rights, also called allowances, can either be auctioned off or 
handed out for free by means of grandfathering. To increase political acceptability, 
allowances have been mainly grandfathered during the first ETS trading periods. 
Polluters do not have to buy their emission rights in an auction, but rather they obtain 
them for free based on their historical emissions. Because polluters do not pay for 
their emission rights, it is a popular perception in the economic and legal literature 
that grandfathering is inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle (e.g., Sorrell and 
Sijm, 2003; Nash, 2000). This chapter has investigated whether this perception is 
correct.  
First, a taxonomy of efficiency and equity interpretations of the polluter-pays 
principle has been presented. Within the efficiency interpretation, a “weak” form of 
the polluter-pays principle (i.e., no subsidization) must be distinguished from its 
“strong” form (i.e., cost internalization). The weak form requires that the government 
refrains from subsidizing pollution control, the strong form requires that polluters 
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internalize the costs of pollution. This means that the strong form subsumes the weak 
form: both versions require that companies internalize pollution costs.  
Nash (2000) argues that grandfathering runs contrary to the core of the polluter-pays 
principle, violating even the principle’s weak form, since it corresponds to a 
government subsidy for polluters. Because grandfathering violates even the weak 
form of the polluter-pays principle, it must also be incompatible with the strong form, 
he argues, which makes him conclude that grandfathering is inconsistent with the 
polluter-pays principle.  
This chapter reaches different conclusions. First, the compatibility of grandfathering 
with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle is analysed. It is 
stressed that grandfathered allowances used for covering the emissions of the 
allowance owner have an opportunity cost that has to be taken into account. Instead of 
using allowances to cover the emissions, the firm could have sold those emission 
rights. This opportunity cost, equal to the allowance price, must be included in the 
product price. The consequence is that the costs of pollution are internalized and 
passed through to the final market price, which makes grandfathering consistent with 
the strong form of the polluter-pays principle (i.e., “cost internalization”). Moreover, 
it is argued that grandfathering allowances constitutes lump-sum subsidies that do not 
distort competition, making grandfathering consistent with the weak form as well. 
The claim that polluters do not pay under grandfathering can only be defended from 
an equity perspective. The comparative analysis of auctioning and grandfathering 
shows that, while both allocation rules are consistent with the efficiency interpretation 
of the polluter-pays principle, only auctioning complies also with the “extended” form 
of the polluter-pays principle, where equity is used as a criterion in addition to—and 
not instead of—efficiency. Grandfathering improves the financial position of the 
shareholders because polluters receive an asset with a market value for free. Even if 
the polluter pays under grandfathering because of the opportunity costs faced, 
companies receive a capital gift equal to the revenue that the government would have 
obtained in an auction. Such a capital gift, while not distortive in efficiency terms, 
does have a redistributive impact that is beneficial to the polluter. Because polluting 
firms do not have to purchase the emission rights, while their shareholders become 
richer, grandfathering may be perceived as unfair from an extended polluter-pays 
perspective.  
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Auctioning ensures the internalization of the pollution costs and, on the top of that, 
forces polluters to purchase their emission rights. However, grandfathering can make 
a (more stringent) cap-and-trade scheme more acceptable to producers.  
The last section has described the conditions to be satisfied in order for grandfathering 
to be an efficient allocation criterion inducing the internalization of external 
environmental costs.  
Each allocation rule is effective under the condition that allowances are not over-
allocated. This condition implies that the ETS cap has to be set at a stringent level. 
Grandfathering is efficient if allowances are one-off grandfathered: as long as the 
current behaviour does not affect the amount of free allowances to be allocated in 
future phases, the allowances’ opportunity cost will remain unchanged over time and 
the effectiveness of grandfathering will be confirmed.  Finally, distortions of 
competition in the secondary markets are minimized only if the allocation rules are 
applied according to homogeneous and harmonized criteria. 
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Chapter 7. ETS Reform and Carbon Leakage: Assessing the Inconsistencies of 
the New ETS Directive 
1. Introduction 
During the meeting held in Brussels on 8-9 March 2007, the European Council 
declared its intention to strengthen the European Climate Policy beyond the Kyoto 
Protocol commitment. On 23 January 2008, the European Commission (EC) 
published a package of proposals (the so-called Climate and Energy Package) aimed 
at mitigating climate change and promoting renewable energy sources through 2020 
and beyond. 
In the field of Climate Change, the Commission officially expressed its firm intention 
to cut unilaterally European emissions by 20% below 1990 by 2020 in the case that no 
international post-Kyoto treaty is signed.32 Moreover, the EC published a proposal 
[COM(2008) 16 final] designed to amend the current European GHG emissions 
trading system (EU ETS) Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC). A revised version of the 
Commission’s proposal was officially approved by both the European Council and the 
European Parliament on 17 December 2008, and was finally adopted in April 2009. 
The new ETS Directive 2009/29/EC amending the first ETS Directive 2003/87/EC 
first extends the EU ETS to a third post-Kyoto trading period (2013-2020). Moreover, 
it reforms the ETS institutional framework in order to improve its functioning and 
effectiveness in promoting the reduction of CO2 emissions. Indeed, according to the 
EC itself, “the overall functioning of the Emissions Trading Scheme could be 
improved in a number of aspects” [COM(2008) 16 final, 2]. 
In light of the new ETS Directive, it becomes relevant to study if and how the ETS’ 
functioning will be effectively improved during its third post-Kyoto trading period 
(2013-2020).  
This chapter focuses on the major provisions that reform the two variables upon 
which the ETS’ effectiveness depends: the ETS cap level, which indicates the quantity 
of emissions the ETS sectors can produce, and the allocation rule, which establishes 
how the initial amount of allowances should be distributed among the ETS sectors.   
                                                 
32 The EC also declared its willingness to reduce the Community greenhouse gas emissions by 30% 
below 2005 levels by 2020 in the case of the achievement of an international “post-Kyoto” treaty that 
would commit the non-EU developed countries to reduce their emissions and the other economically 
more advanced developing countries to contribute to global warming mitigation according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
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After recalling the inefficiencies that emerged in the past trading periods, this chapter 
analyses how these variables have been reformed in order to assess if and to what 
extent the new ETS Directive will improve the ETS’ functioning, by increasing its 
effectiveness, avoiding undesirable distributive effects and granting a higher 
harmonization of rules aimed at minimizing distortions of competition.  
For this purpose, the chapter focuses on the phenomenon of Carbon Leakage, by 
analyzing the methodology defined to assess it and discussing the results of the EC 
quantitative assessment.  
The chapter is structured in five sections. Section 2 focuses on the ETS cap setting 
procedure. After recalling which inefficiencies have emerged in the ETS’ past trading 
periods, the section describes the new ETS cap setting procedure, assessing if and 
how it will improve the ETS’ functioning by reducing the past inefficiencies. 
Section 3 focuses on the allocation criteria. It briefly recalls the previous allocation 
rule and describes both the new allocation rule that will be applied in the third trading 
period and the arguments in favour of switching from grandfathering to auctioning.  
Section 4 constitutes the core of the research. The methodology to assess the ETS 
sectors’ exposure to Carbon Leakage is analysed, and the results of the EC 
quantitative assessment are presented and discussed. Particular attention is devoted to 
the discussion of both the criteria and the level of data aggregation adopted to assess 
the risk of Carbon Leakage. This discussion aims to highlight both when the defined 
procedures have a solid economic basis and when they can be considered mainly 
political or extra-economical. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The New ETS Cap Setting Procedure 
The new ETS Directive deeply reforms the legal procedure required to set the ETS 
cap. This section first analyses the previous procedure to assess the ETS cap, focusing 
on the related economic inefficiencies that have emerged in the past ETS trading 
periods. Then it describes the new methodology and criteria established to assess the 
ETS cap in the next trading phase, discussing whether an effective improvement of 
the ETS’ functioning can be reasonably expected. 
 
2.1 The Past Regulation and Related Inefficiencies  
Chapter 4 has explained that the ETS’ first and second trading periods have been 
characterized by a decentralized legal procedure for setting the ETS cap. Indeed, the 
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first ETS Directive 87/2003/EC delegated to MS the duty to design a NAP for each 
trading period, specifying both how many permits would be assigned at a national 
level and how they would be distributed among national ETS sectors and installations. 
NAPs had then to be submitted to the EC, which could accept, modify or reject them 
consistently with the allocation criteria set out in the EC Directive’s Annex III.33  
In chapter 5, we have shown that the vagueness of the Annex III criteria 
characterizing the NAP decentralized procedure has allowed MS to set national caps 
that were not equally proportional—neither to their national target nor to the national 
percentage of emissions produced by the ETS sectors. As a consequence, despite 
being subjected to a common regulation, the same European ETS sectors have borne 
different emissions reduction burdens depending on the MS in which they have been 
located. The lack of harmonized national caps has been also the consequence of the 
non-homogeneous evaluation of the submitted NAPs on behalf of the EC. The 
distribution of different reduction burdens across national ETS sectors has 
undermined the level playing field in the secondary European common market where 
ETS sectors compete causing a distortion of competition.  
The lack of permit scarcity in the ETS has caused the fall of CO2 prices toward zero, 
thereby failing to give any significant incentive to reduce emissions (chapter 5).  
The EC has recognized that delegating the duty to set national ETS caps has created a 
sort of  prisoner’s dilemma where “each individual MS recognises the collective 
interest to set restrictive caps for optimal reduction of emissions in the EU, but also 
has an interest to maximise the national cap” [SEC (2008) 52, 90].  
Moreover, the NAP decentralized procedure has increased uncertainty in the market 
among the ETS installations. In fact, the European ETS cap could be determined only 
ex-post by summing up the different national caps once all the NAPs had been 
definitively approved by the EC. NAPs should have been examined and approved by 
the EC fifteen months before the beginning of the subsequent trading period, but 
during both the first and second ETS phases some NAPs were finally approved only 
some months after the beginning of the concerning trading period. As a result, at the 
time that the ETS trading periods were officially launched, many installations did not 
                                                 
33 These criteria mainly indicate that the ETS cap should be set consistently with MS emissions 
reduction targets (criterion 1) and with the other existing emissions reduction policies (criterion 2), 
ensuring that emissions can be reduced at lower marginal abatement costs (MACs) (criterion 3). 
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know the amount of permits they would initially receive, and the level of the ETS cap 
was unknown.  
This long procedure involved substantial transaction costs—of a monetary and 
administrative nature—causing, in turn, price volatility in the ETS and increasing 
uncertainty among the regulated actors, and thereby deterring them from developing 
long-term investment strategies for a low-carbon economy.      
Finally, during the first ETS pilot phase, the ETS sectors’ emissions were not 
sufficiently capped. The ETS cap indicates both the amount of emissions the ETS 
sectors are allowed to produce and how the burden of the European emissions 
reduction target will be shared among emitting sources: how many emissions trading 
and non-trading sectors are required to abate in order to ensure the European 
compliance with the target established in both the Kyoto Protocol and in the Climate 
Package.  
A stringent ETS cap and a distribution of the emissions reduction burden among ETS 
and non-ETS sectors according to their marginal abatement costs are two necessary 
conditions for creating effectiveness in the ETS. On the contrary, in the first pilot 
trading period the lack of permit scarcity caused the CO2 price to fall to zero, thereby 
failing to give any significant incentive to reduce emissions. Consequently, the 
emission reduction burden imposed on the ETS sectors was too weak, while the 
reduction burden indirectly imposed on ETS sectors was excessive compared to their 
abatement potentialities and marginal abatement costs. 
In summary, the experience gathered from the first trading period has induced the EC 
to affirm that “a system based on national cap-setting does not provide sufficient 
guarantees that the emission reduction objectives […] will be achieved. Moreover, 
such a system is not likely to lead to minimise overall cost of emissions reductions” 
[COM (16) 2008 final, 7]. 
 
2.2 The ETS Cap Setting Reform  
The new ETS Directive has further centralized the ETS regulatory framework in the 
hands of the EC. Indeed, the NAP procedure has been abandoned and substituted by a 
unilateral EU-wide ETS cap setting procedure on behalf of the EC [COM (16) 2008 
final]. This procedure is aimed at increasing the ETS’ effectiveness by reducing the 
transaction costs linked to the NAP design, submission and approval procedure—
costs due to time, administrative and monetary factors. Increased effectiveness is also 
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sought by enhancing harmonization in the European market through a unique 
regulation. Differently from the previous trading periods, the amount of permits to be 
assigned will be defined according to a common criterion across the MS where the 
ETS sector might be located.  
The EC has evaluated different options for setting the ETS cap and sharing the 
emissions reduction burden between ETS and non-ETS sectors [SEC (2008) 52]: 
1. Status quo approach: MS have to determine the national caps with NAPs. This 
approach corresponds to the same procedure applied in the past trading periods.   
2. Equal effort approach: the cap would be determined at a level that would impose 
the same total costs on the ETS and non-ETS sectors. 
3. Benchmark-based approach: this criterion implies that the cap is set according to 
each sector’s abatement potential. 
4. Proportional reduction approach: the emissions reduction burden imposed on 
trading and non-trading sectors would be proportional to the European target (-
20%). Both ETS and non-ETS should reduce their emissions by 20%. 
5. Efficiency approach: the ETS cap should be set at a level that would equalize the 
marginal abatement costs among trading and non-trading sectors. 
Subsequently, the EC has chosen the most appropriate option according to three 
criteria: 
1. Effectiveness: the ETS cap should be set in order to ensure the achievement of 
the objective of the proposal. 
2. Efficiency: the ETS cap should be set at a level that would allow the emissions 
reduction target to be achieved at the least cost. 
3. Consistency: the ETS cap should be determined according to an approach that is 
likely to limit trade offs across the economic, social and environmental 
domains. 
While the undesirable effects of the status quo approach have been already 
commented upon, the equal effort approach has not been considered economically 
efficient, while the EC has considered the benchmark approach quite vague and as 
increasing uncertainty and the risk of additional market distortions.34 Moreover, the 
EC has identified this approach to be neither effective in setting a cap nor efficient 
                                                 
34 The EC maintains that the outcome of the benchmark approach “is not known either, as the cap 
would rather be determined by assumptions as regards the period within which the required reductions 
could be achieved” [SEC(2008) 52, 99]. 
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since it would require a complicated and very expensive modeling analysis. 
Therefore, these three options have been discarded by the EC.     
The proportional reduction approach is consistent with the European objective and 
coherent with the equity principle, according to which polluters have to pay 
proportionally to the pollution they produce. The ETS cap determined according to 
this approach is clear and easy to calculate; however, it would not be efficient since it 
would impose a -20% emissions cut to all agents independently of their marginal 
abatement costs. 
According to the Commission, only the efficiency approach “would comply fully with 
the objective of least abatement cost to reduce emissions” [SEC(2008) 52, 99]. The 
EC has established that it is the most appropriate criterion to share the emissions 
reduction burden among trading and non-trading sectors, given that it is consistent 
with the reduction target and that it is both efficient and effective.  
In fact, permit scarcity and an efficient distribution of the emissions reduction burden 
among ETS and non-ETS sectors are two necessary conditions for creating 
effectiveness in the ETS. 
Perfect competitive trade would be sufficient to ensure an efficient emissions 
abatement that would minimize and equalize marginal abatement costs, no matter how 
quotas and emissions reduction burdens have been initially allocated among ETS and 
non-ETS sectors. However, there is no linking market between ETS and non-ETS 
sectors ensuring their MACs equalization through ex-post trade; therefore, the ETS 
cap should be set ex-ante at a level that would equalize trading and non-trading MACs 
from the very beginning.  
Based on a general equilibrium simulation model, the EC has established that the -
20% below 1990 emission reduction target would be achieved at the minimum cost, 
thereby imposing on the ETS sectors a -21% emissions abatement compared to 2005, 
while non-trading sectors would be required to reduce their emissions by 10% [COM 
(2008) 17 final]. The different reduction burdens among trading and non-trading 
sectors have been justified by the trading and non-trading sectors’ different marginal 
abatement costs: the ETS sectors have on average lower marginal abatement costs and 
higher abatement opportunities than non-ETS sectors. Therefore, they have to bear a 
higher emissions reduction burden than non-ETS sectors. 
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However, no data or results that could prove that ETS sectors have on average lower 
marginal abatement costs and higher abatement opportunities than non-ETS sectors—
and to what extent—  have been published by the EC.  
According to the modeling assessment analysis, the cost-effective ETS cap consistent 
with the EU’s commitment (-20% by 2020) corresponds to a level of 1,720 Mt CO2 in 
2020. From 2013 through 2020, the ETS cap will be annually reduced by 1.74% as 
shown in Table 1 below [COM (2008) 16 final, art.  9]. The ETS cap indicates the 
quantity of emissions the ETS sectors has to reduce in order to comply with the 
European regulation. The increasing and progressive strictness of the ETS cap gives a 
first indication of the increasing cost and emissions reduction burden imposed by the 
European Climate Policy on the regulated sectors. 
Figure 15 shows that the annual caps set by the EC for the third trading period are 
stricter than both the historical level of ETS emissions and the past ETS caps, thus 
ensuring higher permit scarcity, which is required to promote emissions reductions. 
More than being the result of the new centralized ETS framework, the increased ETS 
cap stringency and predictability are the results of the increasing European political 
commitment to building a credible and effective climate policy.  
Figure 15 - ETS Third Trading Period Cap  
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transaction costs linked to the previous decentralized procedure. It improves the 
harmonization of the European regulation among ETS sectors, which will be 
subjected to a homogeneous cap across MS defined according to a common criterion 
aimed at imposing on both trading and non-trading sectors an emissions reduction 
burden coherent with their marginal abatement costs. Moreover, the ex-ante definition 
of the ETS cap from 2013 to 2020 improves the regulation transparency and its 
effectiveness by reducing the CO2 price volatility and increasing the certainty that the 
ETS installations need to build up their long-term investment strategies.  
 
3. The ETS Allocation Criteria 
Once the ETS cap has been set at an effective level, the corresponding amount of 
allowances can be distributed among the regulated sector either free of charge or as 
auctioned. Art. 10 of the first ETS Directive has established that during the first and 
second trading periods respectively at least 95% and 90% of permits should have been 
assigned free of charge according to historical emissions (i.e., grandfathering). Since 
auctioning entails higher private costs than grandfathering, the adoption of the latter 
allocation rule has increased the ETS’ political acceptability in the eyes of the ETS 
regulated sectors.  
However, since the first ETS pilot trading period was launched, grandfathering has 
been criticized on different grounds (e.g. Cramton and Kerr 2002, Hepburn et al. 
2006, Demailly and Quiron 2006). According to the EC, the allowances allocation 
rule has to ensure environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency and avoid any 
distortion of competition and undesirable distributive effects. Only auctioning 
satisfies these conditions of efficiency and distributional fairness [SEC (2008) 52]. 
Thus, a gradual shift occurs from grandfathering toward auctioning as an ETS default 
allocation rule. The next sections focus on the new allocation rule (i.e., auctioning), 
analysing both the way it will be applied and the potential inefficiencies that could 
arise in the post-Kyoto trading period. 
 
3.1 The New ETS Allocation Rule 
According to the EC, the allowances allocation rule has to ensure environmental 
effectiveness and economic efficiency, and avoid any distortion of competition and 
undesirable distributive effects [SEC (2008) 52]. While the first conditions ensure 
efficiency, the last one is related to a principle of fairness. In order to satisfy these 
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conditions, the EC has decided that allowances have to be initially sold in an auction 
rather than being assigned free of charge. According to the EC, “full auctioning of 
allowances scores best in increasing the efficiency of the system and taking away 
undesirable distributional effects” [SEC (2008) 52, 163] and “full auctioning is […] 
the only option that entirely solves efficiency problems” [SEC (2008) 52, 106], while 
on the other hand “the availability of free allowances reduces the financial necessity 
for undertakings to reduce emissions” [SEC (2008) 52, 92].  
While the theoretical superiority of auctioning over grandfathering has been already 
proved (they are both efficient and, what is more, auctioning is fair), the EC’s latest 
argument against grandfathering does not seem to take properly into account 
economic theory, and in particular the concept of opportunity costs. Under 
grandfathering, ETS installations are called to decide between using the grandfathered 
permits to cover their CO2 emissions or reducing their emissions in order to sell at the 
market price the allowances they have received for free. Under auctioning, 
installations have to decide between buying allowances in an auction in order to cover 
their CO2 emissions or reducing emissions in order to lower the initial amount of 
allowances to be acquired in an auction. While in the latter case the incentive to 
reduce emissions is determined by a cost that the operator does not want to bear, in 
the former case the same incentive is determined by the gain that the operator could 
earn by reducing its emissions and selling the permits received at no cost. Thus, in 
spite of free allocation, the ETS installations face the same financial incentive to 
reduce emissions that they would face under auctioning. 
Moreover, in chapter 6 we have already argued that, when the opportunity cost of free 
assigned permits is properly taken into account, both grandfathering and auctioning 
are efficient allocation criteria. This analysis is consistent with an efficiency 
interpretation of the polluter pays principle. 
However, despite that both auctioning criteria are in theory efficient, the 
implementation of grandfathering in the ETS has created problem concerning market 
efficiency. Because of the lack of clear and harmonized allocation criteria, the way 
grandfathering has been interpreted and implemented in different NAPs had negative 
repercussions on the ETS functioning and effectiveness, by reducing the incentives to 
abate emissions and by generating distortions of competition among installations 
belonging to the same European sector and operating in the same Cap and Trade 
mechanism but de facto regulated by different MS.  
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In light of both the inefficiencies and the undesired distributional effects caused by the 
free allocation of allowances, the EC expressed its intention to progressively abandon 
grandfathering in favour of auctioning as the new ETS default allocation rule. That is, 
according to the EC, only full auctioning can ensure the efficiency of the ETS. 
However, with both the Climate Package and the new ETS Directive’s final approval 
it has become clear that the new allocation rule to be applied during the third ETS 
trading period is far from being full auctioning. Instead, three different allocation 
rules, which vary from full auctioning to full grandfathering, will be applied to three 
different types of sectors. 
The new ETS Directive states that from 2013 onwards no free allocation will be given 
to energy installations, with the exception of co-generation plants, which can receive 
an amount of free permits proportional to the heat delivered to district heating or 
industrial installations and to certain electricity plants located in the Eastern EU MS, 
that respect particular conditions reported in points 9 and 10 of Art. 10a of the new 
ETS Directive.35 This first measure is effectively a full auctioning allocation rule.  
On the other hand, energy-intensive manufacturing installations not included in the 
power sector will face a progressive transition from grandfathering to auctioning. In 
2013, they will receive free of charge 80% of the amount allowances to be assigned.36 
The initial proposal for a new ETS Directive published on January 2008 stated that 
80% percent of free allocation should progressively decreased toward zero in 2020, 
while the final proposal approved in December 2008 states that the same initial 
percentage of free assigned allowances (80%) will decrease by an equal amount each 
year, arriving at 30% free allocation in 2020 and reaching full auctioning only in 
2027. This second measure is here defined as mixed auctioning, since it combines 
both grandfathering and auctioning. Rather than supported by economic 
                                                 
35 The amendment to Art. 10a of the first ETS Directive states that full auctioning should be the 
allocation rule for the electricity generators, as well as the capture and the pipelines for the transport or 
storage of carbon dioxide, while “electricity generators may receive free allowances for district heating 
and cooling and for heat and cooling produced through high efficiency cogeneration as defined by 
Directive 2004/8/EC in the event that such heat produced by installations in other sectors were to be 
given free allocations, in order to avoid distortions of competition” [2008/0013 (COD), 12]. Moreover, 
the new ETS Directive grants derogation from full auctioning to some electricity generators located in 
certain East European MS [Art. 10a, point 9. 10. 2008/0013 (COD)].  
36 The new ETS Directive specifies that grandfathering would correspond to 80% of the “amount that 
corresponded to the percentage of the overall Community-wide emissions throughout the period 2005 
to 2007 that those installations emitted as a proportion of the annual Community-wide total quantity of 
allowances” [2008/0013 (COD), 12]. 
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considerations, the progressive adoption of auctioning seems to be the result of a 
political compromise aimed at increasing the political acceptability of the ETS in the 
eyes of the regulated sectors. 
Finally, those sectors that are found to be at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage are 
entitled to complete exemption from acquiring permits in an auction. This third and 
last measure is a pure grandfathering allocation rule. 
 
Figure 16 – Third ETS trading period allocation rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next section focuses on the problem of Carbon Leakage. After defining what is 
meant by the term “Carbon Leakage,” the methodology to assess the ETS sectors’ 
exposure to Carbon Leakage is analysed and the results of the EC quantitative 
assessment are presented and discussed.  
 
4. The Risk of Carbon Leakage: Causes and Preventative Measures 
After the CO2 emissions have been priced, high energy intensive installations face a 
cost increase, which weighs more heavily on those sectors highly exposed to 
international competition. In fact, differently from the energy sector, which faces 
limited international competition,37 manufacturing sectors facing international 
competition might have a limited possibility to pass through their increased costs into 
the final product price without incurring a significant loss of market share against 
non-EU installations that are not subjected to the same costly environmental 
regulation.  
A European climate policy imposing an unilateral cost on European firms gives an 
indirect comparative advantage in favour of extra-EU competitors whose products are 
thereby guaranteed to become relatively less expensive and, thus, more economically 
                                                 
37 Electricity can be traded only if a grid infrastructure is in place and, even in this case, electricity can 
be transmitted  only to a limited extent, as long as the grid is not congested and bottlenecks are avoided  
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worthwhile. Foreign goods’ substitutability for domestic production increases and as a 
result might cause imports to grow and internal production to decrease. 
The European industrial lobbies have claimed that a European Climate Policy 
imposing a stricter cap and switch from grandfathering to auctioning would further 
worsen their competitiveness against international competitors, forcing them either to 
delocalize their production activity or to re-address their investment strategies toward 
non-EU countries where stringent and costly climate regulations are not in place. In 
the worst-case scenario, European installations might also be forced to shut down 
their plants with their production being replaced by the importation of cheaper extra-
EU products.  
Such a risk derives mainly from the fact that the European climate policy is unilateral 
(i.e., there are no symmetric climate policies outside Europe) and production-based, 
rather than consumption-based. That is, the ETS regulates the emissions linked to the 
production of a good (i.e., production emissions), rather than the emissions linked to 
the final consumption of that good (i.e., product emissions). Being production based, 
the ETS installations can comply with the European regulation just by switching the 
European production activity to outside Europe.  
This is to say that the main effect of a unilateral and costly European climate policy 
could be to outsource production and emissions outside Europe, with detrimental 
effects on European economic growth. If this case were true, a unilateral European 
climate policy imposing substantial asymmetric costs on the European economic 
agents would not only be inefficient, but also ineffective for the environment: 
emissions would decrease in Europe, while increasing proportionally in the rest of the 
world.  Goods would be produced outside Europe and then imported, causing 
additional emissions from their importation.  
The risk of Carbon Leakage would make the European climate policy both 
economically and environmentally ineffective: “[given] the extent that energy-
intensive industrial production is shifting globally from developed to developing 
countries (which it is), the 20 per cent target can be achieved without reducing carbon 
concentrations globally by the implied amount. Indeed, if the production techniques in 
developing countries are less carbon-efficient than in developing countries, and if we 
add the emissions from shipping, aviation, and other transport, it could even increase 
emissions” (Helm 2009: 6). 
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In light of the political will of moving beyond Kyoto before Copenhagen 2009, the 
European Commission has had to solve a conundrum: how to approve a credible 
climate policy in a short time, while at the same time ensuring political acceptability 
and reducing the risk of Carbon Leakage. Since the renegotiation of the emissions 
reduction target was not a political option, the EC proposed a political compromise: 
mitigate the cost impact of the ETS by granting 100% free allocation instead of 
auctioning to all the ETS sectors found to be subjected to the risk of Carbon Leakage.  
In the eyes of the industrial lobbies, grandfathering means lower financial 
expenditures, while in the eyes of the EC it means political acceptability of the new 
European Climate Package and reduction of the Carbon Leakage risk: “in the absence 
of international agreement on climate change policy, some allocation of allowances 
for free could be an efficient instrument to avoid net carbon leakage” [SEC (2008) 52, 
163]. 
However, this statement is not necessarily true. Given the asymmetric and unilateral 
nature of the European climate policy, the risk of Carbon Leakage will persist. This is 
also because the ETS binding cap approved with the Climate Package is anyhow 
imposing an asymmetric costly emissions reduction burden on the European industrial 
sectors. Moreover, considering the opportunity costs associated with free allocation, 
one could also question whether the total exemption from auctioning would provide 
any real protection against leakage. The role of opportunity cost is critical to any 
Carbon Leakage risk assessment under grandfathering. Free assigned allowances have 
an opportunity cost that installations have to take into account when deciding whether 
it is more cost-efficient to produce in Europe and use the grandfathered permits to 
cover the related emissions or to delocalize production and sell the exceeding amount 
of allowances at the market price. In spite of free allocation, the ETS installations 
could still find it cost-efficient to delocalize their plants outside Europe and sell within 
the ETS the total amount of allowances they have received for free. 
Therefore, it is not a given that the adoption of grandfathering instead of auctioning 
will mitigate the risk of Carbon Leakage. This decision looks more politically driven 
than economically grounded. 
Another issue concerns how to determine which ETS sectors should be considered 
effectively at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage and which not. The following 
sections analyse whether the final methodology adopted to assess which sectors 
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should be considered at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage has a solid economic 
background, or rather if it is mainly politically driven.  
 
4.1 Guidelines to Assess Carbon Leakage  
Despite recognizing the necessity of  assessing the risk of Carbon Leakage, the 
Commission initially stated that the sectors or sub-sectors exposed to the risk of 
Carbon Leakage would be determined, if necessary, only after the final outcome of 
the international negotiations for a Post-Kyoto treaty to be held in Copenhagen at the 
end 2009 [COM(2008) 16, Art. 10b]. 
Indeed, the first proposal for the new ETS Directive limited itself to the introduction 
of some general guidelines to analyse the ETS sectors’ exposure to Carbon Leakage, 
without specifying under which conditions a sector could be effectively considered 
exposed to Carbon Leakage and thus exempted from auctioning [SEC (2008) 52]. 
According to the EC definition, the net cost increase is the variable that best 
represents the risk of Carbon Leakage. It is defined as the part of cost increase caused 
by the ETS that the regulated installations cannot pass through to the final product 
price without losing a significant share of the market (against non-EU installations). 
The net cost increase is the result of a two-step analysis defined by the EC and which 
will be described in the following sub-sections. 
4.1.1 Carbon Intensity and Cost Increase Assessment 
The first step consists of the ETS sectors’ industrial production process analysis, and 
it is aimed at assessing to what extent the ETS might increase the regulated sectors’ 
costs.  
After the CO2 emissions have been priced, energy intensive installations bear two 
types of costs.  
First, they are required either to reduce their emissions or to cover their emissions gap 
by acquiring a corresponding amount of permits in the ETS. Direct costs are 
proportional to the installations’ direct emissions, a function of the plant emissions 
intensity (tons of CO2 emissions per ton of production), which mainly depends on the 
fuel mix, the technology efficiency, the amount of self-produced electricity and the 
industrial process emissions.  
Moreover, energy-intensive installations have to pay a higher price for the electricity, 
which is increased by the market value of the allowances passed through by the 
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energy generators (e.g., Sjim et al. 2006). These indirect costs are proportional to the 
production process’ indirect emissions represented by the installations’ electricity 
intensity (MWh per ton of production), which mainly depends on the amount of 
electricity purchased and on the fuel mix used to generate the purchased electricity 
(i.e., fuel emissions factor). When assessing the ETS’ impact on the regulated sectors’ 
production costs, both direct and indirect emissions need to be taken into account. It is 
worth noticing that products’ indirect emissions are related not only to electricity 
consumption, but to all the phases composing the product life-cycle: from the 
extraction and transportation of raw material to the distribution of the final product 
and its final disposal.   
In principle, it would be more appropriate to account for the product life-cycle direct 
and indirect emissions; however, the EU ETS Directives regulates only the production 
process rather than the whole product life-cycle, thus limiting itself to the 
consideration of only the direct and indirect emissions related to the plants that can be 
easily measured.   
 
Table 12 – Determinants of Sectors’ Carbon Intensity 
 Low Electricity 
Intensity 
High Electricity Intensity 
Low Emissions 
Intensity 
Agriculture (non-ETS) Aluminium, Electric Arc 
Furnace  
High Emissions 
Intensity 
Lime, Clinker  Pulp and Paper  
 
 
4.1.2 Assessment of Trade Intensity and Exposure to Competition  
Assessing the cost increase caused by the ETS is not sufficient to determine the risk of 
Carbon Leakage. Sectors that are not exposed to international competition are able to 
pass through the cost increase to the final market price without losing market share, 
and are thus neutralized against the risk of Carbon Leakage. 
Therefore, it is necessary to assess to what extent the effective exposure to 
international non-EU competition allows the ETS regulated installations to pass 
through the cost increase to the final product price without any substantial loss of 
market share. Thus, an assessment of the elasticity of the relevant market demand 
price is required. Alternatively, the Carbon Leakage could be estimated by means of a 
numerical general equilibrium model (e.g., CGE models like the GEM-E3 already 
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financed by the EC). Nevertheless, given the time constraints imposed by the political 
agenda, the EC has considered that a simplified estimation of the European markets’ 
exposure to non-EU competition based on the amount of import/export trade would be 
sufficient to get first quantitative results, to be eventually improved and completed by 
a deeper qualitative analysis of the characteristics of the sectors’ markets and 
technology.  
The EC affirmed that exposure to competition could be assessed according to two 
different indicators: 1) the import penetration ratio determined by the ratio of the 
amount of imported products to consumed products and 2) the export ratio, 
determined by the ratio of the exported products to produced products. From the first 
EC guidelines, it is possible to conclude that both the cost increase and the exposure 
to international competition should be taken simultaneously into account to assess the 
risk of Carbon Leakage.  
Table 13 – Determinants of Carbon Leakage 
 Low Carbon Intensity High Carbon Intensity 
Low Trade Intensity I – no risk of CL II – low risk of CL 
High Trade Intensity III – low risk of CL IV – high risk of CL 
 
 
4.2 The Approved Methodology to Assess Carbon Leakage 
After having published some general guidelines to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage, 
the new ETS Directive specifies a two-step methodology to assess which sectors are 
at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage. First, the EC has been charged with 
determining the sectors at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage via a quantitative 
assessment based on two alternative approaches. 
First, a sector or sub-sector is considered to be exposed to Carbon Leakage if the sum 
of direct and indirect costs induced by the ETS would lead to an increase in 
production costs exceeding 30% of its Gross Value Added or if the value of its 
exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 
30%. Since it is sufficient to satisfy one of the two carbon and trade intensity 
conditions in order to be considered exposed to Carbon Leakage, this first criterion is 
here defined “separated approach,” and it corresponds to one of the three areas (A, B 
or C) of figure 17. 
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Figure 17 – Exposure to Carbon Leakage according to the “Separated 
Approach”
 
 
Second, even if neither carbon nor trade intensities exceed the 30% threshold, a sector 
or sub-sector can be fully exempted from auctioning if its carbon intensity (sum of 
direct and indirect cost divided by the gross value added) exceeds 5% and if its trade 
exposure (value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover 
and imports) exceeds 10%. This second criterion is here defined “integrated 
approach” because exposure to Carbon Leakage occurs only if both the carbon-trade 
intensity conditions are satisfied (area D of figure 18). 
The new ETS Directive specifies that the list of sectors found to be exposed to Carbon 
Leakage according to the quantitative assessment can be eventually supplemented 
after completion of a qualitative analysis, which should focus on both the sectors’ 
technological potential to reduce emissions or electricity consumption and the sectors’ 
current and projected market characteristics.  
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Figure 18 - Exposure to Carbon Leakage according to the “Integrated 
Approach” 
 
4.3 Analysis of the European Commission’s Quantitative Assessment Results 
On April 29th 2009, the European Commission officially published the list of 
industrial sectors found to be at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage by using the 
quantitative assessment procedure specified in the previous section. These preliminary 
results refer to 257 industrial sub-sectors analysed by the European Commission at a 
NACE 4 digit level of disaggregation.38 
The NACE 4 sub-sectors’ carbon intensity has been estimated on the basis of 
historical emissions registered in the Community International Transaction Log 
(CITL) and, when required, with information provided by MS and by the industrial 
associations themselves.39 
Coherent with the former EC guidelines, the direct cost increase has been estimated 
assuming that all the emissions had to be covered acquiring permits at a price of 30 
€/ton. This assumption does not reflect the content of the new ETS Directive, 
according to which permits will have to be 100% acquired in an auction only in 2027, 
                                                 
38 NACE is the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community. The 
number of digits of the code specifies the level of the classification system and the level of sector 
integration. 
39 The emissions produced by those sectors and plants which are going to participate in the ETS 
starting only from the third trading period (2013-2020) are not reported in the CITL; thus, they have 
been prevalently estimated by applying to the fuel mix combustion level the related emissions factors 
and summing up the industrial process emissions weighted by the historical level of production. 
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while in 2013 80% of permits will be assigned free of charge and in 2020 only 70% of 
permits will be sold with an auction. The EC quantitative assessment over-estimate 
the direct costs imposed by the new ETS Directive to the regulated sectors, thus over-
estimating the sectors’ risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage.  
Given the historical data of electricity consumption, indirect costs are estimated by 
multiplying the amount of electricity consumed by the marginal increase of electricity 
price under the assumption that the 30€/ton price is fully passed through into 
electricity prices (e.g., Reinaud 2007; Reinaud 2008; EC DG Environment et al. 
2006).40  
Out of the 257 NACE 4 examined sectors, 98 sectors did not result as exposed to 
Carbon Leakage, 19 sectors have not been examined because of the lack of official 
and reliable data, while 140 sectors (56%) have been found exposed to the risk of 
Carbon Leakage. Out of these 140 NACE 4 sectors exempt from auctioning, 3 sectors 
comply only with the requirements imposed by the integrated approach (5%< 
C.I.<30% and 10%<T.I.<30%); 3 sectors have been considered exposed to Carbon 
Leakage according to the separated approach because of their high Carbon Intensity 
(C.I.>30% and T.I.<10%), while 134 sectors (98% of the exempted sectors) have been 
found exposed to Carbon Leakage according to the separated approach because of 
their high trade exposure (T.I.>30%). The majority of these sectors included in the 
latter group are not carbon intensive at all: 83 out of the 134 sectors have been 
exempted from auctioning only because of their high trade exposure since they would 
face a (direct + indirect) cost increase lower than 1% of their Added Value, while 92 
sectors would face a cost increase lower than 1.5% of their Added Value. Out of these 
134 exempted sectors, 39 sectors would face a cost increase between 1.5% and 5% of 
their Added Value, while the last three sectors would face a cost increase higher than 
5%, thus resulting to be exposed to Carbon Leakage according to both the integrated 
and separated approach. 
 
 
                                                 
40 “Reinaud assumes that electricity pricing would lead to a full pass-through of the carbon opportunity 
cost in power prices. A EUR20 per tonne of CO2 would result in a 21% price increase in Continental 
Europe (or an increase of EUR10/MWh). McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) follow the same methodology 
and also estimate that a EUR20/tCO2 price will increase in electricity prices by EUR10/MWh” 
(Reinaud 2008).  
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 Table 14 – Results of the Carbon Leakage Quantitative Assessment 
  Number of sectors 
Sectors not evaluated 19 
Sectors not exposed to Carbon Leakage 98 
Sectors exposed to Carbon Leakage 140 
 C.I.> 5% and 10%<T.I.<30% (integrated approach) 3 
 C.I.>30% and T.I.<10% (separated approach) 3 
 T.I.> 30% (separated approach) 134 
T.I.>30% and C.I.< 1% 83
T.I.>30% and 1%<C.I.<1.5% 9
T.I.>30% and 1.5%<C.I.<5% 39
 T.I.>30% and C.I. >5% (both separated and integrated approaches) 3
 Source: data elaboration based on European Commission 2009  
 
The Carbon Leakage assessment allows us to understand which role both auctioning 
and free allocation will cover during the ETS third trading period. Indeed, we can 
estimate the amount of permits that will be auctioned by assuming that it will be 
proportional to the percentages of emissions produced by the ETS manufacturing 
sectors not exposed to Carbon Leakage. 
Unfortunately, assessing the amount of emissions that has been historically produced 
by the ETS sectors exposed and not exposed to Carbon Leakage is puzzling. In fact, 
while the Carbon Leakage has been assessed quantitatively at a NACE 4 level, the 
emissions data are collected at an installation level and then aggregated in the CITL 
registry in 9 different categories, which do not correspond to the NACE code 
classification (table 15).  
 
Table 15 - ETS Verified Emissions per Sector t CO2 eq - EU 25 
  2005 2006 2007 2008
1. Combustion installations 1,458,440,788 1,469,722,527 1,482,556,567 1,434,380,809
2. Mineral oil refineries 150,018,675 148,543,346 148,440,503 147,831,560
3. Coke ovens 19,193,122 21,301,035 22,073,888 20,984,289
4. Metal ore roasting or sintering 12,638,622 14,048,755 14,610,022 9,646,738
5. Pig iron or steel 129,292,592 132,899,646 132,240,627 132,897,010
6. Cement clinker or lime 177,537,990 182,078,934 190,653,632 177,543,699
7. Glass, including glass fibre 20,113,068 20,027,365 19,953,995 21,164,105
8. Ceramic products by firing 14,732,205 14,884,435 14,275,761 12,655,292
9. Pulp, paper and board 29,905,467 30,001,704 28,964,649 30,718,015
99. Other activity opted-in 2,143,082 2,142,936 2,180,743 1,478,693
Total 2,014,015,611 2,035,650,683 2,055,950,387 1,989,300,210
Source: CITL 
 
179 
 
The different data aggregation criteria create some problems. First, the emissions data 
of combustion installations reported in the CITL (table 15, category 1) aggregate 
emissions produced by sectors both exposed and not exposed to Carbon Leakage. 
Thus, it is not possible to estimate the percentage of emissions produced by sectors 
exposed to Carbon Leakage. We can subtract from the combustion installations’ 
emissions aggregated data the amount of emissions produced by the Public Electricity 
and Heat Production fuel combustion activities and registered in the European 
Environment Agency’s GHG inventory reports. In this way, we can separate the 
emissions produced by the energy sector, which is required to acquire permits in an 
auction, from the emissions produced by all the other manufacturing installations with 
a total rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW, which however belong to different 
NACE 4 sectors.  
 
Table 16 – EU 25 GHG Emissions from Combustion Installations (t CO2 eq)  
  2005 2006 2007
 Combustion installations 1,458,440,788 1,469,722,527 1,482,556,567
 Energy sector (Public Electricity and Heat Prod.) 1,171,588,399,50 1,177,863,590,91 1,191,771,838,14
 Manufacturing Sectors 286,852,389 291,858,936 290,784,729
Source: CITL and EEA 2009 
 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to further disaggregate the Manufacturing Sectors 
combustion installations’ emissions data in order to assess the amount of emissions 
produced by the combustion installations belonging to NACE 4 sectors exposed and 
not exposed to Carbon Leakage. Second, different sectors corresponding to the CITL 
categories (table 15: 7. glass, 8. ceramic, and 9. pulp and paper) include some NACE 
4 sub-sectors, which have been exempted from auctioning, and other NACE 4 sub-
sectors, which have not. However, since the emissions data are collected at an 
installation level and aggregated at a sector level without giving any NACE 4 
specification, within a macro sector it is not possible to separate the emissions 
produced by the NACE 4 sectors exempted from auctioning from the emissions 
produced by the NACE 4 sectors that are not. By selecting only the CITL categories 
that entirely participated in the ETS during the past trading periods and whose NACE 
4 subsectors have been entirely exempted from auctioning (2. Oil refineries, 3. coke 
ovens, 5. iron and steel, and 6. cement, clinker or lime), it is possible to conclude that 
at least 57% of the permits to be allocated to the industrial manufacturing sectors will 
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be assigned free of charge. This is a precautionary under-estimation of the percentage 
of permits that will be freely assigned to the ETS manufacturing sectors since it does 
not take into account either the sectors that present only some NACE 4 sub-sectors 
exposed to Carbon Leakage (and thus entitled to receive free permits) or the fact that 
even the sectors not exposed to Carbon Leakage will receive in any case a 
progressively decreasing percentage of free permits (80% in 2013, and 30% in 2020). 
However, these considerations are sufficient to conclude that auctioning will be the 
default allocation rule only for the energy sector; on the contrary, the free assignment 
of permits will remain the dominant allocation criterion for the ETS manufacturing 
sectors, even in the third ETS trading period.  
Table 17 –  Emissions from Sectors Exempted and Not Exempted from 
Auctioning
  (ton Co2 eq.) (%) 
ETS Manufacturing Sectors 
Exempted from auctioning 476,042,379 57% 
Partially exempted  366,384,833 43% 
Total 842,427,212 100% 
4.3.1 Analysis of the Carbon Leakage Assessment Methodology 
The methodology defined to assess Carbon Leakage is based on two alternative 
approaches, which differ substantially. The integrated approach takes simultaneously 
into account both the carbon and trade intensities, as well as both the cost increase and 
the possibility to pass through this increased cost to the product price, which depends 
on the sector’s exposure to international competition. Each of these conditions is 
necessary but not sufficient for a sector to be considered exposed to Carbon Leakage; 
their combination defines the areas of exemption from auctioning A1, B, C1 and D of 
figure 19. 
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Figure 19 - Areas of Exposure to Carbon Leakage 
 
On the contrary, according to the separated approach, Carbon Leakage is assessed 
either on a “cost increase” basis or on a “trade exposure” basis. Above the 30% 
carbon intensity threshold a sector is automatically exempted from auctioning, 
independently of both its effective exposure to international competition and of its 
pass-through possibility (areas A1, A2 and B of figure 19). Similarly, above the 30% 
trade intensity threshold a sector is automatically exempted from auctioning 
independently of the ETS cost impact (areas B, C1 and C2 of figure 19).  
However, three of the five exemption areas defined by the separated approach have 
been already delimited by the aggregated approach (A1, B, C1). Thus, the unique 
additional contribution of the separated approach to the Carbon Leakage assessment 
methodology is the delimitation of the two areas A2 and C2. These two areas grant 
exemption from auctioning both to sectors exposed to international trade, which do 
not face any substantial cost increase from the ETS (131 sectors located in the area 
C2), and to the most carbon-intensive sectors, which have some cost pass-through 
possibility ensured by their limited exposure to international competition (3 sectors 
located in the area A2).  
It is possible to conclude that the separated approach is distortive and hence not an 
appropriate criterion to assess Carbon Leakage. The criterion’s unique effect is to 
protect many sectors that, being either carbon free or neutralized against international 
competition, do not face a real risk of Carbon Leakage, as it has been defined by the 
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EC guidelines on the net cost increase basis; thus there is no real economic rationale 
supporting their exemption. 
Based on an integrated analysis of both carbon and trade intensities, the integrated 
approach is the unique criterion suitable for assessing the risk of Carbon Leakage. 
After discussing the consistency and effectiveness of both the criteria defined in order 
to determine which sectors should be exempted from auctioning, the defined 
thresholds need to be considered in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Carbon 
Leakage assessment methodology. First, the EC does not explain if and why the 
chosen thresholds should be tailored to evaluate the risk of Carbon Leakage. It is not 
clear whether the 5%, 10% and 30% thresholds have been set arbitrarily or whether 
they have been specified according to economic principles. Moreover, deciding on a 
threshold basis whether permits should be assigned for free or auctioned, thereby 
implying that sectors can be either fully exempted from auctioning or not exempted at 
all, will impose a regulatory measure that is not proportional to the sectors’ effective 
exposure to the risk of Carbon Leakage and might give them a distortive incentive to 
adopt opportunistic behaviour.   
For instance, fully exempting a sector whose carbon and trade intensities are 
respectively 5.1% and 10.1%, while at the same time not exempting at all a sector 
whose carbon and trade intensities are 4.9% and 9.9%, might induce ineffective 
behaviour on the part of the unexempt sector, which could increase its emissions in 
order to pass the given threshold.41 Alternatively, rather than evaluating the risk of 
Carbon Leakage according to a discrete threshold, free allocation could be granted 
proportionally to a continuous variable which reflects the degree of carbon and trade 
intensity. According to this hypothetical allocation rule, each sector would initially 
receive 80% of allowances for free, as defined by the ETS Directive, plus a 
percentage of free allowances proportional to the degree of risk of exposure to Carbon 
Leakage. 
Finally, the relevance and appropriateness of the variables chosen to assess the risk of 
Carbon Leakage need to be discussed. The cost increase and the consequent risk of 
exposure to Carbon Leakage has been assessed weighting the sectors’ aggregated 
level of historical emissions and electricity consumptions with the sector added value 
data. Thus, the higher the level of emissions and the more electricity that is consumed, 
                                                 
41 The ETS directive specifies that the Carbon Leakage Assessment can be updated every year on the 
basis of new data. 
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the higher the probability to be exempted from auctioning, independently of sectors’ 
carbon and energy efficiency.  The ETS additional cost from auctioning allowances is 
more likely to be borne by the more carbon and energy efficient sectors, which have 
taken early action to reduce their emissions and energy consumption and which are 
more likely to have higher than average marginal abatement costs and lower potential 
for further emissions reduction. 
The public willingness to shift from grandfathering to auctioning under the constraint 
of minimizing the risk of Carbon Leakage has led to the establishment of an allocation 
mechanism that ends up favouring and protecting the most polluting sectors, which 
are more likely to be exempted from auctioning. At the same time, this allocation 
mechanism ironically imposes additional costs on the most carbon and energy 
efficient sectors, which face less probability of being exposed to Carbon Leakage, and 
thus have to acquire permits in an auction. In conclusion, the new ETS Directive has 
defined a procedure to allocate allowances among ETS sectors according to arbitrary 
criteria, which do not seem to have a solid economic foundation, thus failing to 
improve the harmonization within the ETS required to minimize possible market 
distortion.  
 
4.3.2. Relevant Market and Optimal Level of Data Aggregation  
While the previous section has analysed the effectiveness of the criteria defined by the 
EC to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage, this section focuses on the level of data 
aggregation adopted to assess the sectors’ exposure to Carbon Leakage. 
Data can be aggregated either at a national or at a European level (i.e., horizontal 
aggregation) and at a sector NACE 3 or sub-sector NACE 4 level (i.e., vertical 
aggregation). The degree of risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage can vary depending 
on how data are aggregated. Therefore, it becomes necessary to define the more 
appropriate level of horizontal and vertical data aggregation.  
Table 18 – Levels of Data Aggregation 
   Horizontal Aggregation  
  European level National level 
Vertical 
Aggregation 
NACE-3 Code Aggregation I II 
NACE-4 Code Aggregation III IV 
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When evaluating the optimal level of data aggregation, two opposite considerations 
should be borne in mind: first, the higher the degree of data disaggregation, the higher 
the risk of applying different allocation criteria that undermine the harmonization of 
the regulation among sectors and countries. On the other hand, the more data that are 
aggregated, the higher the risk that the Carbon Leakage assessment will not reflect the 
technologies, industrial processes and market characteristics of the regulated sectors. 
The new ETS Directive states that “the Carbon Leakage risk […] should be assessed, 
as a starting point, at a 3-digit level (NACE-3 Code), or where appropriate and where 
the relevant data are available, at a 4-digit level (NACE-4 Code)” [2008/0013 (COD), 
14].  
The EC has assessed the sectors’ Carbon Leakage exposure on the basis of European 
data aggregated at a NACE 4 level (Table 18, cell III), without specifying the reason 
why it should be more appropriate to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage on the basis 
of industrial data disaggregated at a 4-digit level, and geographical data aggregated at 
a European level. It is not clear if the decision regarding the level of data horizontal 
aggregation and vertical disaggregation has been made according to a common 
economic criterion.  
In order to fill this legal gap, this analysis proposes a uniform criterion to determine 
the optimal level of data aggregation: the risk of Carbon Leakage should be assessed 
on the basis of data aggregated consistently with the relevant product and 
geographical market where the regulated sectors compete.42 This criterion is coherent 
with the qualitative assessment guidelines, which state that the Carbon Leakage 
assessment should take into account the sectors’ current and projected market 
characteristics. Potential distortions of competition deriving from the European 
regulation would be minimized if the installations competing in the same relevant 
market were subjected to a uniform allocation rule. First, the relevant product and 
geographic market where the ETS installations compete should be assessed,43 and 
                                                 
42 According to the European Commission, “[t]he relevant market combines the product market and 
the geographic market, defined as follows: a relevant product market comprises all those products 
and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer by reason of the 
products' characteristics, their prices and their intended use; a relevant geographic market comprises the 
area in which the firms concerned are involved in the supply of products or services and in which the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous” Official Journal C 372 , 09/12/1997 P. 0005 – 
0013, available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26073.htm  
43 The Commission attempts to define the product market by investigating whether product A and 
product B belong to the same market. It also tries to determine the geographic market by producing an 
overview of the breakdown of the market shares held by the parties in question and by their 
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then risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage should be estimated using data aggregated 
consistently with the relevant market assessment. 
When deciding the most appropriate level of horizontal-geographical data 
aggregation, it is necessary to evaluate to what extent data aggregated at a European 
level can represent the relevant market where European installations compete and thus 
reflect the exposure to international competition faced by installations or sectors 
located in specific geographic areas.44 When deciding the optimal level of vertical-
industrial data aggregation, it is necessary to evaluate which classification (i.e., 
NACE-3 or NACE-4) better represents the relevant product market where the ETS 
installations compete. On one hand, a 3-digit level analysis risks aggregating sectors 
characterized by different industrial processes with specific energy or emission 
intensities required to produce goods, which—albeit belonging to the same NACE 
classification—are characterized by different degrees of quality (such as primary and 
secondary aluminium, BOF and EAF steel). Despite having similar physical 
characteristics, products belong to different relevant markets if they have different 
levels of quality. On the other hand, a Carbon Leakage assessment based on data 
disaggregated at a 4-digit level might have the undesired effect of applying two 
different allocation rules to different sub-sectors that de facto compete in the same 
relevant market.45 
Moreover, an analysis at a 4-digit level risks producing insignificant and misleading 
results also in the case that installations produce simultaneously different products 
that are classified in different NACE 4 categories and that might have been regulated 
by different allocation criteria despite being produced by the same installation. In 
cases like this, the related plants’ emissions and energy consumption data cannot be 
disaggregated easily among the different NACE 4 levels. The higher the data 
disaggregation level, the higher the risk of using unrepresentative data and obtaining 
                                                                                                                                            
competitors, as well as of the prices charged and any price differentials.  Official Journal C 372, 
09/12/1997 P. 0005 – 0013, available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l26073.htm  
44 For instance, when analysing sectors that produce goods whose transportation costs significantly 
impact the final price (e.g., cement), it can be observed that sectors located in continental countries are 
less exposed to international competition than sectors located in sea countries. 
45 For example, in the case that the two NACE 4 sub-sectors—one manufacturing ceramic tiles and 
flags and the other brick tiles and construction products in baked clay—were producing substitute 
goods competing in the same market, then these sectors should be homogeneously regulated and 
subjected to the same allocation criterion. In this case, the qualitative analysis would suggest a unique 
Carbon Leakage assessment based on NACE 3 aggregated sectors.
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biased results. This suggests that an analysis at a 3-digit level would be more 
appropriate. Alternatively, the EC should clarify how aggregated data from plants 
producing simultaneously different goods have been disaggregated at a NACE 4 level 
in order to improve the transparency of European regulation. In conclusion, the 
Carbon Leakage quantitative assessment should be improved by a qualitative 
valuation concerning the appropriate NACE level of data aggregation. This chapter 
interprets the EC guidelines, asserting that it is appropriate to use 4-digit level data 
when this degree of aggregation better reflects the characteristics of the relevant 
market where installations compete. Indeed, distortions of competition in the 
European markets would be minimized if the risk of Carbon Leakage were assessed 
using data aggregated according to the relevant market where sectors compete. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In 2008, the European Commission declared its firm intention to strengthen the 
European Climate Policy beyond the Kyoto Protocol commitment. The new ETS 
Directive has re-designed the ETS legal framework in order to improve its functioning 
during the third post-Kyoto trading period (2013-2020). In fact, the experience 
gathered from the past ETS trading periods suggests that the ETS effectiveness could 
be improved on different fronts. 
This chapter has analyzed the ETS reform focusing on both the ETS cap setting 
procedure and on the allocation mechanism to distribute permits among ETS 
installations. Different conclusions have been reached concerning the two different 
topics of investigation. 
Regarding the ETS cap setting procedure, it is possible to conclude that the new ETS 
Directive has improved the ETS effectiveness in different areas. The new centralized 
procedure for setting an EU-wide cap reduces the transaction costs linked to the 
previous decentralized procedure. It improves the harmonization of the European 
regulation among ETS sectors, which will be subjected to a homogeneous cap 
determined according to a common criterion aimed at imposing on both trading and 
non-trading sectors an emissions reduction burden coherent with their marginal 
abatement costs. Moreover, the ex-ante definition of the ETS cap from 2013 to 2020 
will improve the regulation transparency and its effectiveness, by reducing the CO2 
price volatility and increasing the certainty ETS installations need to build up their 
long-term investment strategies.  
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Different conclusions have been reached when analysing the allocation rule reform.  
First, the EC has expressed a clear intention to shift from grandfathering to 
auctioning. However, a theoretical full auctioning rule has been substituted with three 
co-existing allocation measures that will be applied to different sectors depending on 
their risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage, thus decreasing, rather than improving, the 
rules’ harmonization within the ETS.   
Moreover, the analysis of the Carbon Leakage assessment methodology has shown 
that instead of improving the allocation transparency and creating a higher 
harmonization of rules, the EC has defined highly arbitrary and inefficient criteria to 
assess which sectors are entitled to be exempted from auctioning. The results of the 
EC Carbon Leakage quantitative assessment show that the free assignment of permits 
will remain the dominant allocation criterion for the ETS manufacturing sectors, even 
during the third ETS trading period. Moreover, the analysis conducted by the EC is 
based on data aggregated in a discretionary way, which do not reflect the relevant 
market where ETS sectors compete, thus failing to improve the harmonization within 
the ETS by minimizing any possible market distortion. 
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Chapter 8 -  Summary and Conclusions 
1. The Challenge of the European Climate Policy  
The last decades have experienced an increasing awareness about global warming, its 
causes and potential consequences for the ecosystem in general, and humankind in 
particular. Global warming is currently recognized as one of the most impressive 
negative externalities ever experienced within the western market economy. In light 
of the problematic trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth, 
mitigating climate change without preventing economic development has become one 
of the most significant issues on the European political agenda. With the ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the former EU 15 MS first committed to reduce 8% of 
emissions below the level of 1990 by 2012. In 2007, the European Commission 
published the communication "Limiting Global Climate Change to 2° Celsius: The 
Way Ahead for 2020 and Beyond," where it expressed its firm intention to enforce 
emissions-reduction climate policies even beyond the terms of the Kyoto Protocol. At 
the end of 2008, the European Climate Package, which imposes a unilateral 20% 
emissions cut below the 1990 emissions level by 2020, was finally approved. The real 
challenge of the European climate policy is not so much to reduce the European 
emissions. Such a goal could be easily achieved by lowering the European levels of 
production and consumption. However, this scenario would constitute a failure of the 
European climate policy, rather than a success, since it would be characterized by an 
increase in unemployment rates and by a worsening of the European welfare. 
The real challenge is to promote a gradual switch to a low-carbon economy in which 
emissions can be reduced without compromising European economic growth and 
well-being. This sustainable scenario needs to be supported by the innovation and 
introduction of technologies that are simultaneously efficient and environmentally 
friendly. 
2. The Political and Economic Origins of the Emissions Trading Scheme 
Achieving the EU’s ambitious environmental targets without slowing down European 
economic growth requires adequate economic instruments tailored to induce a cost-
effective reduction of GHG emissions. The European Directive 87/2003/EC has 
established a cap and trade system—the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS)—as the main legal and economic instrument aimed at promoting a reduction of 
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emissions in a cost-effective way. According to the relevant economic literature, both 
taxes and tradable permits constitute an efficient and flexible means to internalize the 
costs of pollution; therefore, it has been questioned why a cap and trade system has 
been preferred to a tax system to facilitate compliance with the Kyoto target. Different 
explanations have been given. 
First, it has been argued that in an international context a cap and trade instrument—
compared to carbon taxes—garners higher political acceptability in the eyes of MS, 
which are not willing to give up their sovereignty in this strategic field. Second, while 
taxes are subjected to the risk of normative and fiscal arbitrage which might cause a 
race to the bottom and thereby limit international cooperation, a cap and trade system 
is more likely to favour and induce international cooperation according to both a top-
down approach (i.e., linking of different cap and trade schemes)  and to a bottom-up 
approach (i.e., voluntary agreements in the form of certified emissions reduction 
contracts—such as the case of clean development mechanisms). 
The general preference for a cap and trade scheme over a tax system, which has been 
already experienced in Europe, has been also explained as the result of the failure of 
European regulation, which has been captured and influenced by private interests. 
While equally efficient, taxes and tradable permits have different redistributive 
effects: a tax system entails a transfer of money from the private to the public sector. 
Imposing a carbon tax (or auctioning allowances) results in firms having to pay not 
only for the emissions they abate but also for the pollution they generate. On the 
contrary, a cap and trade scheme—where allowances are allocated for free (as in the 
ETS)—entails opposite consequences for the public finance, as the potential revenue 
from taxing carbon emissions (or from auctioning allowances) is kept by the private 
parties, which have to pay only for the emissions they reduce. Compared to a tax 
system (and to auctioning), the advantage of grandfathering allowances within a cap 
and trade scheme increases the political acceptability of regulation in the eyes of the 
regulated agents (e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1998; Tietenberg et al., 1999). For this 
reason, a cap and trade scheme has been preferred over a tax system, and 
grandfathering has been adopted as the prevalent method of allocating emission 
allowances (e.g. Revesz and Stavins, 2004). After mentioning the different 
redistributive effects that exist between a tax system and a cap and trade system (of 
grandfathered allowances)—and after highlighting the higher political acceptability of 
the second instrument over the first— it is important to focus on the efficiency 
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properties of the cap and trade scheme. The Law & Economics literature considers a 
cap and trade system, where a limited number of freely tradable polluting property 
rights is generated and assigned to economic agents, an optimal instrument to induce 
efficient emissions reduction. According to the European ETS Directive, the ETS was 
expected to promote emissions reduction in an efficient and cost-effective way by 
reducing the GHG emissions where the marginal abatement costs are lowest (art. 1). 
The European Commission estimated that “the scheme should allow the EU to 
achieve its Kyoto target at a cost of between € 2.9 and € 3.7 billion annually. This is 
less than 0.1% of the EU's GDP. Without the scheme, compliance costs could reach 
up to € 6.8 billion a year” (EC 2004: 6). 
 
3. The Purpose, Scope and Methodology of the Thesis  
In light of the theoretical properties of a cap and trade system, this research has 
analyzed both the legislation that established the ETS and its economic performance 
in order to assess whether the ETS can be considered a cost-effective instrument to 
reduce emissions, as theorized by the relevant literature. A Law and Economics 
approach has been applied. First, the research has questioned whether the ETS has 
been affected by some inefficiencies, and where identified, it has investigated to what 
extent they could be considered a consequence of the underlying legislation (positive 
analysis). When the ETS institutional and legal design has been found to be 
ineffective or distortive, we have analyzed whether the ETS inefficiencies could be 
corrected by improving the European legislation (normative analysis). In this analysis, 
the Kyoto emissions reduction target has been taken as a given; thus, by questioning 
the effectiveness of the EU ETS to reach a given target, no attempt has been made to 
infer conclusions about the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol in general. The positive-
normative approach of this thesis has been developed at two parallel levels of analysis 
upon which both the ETS’ effectiveness and the ETS sectors’ production costs mainly 
depend. First, a macro-level analysis of the ETS has been developed focusing on the 
ETS cap level. The stringency of the cap determines the amount of emissions the ETS 
sectors have to reduce and how much MS rely on this economic flexible mechanism 
to comply with the Kyoto target. A second analysis of the ETS has focused on the 
allocation rule adopted to assign the initial amount of allowances among the ETS 
sectors. The choice between grandfathering and auctioning impacts both the ETS 
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sectors’ costs and competitiveness in the secondary markets. These allocation rules 
have been compared according to both an efficiency and equity perspective. 
4. Analysis of the ETS Cap Stringency to Assess the Effectiveness of the ETS 
In chapter 5 of this thesis we have analysed to what extent MS are effectively relying 
on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments, and we have determined 
whether the emissions reduction burden deriving from the ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol has been divided between ETS and non-ETS sectors in a cost-effective way.  
This research has focused mainly on the ETS cap and on its stringency, where the 
ETS cap indicates the proportion of emissions that the ETS sectors are legally 
required to abate and, consequently, the amount of emissions the non-trading sectors 
have to reduce to comply with Kyoto commitments. A theoretical benchmark has 
been determined to assess the ETS cap stringency and to evaluate if emissions permits 
were over-allocated during the first and second ETS trading periods. According to this 
benchmark, over-allocation occurs when the ETS cap exceeds a theoretical ETS cap 
that would impose an emissions reduction burden on the ETS sectors proportional to 
the share of European emissions they produce.  
This methodology has clarified how the emissions reduction effort has been divided 
between ETS and non-ETS sectors, highlighting to what extent MS have been 
effectively relying on the ETS to comply with their Kyoto commitments. 
The analysis has first demonstrated that over-allocation of allowances  occurred in 
most of the European MS during both the first and second ETS trading periods. Then, 
the causes and consequences of over-allocation have been discussed. First, we have 
seen that the over-allocation of allowances has been favoured by the ETS’ 
decentralized legal procedure where, according to the principle of subsidiarity,  MS 
were delegated the duty to design for each trading period a NAP to specify both how 
many permits would be assigned at a national level and how they would be distributed 
among national ETS sectors and installations. Given the lack of clear allocation 
criteria (Annex III of the Directive) and the lack of historical data on ETS emissions, 
MS ended up over-allocating allowances by setting national caps which were not 
equally proportional either to their national target or to the national percentage of 
emissions produced by the ETS sector.  
Five years after the first ETS Directive, also the EC has recognized that delegating to 
MS the duty of setting national ETS caps has created a sort of  prisoner’s dilemma 
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where “each individual MS recognises the collective interest to set restrictive caps for 
optimal reduction of emissions in the EU, but also has an interest to maximise the 
national cap” [SEC (2008) 52, 90].   
According to the political economic approach to the theory of regulation, it is possible 
to infer that national regulators have been captured by the private interests of the 
regulated agents, who have succeeded in receiving a generous amount of permits, 
thereby reducing the impact of the ETS on their costs, but in the mean time 
compromising the effectiveness of the ETS. This is the main consequence of over-
allocation: the CO2 price has fallen toward zero, thus failing to provide any significant 
incentive to reduce emissions. 
Moreover, the methodology and the benchmark chosen to asses the ETS cap 
stringency has highlighted that the ETS, despite being the most important mechanism 
of the EU climate policy, is not sufficient to ensure compliance with the Kyoto target. 
This is because the ETS regulates only part of the EU emissions, and it has to be 
coordinated with the national climate policies aimed at inducing emissions reduction 
in the non-ETS sectors. Indeed, compliance with the Emissions reduction target 
established in the Kyoto Protocol requires that the lower the emissions reduction 
burden imposed on the ETS sectors is (and the higher the ETS cap is), the stricter non-
ETS environmental policies must be, and vice-versa.  
Thus, the other shortcoming of permit over-allocation is that stricter national non-ETS 
policies should have been promoted in order to comply with the Kyoto target, 
entailing a transfer of the emissions reduction effort from trading to non-trading 
sectors—a transfer that is not cost effective. In fact, since the ETS sectors have on 
average lower MACs than non-ETS sectors, they should bear a higher emissions 
reduction burden. Thus, the reduction burden indirectly imposed on non-ETS sectors 
is excessive compared to their abatement potentialities and marginal abatement costs. 
This analysis has shown that the size of over-allocation has differed among MS. As a 
consequence, despite being subjected to the same European regulation, national firms 
and sectors competing in the same European market have borne different emissions 
reduction burdens depending on the MS in which they were located. The distribution 
of different reduction burdens across national ETS sectors has undermined the level 
playing field in the secondary European common market where they compete, causing 
a distortion of competition and creating undesirable economic consequences at the 
expense of an effective EU common market integration. 
194 
 
Moreover, the NAP decentralized procedure has increased uncertainty in the market 
among the ETS installations. In fact, the European ETS cap could be determined only 
ex-post by summing up the different national caps once all the NAPs were definitively 
approved by the EC. NAPs should have been examined and approved by the EC 
fifteen months before the beginning of the subsequent trading period, but during both 
the first and second ETS phases some NAPs were finally approved only some months 
after the beginning of the trading period in questions. As a result, at the time the ETS 
trading periods were officially launched many installations did not know the amount 
of permits they would initially receive, and the level of ETS cap was unknown.  
This long procedure involved substantial information and administrative costs, 
causing price volatility in the ETS and increasing uncertainty among the regulated 
actors, and ultimately deterring them from developing long-term investment strategies 
for a low-carbon economy.      
 
 
5. Analysis of ETS Allocation Rules: Efficiency and Equity  
As stated in Art. 10 of the first ETS Directive, during the first and second trading 
periods respectively at least 95% and 90% of permits were assigned free of charge 
(i.e., through grandfathering). Since auctioning entails higher private costs than 
grandfathering, the adoption of grandfathering has increased the ETS’ political 
acceptability in the eyes of the ETS regulated sectors. However, since the first ETS 
pilot trading period was launched, grandfathering has been criticized on different 
levels. First, it has been blamed for causing undesired redistributive effects: many 
electricity generators could earn windfall profits by passing through to the final 
electricity price the market value of the allowances they initially received for free. 
The general criticism has regarded the unfairness of inducing consumers to pay for 
what producers received for free. Grandfathering has been criticized also regarding 
the issue of efficiency as some claim that it is equivalent to a government subsidy, 
which creates an artificial and undesirable incentive for existing market participants 
not to exit the industry and to keep operating older and less efficient plants (Nash 
2000). Also the European Commission has expressed its  doubts concerning the 
properties of grandfathering by arguing that “full auctioning of allowances scores best 
in increasing the efficiency of the system and taking away undesirable distributional 
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effects” [SEC (2008) 52, 163] and “full auctioning is […] the only option that entirely 
solves efficiency problems” [SEC (2008) 52, 106]. 
This thesis has analysed whether it was correct to classify grandfathering as an 
inefficient allocation rule per se. The main purpose of chapter 6 has been to assess 
whether grandfathering could be considered—in theory and in practice—an efficient 
and fair allocation rule. In order to do this, this chapter has analysed the conditions 
under which this allocation rule is consistent with the polluter-pays principle. The 
basic question is: do polluters pay under grandfathering, or not? First, a taxonomy of 
efficiency and equity interpretations of the polluter-pays principle has been presented. 
Within the efficiency interpretation, a “weak” form of the polluter-pays principle (i.e., 
no subsidization) has been distinguished from its “strong” form (i.e., cost 
internalization). The weak form requires that the government refrains from 
subsidizing pollution control, while the strong form requires that polluters internalize 
the costs of pollution. This means that the strong form subsumes the weak form: both 
versions require that companies internalize pollution costs.  
Contrary to this view, which finds grandfathering inefficient per se, it has been argued 
that, once the opportunity costs of freely assigned allowances are properly taken into 
account, both grandfathering and auctioning are equally efficient in inducing 
emissions reduction, while continuing to have different redistributive effects. Once a 
market for tradable permits where parties can freely bargain their allowances at zero 
transaction costs is in place, an efficient outcome is reached independently of how 
allowances are initially assigned. Moreover, passing the opportunity costs of the 
grandfathered permits to the final market price is economically correct. In fact, 
grandfathered permits can be used to cover the amount of emissions resulting from the 
production activity or, in the case of emissions reduction, they can be sold in the ETS 
at the market price. When the first option is chosen, the opportunity cost of the 
grandfathered allowances is determined by the foregone profit the firm could have 
earned by reducing emissions and selling the surplus of permits at the market price. 
Given these two alternative uses of grandfathered permits, the ETS installations will 
continue to produce and to cover their emissions with the freely assigned allowances 
only if this option is a first best. In other words, ETS installations have to be sure that 
when producing and using their allowances to cover their emissions they can gain a 
profit which is at least as big as the one they could earn by reducing emissions (or 
decreasing production) and selling the exceeding amount of allowances received at no 
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cost. This alternative use of tradable permits explains why it is correct that firms 
internalize the market price of free assigned allowances into their marginal production 
costs, passing it into final prices.  
Internalizing the cost of the emission externality into the price is not only correct but 
effective: as the price increases, polluting products become costlier and less attractive, 
whereas market competition should ensure a progressive switch toward cleaner and 
less expensive products and technologies. In fact, grandfathering permits according to 
historical emissions results in more polluting firms receiving a higher amount of 
permits than less polluting firms; thus the more a firm polluted, the more allowances 
are assigned and the higher the opportunity cost to be internalized and passed through 
to the market price. Thus, after the ETS has been established and allowances have 
been grandfathered, firms producing with polluting plants face a higher marginal cost 
increase than those firms adopting clean technologies.  
When secondary markets are competitive, more polluting firms have to compete at 
higher prices; thus, their competitiveness is worsened and in the long run polluting 
plants tend to be driven out from the market to be substituted by less efficient carbon-
intensive plants. The claim that polluters do not pay under grandfathering can only be 
defended from a fairness perspective. The comparative analysis of auctioning and 
grandfathering has shown that, while both allocation rules are consistent with the 
efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle, only auctioning complies also 
with the “extended” form of the polluter-pays principle, where equity is used as a 
criterion on top of—and not instead of—efficiency.  
While having the same effects in terms of market outcome, the real difference 
between auctioning and grandfathering is redistributive: who pays whom. The former 
solution entails a money transfer from the regulated sectors to the governments. In the 
latter solution, the ETS installations keep the money. Clearly, while private 
companies have a preference for grandfathering, governments intended to switch 
toward auctioning as a default allocation rule for the third ETS trading period. 
Because polluting firms do not have to purchase the emission rights while their 
shareholders become richer, grandfathering may be perceived as unfair from an 
extended polluter-pays perspective. Auctioning ensures the internalization of the 
pollution costs and, in addition, forces polluters to purchase their emission rights.  
Finally, this chapter has analysed whether the theoretical findings concerning the 
efficiency and fairness of grandfathering within the ETS can still be considered valid 
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in light of the lack of ETS cap stringency. By highlighting the inefficiencies that 
emerged at the time of applying this allocation rule in the ETS, the chapter concludes 
by determining some conditions that have to be satisfied to ensure the consistency of 
grandfathering with the efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. 
First, it has been argued that the way grandfathering has been implemented in the ETS 
has created some inefficiencies. In particular, the decision to update (to recent 
emissions levels) the baseline adopted to grandfather allowances to the existing ETS 
installations has created an early action problem with the risk of both postponing 
emissions abatement and giving a distortive incentive to continue operating polluting 
and less efficient plants. It has been argued that grandfathering has been applied non 
homogeneously among MS, limiting the internal harmonization within the ETS and 
causing additional undesired redistributive effects. The lack of a level playing field for 
ETS operators has distorted competition in the European market under Articles 81 and 
82 of the EC Treaty (e.g. Johnston 2006; Weishaar 2007). Moreover, it has been 
found that if allowances are over-allocated, consistency with the weak form of the 
polluter-pays principle is violated independently of the allocation rule. Indeed, the 
cross-subsidization from the non-ETS sectors to the ETS sectors takes place whether 
or not the over-allocated permits have been grandfathered or auctioned. 
To summarize, each allocation rule is effective under the condition that allowances 
are not over-allocated. This implies that the ETS cap has to be set at a stringent level. 
Grandfathering is efficient only if allowances are one-off grandfathered and in the 
absence of any baseline updating process: as long as current behaviour does not affect 
the amount of free allowances to be allocated in future phases, the allowances’ 
opportunity cost will remain unchanged over time and the effectiveness of 
grandfathering is confirmed. Finally, distortions of competition in the secondary 
markets are minimized only if the allocation rules are applied according to 
homogeneous and harmonized criteria. 
 
6. Analysis of the ETS Reform and the Risk of Carbon Leakage 
In 2007, the European Commission declared its firm intention to strengthen the 
European Climate Policy beyond the Kyoto Protocol commitment, and in 2008, the 
EU Climate Package was finally approved. A pillar of the EU Climate Package is the 
new ETS Directive 2009/29, which amends the first ETS Directive 2003/87 and re-
designs the ETS legal framework in order to improve its functioning during the third 
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post-Kyoto trading period (2013-2020). In fact, the experience gathered from the past 
ETS trading periods suggests that the ETS’ effectiveness could be improved on 
different fronts. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis has analyzed the ETS reform, focusing on both the ETS cap 
setting procedure and on the allocation rule. Different conclusions have been reached 
concerning the two different topics of investigation. Regarding the ETS cap setting 
procedure, it is possible to conclude that the new ETS Directive has improved the 
ETS’ effectiveness on different levels. The new centralized procedure for setting a 
EU-wide cap reduces the transaction costs linked to the previous decentralized 
procedure. It improves the harmonization of European regulation among ETS sectors 
that will be subjected to a homogeneous cap determined according to a common 
criterion aimed at imposing on both trading and non-trading sectors an emissions 
reduction burden coherent with their MACs. Moreover, the ex-ante definition of the 
ETS cap from 2013 to 2020 improves the regulation’s transparency and effectiveness, 
thereby increasing the certainty that ETS installations need in order to build up their 
long-term investment strategies.  
Different conclusions have been reached when analysing the reform of the allocation 
rule. Many inconsistencies emerged at the time of defining the new allocation rule, 
which is likely to worsen, rather than improve, harmonization within the ETS. In fact, 
despite the initial intention to shift from grandfathering toward auctioning, the new 
ETS Directive will apply three different allocation rules, granting exemption from 
auctioning to those sectors found to be at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage. First, 
the problem of Carbon Leakage has been introduced and discussed: since CO2 
emissions have been priced, energy intensive installations face a cost increase which 
depends on their direct and indirect emissions (from fuel and electricity consumption). 
ETS sectors claim to have high MACs, limited internal abatement opportunities and  
limited possibilities to pass their increased marginal costs into the final price without 
incurring a significant loss of market share against non-EU competitors not subjected 
to any environmental regulation.  In light of the more stringent and costly Climate 
Package, ETS sectors might be induced to delocalize their production activity and re-
address their investments toward non-EU countries where costly regulations are not in 
place. In the worst-case scenario, ETS installations might be forced to shut down and 
their production replaced by extra-EU competitors as a result. The main effect of the 
European climate policy would be to slow down European economic growth without 
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bringing any environmental benefits since emissions would decrease in Europe, while 
increasing proportionally in the rest of the world. 
We have identified three main causes of the risk of Carbon Leakage. First, the risk of 
Carbon Leakage arises because the EU climate policy imposes three types of costs on 
the regulated sectors: a direct cost deriving from the duty to reduce emissions, which 
increases as the ETS cap is lowered; a second cost deriving from the duty to acquire 
the initial amount of permits in an auction; and, finally, an indirect cost caused by the 
electricity price, which is increased by the cost of the CO2 emissions. The second 
cause of Carbon Leakage is the asymmetric nature of the European Climate Policy. 
Being unilateral, it creates an incentive for normative arbitrage, inducing the regulated 
sectors to move where no stringent regulation is in place. 
Finally, and most importantly, the risk of Carbon Leakage arises mainly from the fact 
that the European Climate policy, and the ETS in particular, is production-based, 
rather than product-based. That is, regulated agents can comply with the EU 
regulation by either buying allowances in the ETS or by reducing internally their 
direct emissions within their production process. However, the ETS fails to give any 
monetary incentive to reduce indirect emissions, that is whenever emissions would be 
reduced in a different economic sector from the one undertaking the abatement 
investment.46 The ETS internalizes the negative externality deriving from direct 
emissions within the production process, while failing to internalize positive 
externality deriving from any emissions abatement outside the production process. 
This shortcoming creates inefficiency whenever reducing direct emissions within the 
production process is more expensive than reducing the same amount of emissions in 
other economic sectors outside the production process. Moreover, because of the 
production-based nature of the EU regulation, compliance with the ETS can be 
ensured just by switching production to outside Europe (i.e., outsourcing 
emissions).Given these different causes of Carbon Leakage, it is possible to conclude 
that the EC decision to grandfather allowances—instead of auctioning them—to those 
sectors that are found to be exposed to Carbon leakage can only partially reduce the 
risk of Carbon Leakage, which is, however, likely to persist. In fact, the more 
stringent ETS cap of the third trading period is anyhow imposing an asymmetric and 
                                                 
46 For instance, if an ETS installation improves its plant’s electricity intensity, total emissions are likely 
to decrease, but the ETS installation emissions gap is not. Equally, if a firm decides to switch from 
wheel to rail transportation, overall emissions are likely to decrease, while the firm’s emissions gap is 
not.    
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costly emissions reduction burden on the European industrial installations. Moreover, 
free assigned allowances have an opportunity cost that installations take into account 
when deciding whether it is more cost-efficient to produce in Europe (using the 
grandfathered permits to cover the related emissions) or to delocalize production and 
sell the exceeding amount of allowances at the market price. Thus, in spite of free 
allocation, the ETS installations might still find it cost-efficient to delocalize their 
plants outside Europe, since they could sell the total amount of allowances they have 
received for free and Carbon Leakage would persist to a certain extent even if permits 
are grandfathered. Deriving from the unilateral and production-based nature of the 
EU climate policy, the risk of Carbon Leakage is likely to persist even if the sectors 
found to be at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage are exempted from auctioning 
Another shortcoming of the EU climate policy concerns the definition of an 
appropriate methodology to determine which ETS sectors should be considered 
effectively at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage, and which not. This thesis has 
verified whether the Carbon Leakage risk assessment methodology adopted in the 
new ETS Directive can be considered economically grounded, or rather politically 
driven. The ex-post analysis of the results of the Carbon Leakage risk assessment 
performed by the EC has shown that, instead of improving the allocation transparency 
and creating higher rules harmonization, the EC has defined highly arbitrary and 
inefficient criteria to assess which sectors are entitled to being exempted from 
auctioning. 
We have shown that the methodology adopted to decide which allocation rule is to be 
applied to the different ETS sectors is quite arbitrary and not sufficiently 
economically grounded. This is because it ends up favouring and protecting the vast 
majority of sectors, which have been exempted from auctioning according to a 
criterion (i.e., separated approach) that fails to consider simultaneously both the 
sectors’ carbon and trade intensities and, therefore, independently of their effective 
risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage. In spite of the EC’s declarations and intentions, 
this research has shown that the free assignment of permits will remain the dominant 
allocation criterion for the ETS manufacturing sectors even during the third ETS 
trading period.  
Moreover, the analysis conducted by the EC is based on data aggregated in a 
discretionary way, which does not reflect the relevant market where ETS sectors 
compete and the basic economic principles of competition policy. As a result, 
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regulation fails to improve harmonization within the ETS by minimizing any possible 
market distortion. 
 
7. Conclusions and Further Research 
Thanks to the ETS, for the first time, CO2 emissions have been priced. This is the first 
practical and international attempt to internalize the negative externality that is at the 
core of global warming— a crucial step required to mitigate climate change. Such an 
attempt constitutes a milestone within the European climate policy. 
Without denying the importance of such a result, this thesis has analysed the legal 
framework of the ETS and its economic performance in order to verify how effective 
this mechanism is in promoting emissions abatement and to determine how much the 
European MS effectively rely on this instrument to comply with their emissions 
reduction targets. Being the first experiment of a cap and trade system in Europe, it 
was plausible to expect that some shortcomings would have emerged within the ETS 
and that its performance could have been improved by correcting the underlying 
legislation. This thesis has first focused on the ETS cap setting procedure and on the 
rule adopted to assign allowances among the regulated sectors designed by the first 
ETS Directive 2003/87. Finally, it has analyzed how these variables have been 
reformed by the second ETS Directive 2009/29 amending the first one.    
We have found that during the ETS first and second trading periods the ETS cap was 
not sufficiently stringent, as MS over-allocated allowances to ETS national sectors: 
national caps set by MS were proportional neither to the national targets nor to the 
ETS share of national emissions. Over-allocation of allowances to the ETS sectors 
implies that part of the emissions reduction burden has been transferred from trading 
to non-trading sectors. This analysis has demonstrated the importance of coordinating 
European and national climate policies: without such an integrated approach, the 
Kyoto and post-Kyoto emissions reduction targets are not likely to be achieved. In 
addition, setting ex-ante an ETS cap, which allocates the emissions reduction burden 
among ETS and non-ETS sectors according to their MACs, is a necessary condition to 
achieve the targets effectively, at the minimal cost. The following comparative 
analysis of grandfathering and auctioning has stressed how these allocation rules, 
while having different distributive impact, have the same impact on the final markets, 
thereby offering comparable incentives to reduce emissions. However, the non-
harmonised way these rules have been applied within the ETS contributed to the 
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distortion of competition in the European internal market. This conclusion has been 
confirmed when analysing the second ETS Directive 2009/29; the Directive has 
defined a new procedure to allocate allowances among ETS sectors according to 
arbitrary and distortionary criteria, which have been more politically than 
economically driven and thus have failed to improve the harmonization of the rules 
within the ETS. Finally, the analysis of the causes of the risk of Carbon Leakage, of 
the methodology to assess it and the measures defined to prevent it, has highlighted 
the major shortcomings of the European climate policy.  
The risk of Carbon Leakage arises mainly from the fact that the European climate 
policy is unilateral (i.e., there are no symmetric climate policies outside Europe) and it 
is production based, rather than consumption based. That is, the ETS regulates the 
emissions linked to the production of a good (i.e., production emissions), rather than 
the emissions linked to the final consumption of that good (i.e., product emissions). 
Being production based, the ETS installations can comply with the European 
regulation just by switching the European production activity where no costly 
regulation is in place. This is to say that the main effect of a unilateral and costly 
European climate policy could be to outsource both European production and 
emissions, with  detrimental effects on European economic growth. A unilateral 
European climate policy that imposes substantial asymmetric costs on the European 
agents risks not only being economically inefficient, but also environmentally 
ineffective: emissions risk decreasing in Europe, while increasing proportionally in 
the rest of the world. 
In  light of the causes of the risk of Carbon Leakage, the decision to grandfather 
allowances to those sectors found to be at risk of exposure to Carbon Leakage is not 
likely to prevent such a risk, which arises from the asymmetric and production-based 
nature of the EU climate policy. Rather, its main effect is to lower the harmonization 
of the allocation criteria within the ETS, and as a result to distort market competition. 
The real solution to this risk is not to grant allowances free of charge, but rather to 
reduce the possibility of normative arbitrage by promoting international negotiations 
and to make the whole ETS regulation consumption based. That is, while currently the 
European climate policy and the ETS are limited to regulating the installations, 
focusing on the emissions deriving from the production process, it is necessary to 
develop an integrated climate policy that shifts its focus from the production process 
to the whole product life cycle. This is to say that the ETS has to become more 
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flexible, offering the ETS installations the possibility to comply with the ETS 
regulation not only by acquiring allowances or abating emissions internally in the 
production process, but also by reducing emissions in the other chains of the product 
life cycle (i.e., importation, transportation, distribution, consumption, waste 
recycling), and basically in the non-ETS sectors.  
The first step for increasing the flexibility of the ETS is to determine a linking 
mechanism between ETS and non-ETS sectors. This would give the ETS installations 
the possibility to reduce emissions also in the non-ETS sectors. In this way, new 
abatement opportunities would be generated—with a higher possibility of reducing 
emissions at lower marginal abatement costs—while giving the ETS sectors the 
possibility to participate more actively in the economic mechanisms generated by the 
market-based instruments such as the ETS, which would benefit from its opportunities 
and sustain the related costs. By making such mechanisms more flexible, the 
coordination between the ETS and non-ETS climate policies could be improved, and 
many unregulated sectors of our economic system would be called to consider more 
directly the externalities that they generate. Switching to a consumption-based 
regulation and granting higher flexibility and coordination are the preliminary 
recommendations aimed at improving the economic and environmental effectiveness 
of national and European climate policies. These topics needs to be further analysed 
and developed and might constitute the core of further research. 
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Samenvatting van het proefschrift 
De Europese politieke wil om te komen tot een koolstofarme economie is van positieve invloed 
geweest op het instellen van de Europese regeling voor de emissiehandel (Emissions Trading 
Scheme, ETS): een systeem van emissiehandel dat erop is gericht het verwezenlijken van de Kyoto-
doelstelling op een kosteneffectieve manier mogelijk te maken door in opdracht van de grootste 
Europese vervuilers in de energie- en industriesector efficiënte emissiereductie te stimuleren. 
Dankzij de ETS is er nu voor het eerst een prijskaartje komen te hangen aan de CO2-emissies. Dit is 
de eerste praktische en internationale poging de negatieve externaliteit die de kern vormt van de 
opwarming van de aarde te internaliseren — een cruciale stap die is vereist om klimaatverandering 
terug te dringen. Een dergelijke poging vormt een mijlpaal binnen het Europese klimaatbeleid. 
Zonder het belang van een dergelijk resultaat te ontkennen wordt in dit proefschrift het juridisch 
kader en de prestaties van de ETS geanalyseerd teneinde erachter te komen hoe effectief dit 
mechanisme is bij het promoten van emissievermindering en om te bepalen in welke mate de 
Europese lidstaten (“LS”) zich daadwerkelijk verlaten op dit instrument als het erom gaat aan hun 
doelstellingen voor emissiereductie te voldoen. Omdat het hier ging om het eerste experiment met 
een emissiehandelssysteem in Europa, was het logischerwijs te verwachten dat er binnen de ETS 
enkele tekortkomingen aan de dag zouden komen en dat de prestaties beter konden worden als de 
onderliggende wetgeving werd verbeterd. Dit proefschrift heeft zich eerst gericht op de procedure 
die in de ETS werd gevolgd om het plafond aan emissie-quota (de zogenaamde ‘cap’) te bepalen en 
op de regels die worden gevolgd voor het toewijzen van rechten aan de gereguleerde sectoren, als 
bedoeld in de eerste ETS richtlijn 2003/87. Tot slot wordt in het proefschrift geanalyseerd hoe deze 
variabelen zijn gewijzigd door de tweede ETS richtlijn 2009/29, een wijziging op de eerste. In deze 
analyse wordt de Kyoto-doelstelling ten aanzien van de emissiereductie als gegeven beschouwd; 
door te vragen naar de effectiviteit van de ETS van de Europese Unie (“EU”) om een bepaald doel 
te realiseren wordt dus op geen enkele wijze gepoogd welke conclusies dan ook te trekken 
aangaande het Kyoto-protocol.  
Eerst werd de strengheid van de ETS-cap geëvalueerd, waarbij de ETS-cap het gedeelte aangeeft 
waarmee de ETS-sectoren hun uitstoot wettelijk dienen te verminderen en, vervolgens, de 
hoeveelheid waarmee de niet-handelssectoren hun uitstoot moeten verminderen om aan de Kyoto-
verplichtingen te voldoen. Er is een theoretische benchmark vastgesteld om de strengheid van de 
ETS-cap te bepalen en om te evalueren of er te veel emissierechten werden gealloceerd gedurende 
de eerste en tweede ETS-handelsperiode. Volgens deze benchmark treedt er overallocatie op als de 
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ETS-cap een theoretische ETS-cap overschrijdt die de ETS-sectoren bezwaart met een 
emissiereductie die evenredig is aan het aandeel Europese emissies dat ze produceren. Deze 
methodologie heeft duidelijk gemaakt hoe de pogingen tot emissiereductie zijn verdeeld tussen 
ETS- en niet-ETS-sectoren, en laat goed zien in welke mate de LS effectief hebben vertrouwd op de 
ETS teneinde aan hun Kyoto-verplichtingen te voldoen. De analyse heeft eerst aangetoond dat 
overallocatie van rechten in de meeste van de Europese LS plaatsvond tijdens de eerste en tweede 
ETS-handelsperiode. De door ETS gereguleerde sectoren hebben een grote hoeveelheid rechten 
ontvangen, waarbij ze de invloed van de ETS op hun kosten verminderden, maar tegelijkertijd de 
effectiviteit van de ETS in gevaar brachten. Dit is het belangrijkste gevolg van overallocatie: de 
prijs van CO2 is gezakt naar nul, waardoor elke significante prikkel om emissies te verminderen is 
weggenomen. De methodologie en de benchmark die werd gekozen om de strengheid van de ETS-
cap vast te stellen heeft bovendien duidelijk gemaakt dat de ETS, ondanks dat ze het belangrijkste 
mechanisme vormt van het Europese klimaatbeleid, onvoldoende garanties biedt dat aan de Kyoto-
doelstelling wordt voldaan. Om aan de Kyoto-doelstelling te voldoen, hadden er strengere nationale 
niet-ETS-beleidslijnen moeten worden vastgesteld, inclusief een niet-effectieve overdracht van de 
inspanning tot het verminderen van emissies van handels- naar niet-handelssectoren. Omdat de 
ETS-sectoren gemiddeld lagere MKR-waarden (marginale kostenreductie) hebben dan niet-ETS-
sectoren, zouden ze verplicht moeten worden tot meer emissiereductie. De reductielast die indirect 
op de niet-ETS-sectoren drukt is dus buitensporig in verhouding tot hun verminderingscapaciteiten 
en marginale kosten. Uit deze analyse is ook gebleken dat de omvang van de overallocatie tussen de 
LS varieerde. Ondanks dat ze zijn onderworpen aan dezelfde Europese regelgeving, drukte de 
verplichting tot emissiereductie niet even zwaar op nationale bedrijven en sectoren hoewel ze in 
dezelfde Europese markt concurreren, maar was dit afhankelijk van de LS waarin ze zijn gevestigd. 
De verdeling van verschillende reductielasten over nationale ETS-sectoren heeft het gelijke 
speelveld in de secundaire Europese gemeenschappelijke markt waarin ze concurreren ondermijnd, 
en zo gezorgd voor concurrentievervalsing en ongewenste economische consequenties gecreëerd, 
ten koste van een effectieve integratie van de Europese gemeenschappelijke markt. 
Een tweede deel van dit proefschrift heeft zich gericht op de ETS-allocatieregel voor de toewijzing 
van de emissierechten. De keuze tussen grandfathering en verkoop bij veiling is van invloed op 
zowel de kosten als de concurrentiepositie van de ETS-sectoren in de secundaire markten. 
Grandfathering is onderwerp van kritiek geweest voor wat betreft de factor efficiëntie. Ook de 
Europese commissie redeneerde dat “volledig veilen […] de enige optie is om efficiencyproblemen 
geheel op te lossen” [SEC (2008) 52, 106]. Dit onderzoek analyseerde of het juist was 
grandfathering als zodanig als een inefficiënte allocatieregel te classificeren. Verkoop bij veiling en 
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grandfathering zijn met elkaar vergeleken volgens het principe ‘de vervuiler betaalt’, zowel vanuit 
een efficiëntie- als vanuit een rechtvaardigheidsoogpunt. Er wordt gesteld dat, zodra op een juiste 
manier rekening wordt gehouden met de alternatieve kosten van gratis toegewezen rechten, zowel 
grandfathering als verkoop bij veiling even efficiënt zijn als het gaat om het bewerkstelligen van 
emissiereductie, waarbij ze verschillende herverdelingseffecten zullen blijven houden. Zodra er 
sprake is van een markt voor verhandelbare rechten, waar partijen vrij kunnen onderhandelen over 
hun rechten zonder transactiekosten, is een efficiënte uitkomst gewaarborgd, onafhankelijk van de 
manier waarop rechten in eerste instantie zijn toegewezen. Bovendien is het doorberekenen van de 
alternatieve kosten van de gegrandfatherde rechten in de uiteindelijke marktprijs economisch 
correct. De externe kosten van een emissie internaliseren in de prijs is niet alleen correct, maar ook 
effectief: naarmate de prijs stijgt, worden vervuilende producten duurder en minder aantrekkelijk, 
terwijl marktconcurrentie voor een progressieve omschakeling naar schonere en minder dure 
producten en technologieën zou moeten zorgen. De bewering dat vervuilers bij grandfathering niet 
betalen, kan alleen worden verdedigd vanuit een rechtvaardigheidsperspectief. Uit de vergelijkende 
analyse tussen verkoop bij veiling en grandfathering is gebleken dat, hoewel beide allocatieregels 
consistent zijn met het principe ‘de vervuiler betaalt’ vanuit efficiëntieoogpunt, alleen verkoop bij 
veiling ook voldoet aan de ‘uitgebreidere’ vorm van het principe ‘de vervuiler betaalt’, waarbij 
rechtvaardigheid als criterium wordt gebruikt bovenop (en niet in plaats van) efficiëntie. Hoewel het 
dezelfde effecten heeft als het gaat om marktuitkomsten is het echte verschil tussen verkoop bij 
veiling en grandfathering een kwestie van herverdeling: wie betaalt wie. De eerste oplossing 
impliceert een overdracht van geld van de gereguleerde sectoren naar de overheden. In de tweede 
oplossing behouden de ETS-instellingen het economisch voordeel.  
In het laatste deel van dit proefschrift werd de ETS-herziening geanalyseerd, waarbij vooral is 
gekeken naar de instellingsprocedure van de ETS-cap en naar het allocatiemechanisme waarmee 
ETS-instanties rechten verdelen. Wat betreft de twee verschillende onderzoeksonderwerpen werden 
verschillende conclusies getrokken. Wat betreft de instellingsprocedure van de ETS-cap kan men 
concluderen dat de nieuwe ETS-richtlijn 2009/29/EC die een wijziging vormt op de eerste ETS-
richtlijn, de effectiviteit van de ETS om verschillende redenen heeft verbeterd. De nieuwe centrale 
procedure voor het instellen van een EU-brede cap vermindert de transactiekosten waarmee de 
vroegere decentrale procedure gepaard ging. Ze zorgt voor een betere harmonisatie van de Europese 
regelgeving tussen ETS-sectoren die onderworpen zullen worden aan een homogene cap, die is 
bepaald volgens een gemeenschappelijk criterium, dat erop gericht is zowel de handels- als niet-
handelssectoren een plicht tot emissiereductie op te leggen die overeenkomt met hun marginale 
kosten. Bovendien zorgt de ex ante definitie van de ETS-cap van 2013 tot 2020 voor betere 
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transparantie en effectiviteit van de regelgeving door de prijsvolatiliteit van CO2 te verminderen en 
de zekerheid te vergroten die nodig is om investeringsstrategieën voor de lange termijn te bepalen.  
Bij het analyseren van de herziening van de allocatieregel werden verschillende conclusies 
getrokken. Veel inconsequenties kwamen destijds voort uit het definiëren van de nieuwe 
allocatieregel, die waarschijnlijk de harmonisatie binnen de ETS eerder zal verslechteren dan 
verbeteren. Ondanks de oorspronkelijke intentie om over te stappen van grandfathering naar 
verkoop bij veiling zal de nieuwe ETS-richtlijn in feite drie verschillende allocatieregels toepassen, 
waarbij die sectoren waarvan men geconstateerd heeft dat ze het risico van koolstoflekkage lopen, 
worden vrijgesteld van verkoop bij veiling. Eerst wordt het probleem van koolstoflekkage 
geïntroduceerd en besproken: sinds er een prijskaartje werd gehangen aan CO2-emissies, worden 
energie-intensieve instellingen geconfronteerd met een kostentoename die afhankelijk is van hun 
directe en indirecte emissies (van brandstof- en elektriciteitsverbruik). ETS-sectoren claimen dat ze 
hoge MRK’s hebben, beperkte mogelijkheden tot interne vermindering en beperkte mogelijkheden 
hun marginale kosten door te berekenen in de uiteindelijke prijs, zonder een significant 
marktaandeel te verliezen aan hun niet-Europese concurrenten, die niet onderworpen zijn aan enige 
milieuwetgeving. In het kader van het strengere en duurdere klimaatpakket worden ETS-sectoren er 
misschien toe gedreven hun productieactiviteit naar elders te verhuizen, waarbij ze hun 
investeringen naar niet-Europese landen overbrengen, waar geen dure regelgeving bestaat. In het 
ergste geval worden ETS-instellingen misschien gedwongen te sluiten, waarbij hun productie wordt 
vervangen door concurrenten van buiten de EU. Het belangrijkste effect van het Europese 
klimaatbeleid zou zijn dat de Europese economische groei vertraagt zonder dat er sprake is van enig 
voordeel vanuit milieuoogpunt, omdat de emissies in Europa afnemen, maar evenredig stijgen in de 
rest van de wereld. We hebben de drie voornaamste oorzaken van koolstoflekkage werden 
geïdentificeerd. Op de eerste plaats bestaat er kans op koolstoflekkage omdat het Europese 
klimaatbeleid drie soorten kosten oplegt aan de gereguleerde sectoren: een directe kostenpost, 
voortkomend uit de plicht tot emissievermindering, die stijgt als de ETS-cap wordt verlaagd. Nog 
een kostenpost komt voort uit de verplichting het oorspronkelijke aantal rechten aan te schaffen op 
een veiling, en ten slotte een indirecte kostenpost veroorzaakt door de prijs voor elektriciteit die 
stijgt door de kosten van de CO2-emissies. De tweede oorzaak van koolstoflekkage is de 
asymmetrische aard van het Europese klimaatbeleid. Omdat het unilateraal is, zet het aan tot 
normatieve arbitrage en prikkelt het de gereguleerde sectoren daar naartoe te gaan waar geen 
strenge regelgeving bestaat. Tot slot, en dat is het belangrijkst, komt de kans op koolstoflekkage 
vooral voort uit het feit dat het Europees klimaatbeleid, en vooral de ETS, is gebaseerd op 
productie, in plaats van op product: gereguleerde agenten kunnen voldoen aan de EU-regelgeving 
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door ofwel rechten in de ETS te kopen of intern hun directe emissies te reduceren binnen hun 
productieprocessen. Maar de ETS vergeet enige monetaire prikkel te geven tot het reduceren van 
indirecte emissies, dat wil zeggen telkens wanneer emissies eventueel gereduceerd worden in een 
andere economische sector dan de sector die in vermindering investeert1. De ETS internaliseert de 
negatieve externe kosten die ontstaan uit directe emissies binnen het productieproces, maar vergeet 
positieve externe kosten die ontstaan uit emissievermindering buiten het productieproces te 
internaliseren. Deze tekortkoming zorgt voor inefficiëntie wanneer de reductie van directe emissies 
binnen het productieproces duurder is dan wanneer dezelfde hoeveelheid emissies in andere 
economische sectoren buiten het productieproces wordt gereduceerd. Bovendien kan vanwege de op 
productie gebaseerde aard van de EU-regelgeving naleving van de ETS worden gegarandeerd door 
simpelweg de productie buiten Europa te brengen (outsourcing van emissies). 
Gezien deze verschillende oorzaken voor koolstoflekkage kunnen we concluderen dat het Europese 
besluit om rechten te grandfatheren in plaats van ze bij opbod te verkopen, voor die sectoren 
waarvan men vindt dat ze aan koolstoflekkage blootstaan slechts gedeeltelijk het risico op 
koolstoflekkage kan verkleinen, en dat zal waarschijnlijk wel zo blijven. Op de eerste plaats legt de 
strengere ETS-cap van de derde handelsperiode sowieso een asymmetrische en dure verplichting tot 
emissiereductie op aan de Europese industriële instellingen. Op de tweede plaats kennen gratis 
toegewezen rechten een alternatieve kostenpost waar instellingen rekening mee houden als ze 
besluiten of het handiger is in Europa te produceren (met gebruikmaking van gegrandfatherde 
rechten om de daarmee gepaard gaande emissies af te dekken) dan de productie naar elders te 
verhuizen en de overtollige hoeveelheid rechten te verkopen tegen de marktprijs. Ondank de gratis 
allocatie vinden ETS-instellingen het misschien dus toch handiger hun fabrieken buiten Europa te 
brengen, omdat ze de totale hoeveelheid rechten die ze gratis kregen, kunnen verkopen en de 
koolstoflekkage tot op zekere hoogte zal blijven bestaan, zelfs als rechten worden gegrandfatherd. 
Vanwege de unilaterale en op productie gebaseerde aard van het Europees klimaatbeleid, zal het 
risico van koolstoflekkage waarschijnlijk blijven bestaan, zelfs als de sectoren, waarvan men 
geconstateerd heeft dat ze blootgesteld zijn aan het risico van koolstoflekkage, worden uitgesloten 
van verkoop bij veiling. 
Een andere tekortkoming van het Europees klimaatbeleid betreft de definitie van een adequate 
methodologie om te bepalen welke ETS-sectoren effectief moeten worden beschermd tegen de kans 
op blootstelling aan koolstoflekkage en welke niet. In dit proefschrift is nagegaan of de 
1 Als een ETS-instelling bijvoorbeeld de elektriciteitsintensiteit van haar fabriek verbetert, zullen de totale emissies 
waarschijnlijk afnemen, maar de emissiekloof van de ETS-instelling niet. Hetzelfde geldt als een bedrijf besluit over te 
schakelen van weg- naar spoortransport: de totale emissies nemen waarschijnlijk af, maar de emissiekloof van het 
bedrijf niet.  
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methodologie die in de nieuwe ETS-richtlijn werd toegepast om het risico op koolstoflekkage vast 
te stellen kan worden beschouwd als economisch gefundeerd, of veeleer als politiek gemotiveerd. 
De ex-post analyse van de resultaten van de risicobepaling van koolstoflekkage, die werd 
uitgevoerd door de EC, heeft uitgewezen dat de EC, in plaats van de allocatietransparantie te 
verbeteren en een grotere harmonisatie in regelgeving toe te staan, zeer arbitraire en inefficiënte 
criteria heeft vastgelegd om te bepalen welke sectoren het recht hebben te worden vrijgesteld van 
verkoop bij veiling. We hebben laten zien dat de methodologie die werd aangenomen om te 
besluiten welke allocatieregel moet worden toegepast nogal arbitrair is en geen voldoende 
economische onderbouwing kent, omdat het uiteindelijk het leeuwendeel van de sectoren 
bevoordeelt en beschermt, die zijn vrijgesteld van verkoop bij veiling volgens een criterium 
(afzonderlijke benadering) dat niet tegelijkertijd rekening houdt met zowel de koolstof- als 
handelsintensiteit van de sectoren, en derhalve op onafhankelijke wijze hun effectieve blootstelling 
aan het risico van koolstoflekkage. Ondanks de verklaringen en intenties van de EC heeft het 
proefschrift uitgewezen dat vrije verstrekking van rechten het overheersende allocatiecriterium zal 
blijven voor de ETS-productiesectoren, zelfs tijdens de derde ETS-handelsperiode. Wil men echter 
echt een oplossing bieden voor het risico van koolstoflekkage, dan moet men stoppen met het gratis 
toewijzen van rechten, en in plaats daarvan de hele ETS-regelgeving baseren op het verbruik, en 
een geïntegreerd klimaatbeleid ontwikkelen waarbij de focus verschuift van het productieproces 
naar de hele levenscyclus van het product. Dat wil zeggen dat de ETS flexibeler dient te worden, en 
de ETS-instellingen de mogelijkheid moet worden gegeven te voldoen aan de ETS-regelgeving, 
waarbij ze niet alleen rechten verwerven of intern in het productieproces emissies verminderen, 
maar waarbij ze ook emissies reduceren in de andere ketens van de levenscyclus van het product 
(import, transport, distributie, verbruik, hergebruik), met name in de niet-ETS-sectoren.  
Gelet op deze onvolkomenheden vormen de overschakeling op een op consumptie gebaseerde 
regelgeving en het toestaan van een grotere flexibiliteit en coördinatie tussen een Europees ETS- en 
nationaal niet-ETS-klimaatbeleid de voorlopige aanbevelingen, gericht op het verbeteren van hun 
effectiviteit in termen van economie en milieu. 
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